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Abstract
In the early period of the telecommunications sector liberalization begun in 
1999, market structure reform has made incumbents bigger, stronger and 
more powerful. Growing market dominance by several operators guarded by 
ineffective regulations may put some relatively competitive markets such as 
internet and mobile cellular services at risk. Dominant operators may have 
incentive to abuse their power to soften market competition.
This research analyzes pricing behaviors of dominant operators in Indonesia. 
It focuses on two cases representing two different access structures namely 
one-way access and two-way access. One-way access is a condition where 
there is a vertically integrated operator owns a bottleneck facility in an 
upstream market and competes in a downstream market against rivals which 
need access to its upstream facility. In contrast, two-way access structure is a 
situation where two or more operators need access to each other's networks. 
Since this case-study is based on general economic principles, with some 
suitable adjustments, the analyses developed here could be applied to similar 
problems in different countries or different market sectors.
The first case is about competition in a one-way access structure. It analyses 
possible exclusionary behavior by Telkomnet, a vertically integrated 
operator, in its significant discount program for dial-up internet service 
between 2006 and 2007. There has been some concern by regulators about 
this case, but there was no in-depth investigation. This research shows that 
Telkomnet's discount is not profit maximizing in the short run, as indicated 
by its inelastic demand. However, since the discount has an economically 
insignificant effect on the overall traffic of the competitors as indicated by
iii
small cross-price elasticity estimate, it is not necessarily a predatory conduct. 
Still, in a dynamic game context, Telkomnet's low but non-profit maximizing 
price may demonstrate a strategy to threaten competitors or to persuade the 
regulator to relax regulation in this market. For that reason, the regulator 
should still be aware of Telkom's behavior and should find a way to promote 
technology that can relax dependency on the local telephone network.
The second case-study analyses the mobile cellular telephone industry, 
which has a two-way access structure. This research analyses possible 
collusive pricing by dominant operators in this sector. The Competition 
Commission completed an investigation related to this case in late 2007 but 
the findings were opposed by some experts due to unconvincing analysis. 
Analysis in this thesis reveals that prices of dominant mobile operators are 
well above their profit maximizing or non-cooperative level, which is 
consistent with collusive outcome. Price regulation that set a high ceiling 
level and partial cross-ownership are two factors that may facilitate this 
outcome. In order to enhance competition, it may be useful to reduce the 
regulatory price ceiling and floor. Nevertheless, regulators should still 
continuously monitor and analyze pricing behavior in emerging competitive 
market like mobile cellular market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The structure of the telecommunications market has experienced some 
significant changes during the early period of second phase of 
telecommunication liberalization started in 1999. The market structure 
reform enables dominant operators to expand their business in various 
market segments that make them bigger and more dominant. Their 
advantages as the first movers in the sector may explain this achievement. 
However, the chance for the incumbents to exercise their power to soften 
competition may also contribute to this outcome as the market was still ruled 
by regulations that gave preferences to monopolistic incumbents.
This research analyzes competition in the Indonesian telecommunications 
market with focus on observing whether dominant operators' pricing 
indicate an anticompetitive behavior. It examines two cases related to pricing 
strategies of the operators in relatively competitive markets: Internet service 
and mobile cellular service. Anticompetitive concern about these two cases 
emerged between 2006 and 2007. The research provides an economic 
alternative analysis for these cases, based on new data sources, and lessons 
from the findings for policy consideration.
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This introduction chapter presents several brief discussions related to the 
research including background, literature review, objective, methodology, 
and structure of the thesis.
1.1. Background
Enactment of the new telecommunications law number 36 in 1999 (Law 
36/1999) started a new era of the Indonesian telecommunications market.
This milestone is considered as the second phase of liberalization following 
the previous decade of partial deregulation phase (Lumanto and Kosuge 
2005; Lee and Findlay 2005). The new law was intended to eliminate 
monopolistic practice in most segments of the telecommunications market. In 
addition, in the same year, law number 5 (Law 5/1999) concerning 
prohibition of monopolistic and unfair business practice was introduced.
Both laws create key regulatory umbrellas to support the competitive 
market, protect public interest and improve economic efficiency.
In the early period of liberalization, the market structure experienced 
considerable changes especially in fixed-network services. For example, in 
2002 the government decided to transform the monopolistic market into a 
duopolistic structure by preparing two complement incumbents, Telkom and 
Indosat, as competing vertically integrated operators. This duopoly policy 
eliminates cross ownership of both operators in some telecommunications 
companies. Furthermore, structural reform also affects market segments that 
had been relatively competitive. For example, Telkom and Indosat were 
allowed to enter the competitive retail Internet service market, which was 
previously dominated by small operators and allocated for young
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entrepreneurs. This entrance creates unbalanced competition between 
vertically integrated and independent operators. Furthermore, in the mobile 
cellular market, acquisition of Satelindo by Indosat has reduced the number 
of competing operators from four to three, increasing market concentration. 
Moreover, ownership restructuring in mobile cellular operators also 
produced a potential anticompetitive effect when two different but related 
Singaporean companies partially held shares in two major mobile cellular 
operators, Telkomsel and Indosat.
In contrast, regulatory reform especially related to price regulations 
progressed relatively slowly. In fact, the government reviewed price 
regulation from 2001. However, after long regulatory processes, the new 
pricing regime was finally finished in 2006 and became effective in 2008. 
Therefore, during the early period of liberalization (between 1999 and 2007), 
telecommunications operators in Indonesia still referred to past price 
regulations for their pricing policy. These legacy regulations were designed 
in the monopolistic era that tended to favor dominant incumbents.
In short, structural reform strengthens the position of the incumbents in the 
market. A concentrated market dominated by few operators may put 
competition at risk, especially if regulations controlling the market do not 
effectively work. In this condition, dominant operators may have a chance to 
abuse their market power to lower competitive pressure at the expense of 
consumers and rivals.
This research analyzes possible anticompetitive behaviors by dominant 
operators in these telecommunications sectors, focusing on two 
anticompetitive concerns that recently emerged. The first case deals with a
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significant discount offered by Telkomnet, a vertically integrated operator, 
for a bundled product of standard telephone service and dial-up Internet 
service between 2006 and 2007. This case has never been investigated 
thoroughly even though there have been some discussions about it. The 
second case examines allegation of collusive pricing in the mobile cellular 
market. The Competition Commission (KPPU) has completed investigation 
of this case, but some of its essential economic analyses have been criticized 
as unconvincing. The paragraphs below briefly describe these cases.
Competition in Dial-up Internet Service
Dial-up Internet service is a method to access Internet by connecting the 
computer of Internet users and the server of the Internet service provider 
(ISP) through a fixed telephone network. Consequently, in this case, local 
telephone and Internet services are complementary. In the Indonesian case, 
Telkom as an incumbent fixed-network provider dominates fixed telephone 
access. For that reason, the local telephone service is an essential or 
bottleneck product for dial-up Internet service offered by the ISPs. 
Subscribers of independent ISPs need local telephone service to access their 
Internet service.
In the mid- to late 1990s, the market for dial-up Internet service was 
relatively competitive with several independent ISPs competing for 
subscribers. The situation changed when Telkom entered the dial-up Internet 
service market in early 2000 through its subsidiary Telkomnet. In this case, 
dial-up Internet provision provided by Telkomnet is considered as a 
vertically integrated operation. Telkomnet only sells its dial-up Internet 
service (competitive product) in a bundle with local telephone service
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(essential product). Telkomnet's Internet bundle offers a flexible subscription 
scheme with no prior registration, no monthly fee, and integrated Internet 
and telephone bill. In later development, Telkomnet has been able to be the 
most preferred dial-up Internet service and successfully attract Internet 
users.
Independent ISPs as competitors argued in 2003 that competition from 
Telkomnet is unbalanced. They claimed that these flexibilities offered by 
Telkomnet are unfair and they filed a formal complain to KPPU. However, 
the argument is relatively weak. Since the regular price of Telkomnet's 
Internet bundle is still relatively high if compared to its competitors and 
Telkomnet's flexibilities come from its initial advantage as a network 
provider, anticompetitive allegation is not appropriate.
A stronger anticompetitive concern arose when Telkomnet launched the 
WeekendNet promotion program in 2006. The program provides significant 
discount for weekend usage that makes the price of the bundle after discount 
is close enough to the price of local telephone service. It implies that 
Telkomnet may charge its dial-up Internet service at a very low level. 
Furthermore, the duration of the promotion is sufficiently long to justify 
concern. It was initially only for 3 months but then extended for another 6 
and 3 months. In total, the program lasted for more than a year between 2006 
and 2007. For that reason, Telkomnet's long promotion discount strategy 
leads to a question about possible below-cost pricing or cross-subsidy 
practice that gives predatory effect to independent ISPs as competitors.
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Competition in Mobile Cellular Service
In Indonesia, there are three operators with GSM (global system for mobile) 
technology dominating the market: Telkomsel, Indosat-Satelindo, and 
Excelcomindo. These three operators enjoy their dominance and the market 
was relatively stable in terms of price competition.
In late 2006, FSP-BUMN, a non-governmental organization, filed a claim 
about price-fixing allegation indicated by parallel pricing of postpaid plans 
offered by two major operators, Telkomsel and Indosat. FSP-BUMN argued 
that cross-ownership structure facilitated this collusive outcome. At that 
time, two different Singaporean companies partially owned Telkomsel and 
Indosat. Sing-Tel had 35 percent shares in Telkomsel and Singapore 
Technologies Telemedia (STT) held more than 41 percent shares in Indosat. 
Furthermore, people believe that Temasek Holding Company controls these 
two Singaporean companies.
The Competition Commission (KPPU) investigated the case and in late 2007 
announced its finding. KPPU concluded that partial cross-ownership has 
breached the law and ordered any of these Singaporean companies to divest 
its shares either in Telkomsel or Indosat. However, some economists 
opposed the decision because the economic analysis was inadequate.
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1.2. The Literature
Interconnection is important in the network industry. It acts as an 
intermediate service that allows an operator to access other operators' 
networks in order to deliver a complete service. In telecommunications, 
interconnection may improve efficiency because it prevents unnecessary 
network duplication and may increase users' utility because it provides 
additional subscribers that can be connected (Armstrong 1997:66). In a 
competitive telecommunications market, interconnection also shapes market 
competition. An operator with large network may have an opportunity to 
abuse its power in interconnection service to soften market competition. The 
structure of network interconnection may shape anticompetitive behavior by 
the operators.
In general, there are two types of access model in telecommunications 
networks, one-way access and two-way access (Armstrong 1998:1). One-way 
access is the condition when there is a vertically integrated operator owning 
a bottleneck facility in an upstream market who competes with rivals in a 
downstream market. In this case, the rivals require access to the upstream 
essential facility owned by the vertically integrated operator. In this access 
structure, the competing operators are in an unbalanced situation. Thus, the 
vertically integrated operator dominating an essential access facility may 
have incentive to exclude downstream rivals. The dial-up Internet service 
market is an example of competition in the market with a one-way access 
structure.
7
Two or more operators are in two-way access structure if they need access to 
each other's network to be able to deliver a complete service. In this 
structure, operators are in a relatively equal position. Therefore, they may be 
motivated to collude in order to maximize joint profit. The mobile cellular 
market is an example of a market with two-way access structure.
A brief descriptions of the discussions in literature about operators' 
behaviors in on-way and two-way access structures is presented in the 
following paragraphs.
Exclusionary Behavior in One-way Access
In one-way access structure, a vertically integrated operator possesses 
monopolistic power over essential upstream facilities required by its 
competitors in the downstream market. Several papers in one-way access 
pricing indicate that the vertically integrated operator may have incentive to 
exclude its downstream rivals. The asymmetric structure of one-way access 
gives the vertically integrated operator a chance to abuse its power by 
discriminating between access service to its subsidiary and to its rivals. In 
general, there are two discriminatory strategies in one-way access including 
non-price discrimination or sabotage, and access-price discrimination 
(Weisman 2001).
Non-price discrimination or sabotage is a practice by a vertically integrated 
operator to provide different access service treatment to its subsidiary and 
rivals. It is usually exercised if price regulation is strict, especially when 
access price discrimination between subsidiary and rivals is unlikely to be 
implemented explicitly as well as implicitly. The purpose of sabotage is
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usually to raise rivals' cost. There are several strategies to realize sabotage 
such as quality degradation, tying, bundling, refusal to deal, and boycott.
Due to the rise in costs, the prices of rivals become relatively high and less 
competitive. This condition would decrease rivals' demand and, at the 
extreme, force rivals out of the market.
However, some papers also argue that sabotage is not necessarily 
implemented even though the vertically integrated operator has a chance to 
do so, especially if access price is sufficiently above cost (Weisman 1995; 
Sibley and Weisman 1998a and 1998b; Mandy 2000). The reason is that 
downstream rivals are revenue generators for the upstream division and 
eliminating them from the market would give adverse impact to the overall 
profit of the vertically integrated operator. In general, non-price 
discrimination strategies are harmful because it may soften market 
competition and raise retail price. Therefore, if the integrated operator 
exercises a sabotage strategy, it actually performs an anticompetitive 
conduct.
Access price discrimination is a practice by an integrated operator to set 
different access charges to its subsidiary and to its rivals. This practice is 
only possible if regulation is not severe. The regulator or competition 
commission usually prohibits explicit or naked price discrimination. 
However, the integrated operator may carry out implicit access price 
discrimination through several strategies such as access discount or bundling 
essential and competitive products. Because of price discrimination, a 
subsidiary of the integrated operator is able to offer lower prices. Thus, it 
may produce a predatory effect toward downstream rivals.
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Similarly, a vertically integrated operator may be less motivated to 
discriminate against rivals if access price is set sufficiently above cost 
(Biglaiser and DeGraba 2001; Fjell and Foros 2008). However, implementing 
access price discrimination is not necessarily for excluding rivals but may be 
for maximizing profit (King 1999; Krouse and Krouse 2005; Fjell and Foros 
2008). The logic is that low price would increase demand for its downstream 
subsidiary, which in turn escalates overall profit. For that reason, if the 
vertically integrated operator implements a price discrimination strategy, it 
is not always anticompetitive.
Consequently, bundling as one strategy to realize access-price discrimination 
is not always anticompetitive. A practice that bundles monopolistic and 
competitive products by a vertically integrated operator in a one-way access 
structure may indicate an anticompetitive behavior if the price of the bundle 
is significantly lower than the sum of the price of the elements in the bundle 
(Gans and King 2005). Flowever, a bundling still needs a more thorough 
investigation before determining it as anticompetitive.
Collusive Behavior in Two-way Access
Two-way access structure is a condition where the competing operators need 
access to rivals' networks. In case where the operators are relatively 
symmetric, they have relatively equal bargaining position. For that reason, 
operators need to co-operate with each other. If there are only a few 
operators in the market, this mutual interest may give operators the chance 
to collude to maximize their joint profits (Motta 2004). An indirect way to 
achieve collusive equilibrium in retail price is by negotiating access price.
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Alternatively, mutual understanding or conspiracy is a direct method to 
reach collusive outcome in retail price.
Literature on two-way access pricing mostly concerns possible use of access 
price as an instrument to produce collusive outcome in retail price. These 
papers also indicate that constraints in retail pricing also affect the power of 
access price to create collusive outcome. These constraints include whether 
retail price is linear (only consists of usage fee) or non-linear (consists of 
multiple fees such as monthly subscription and usage fees) and whether it 
should be uniform or can be discriminated based on call termination (intra­
networks or inter-networks calls). Negotiated access price has a strong 
collusive effect if retail pricing is linear and non-discriminated (Armstrong 
1998; Laffont et al. 1998a). In the case where retail pricing is non-linear and 
non-discriminated, with some strong assumptions, the power of an access 
price to produce a collusive outcome diminishes (Laffont et al. 1998a; Dessein 
2003; Hahn 2004).
In the mobile cellular service market, the more realistic assumption is that 
retail prices may be discriminated based on call termination. In the case 
where retail pricing is non-linear and discriminated, such as in a post-paid 
plan, an access price is not able to create collusive outcome if it is set at cost 
(Laffont et al. 1998b). However, if the access price is set above cost it may 
induce collusive effect in retail price (Gabrielsen and Vagstad 2008). 
Furthermore, a below-cost access price would also produce a collusive 
outcome in subscription fees (Gans and King 2000). In addition, if the call 
externality is taken into account, that is, the subscriber also gets positive 
utility from receiving a call, non-cooperative pricing for off-net (inter-
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networks) calls is higher than on-net (intra-network) calls (Berger 2005; 
Hoemig 2007).
In the case where retail pricing is linear and discriminated such as in a pre­
paid plan, above cost access price would lead to partial collusive outcome 
especially in off-net price (Laffont 1998b). However, if the call externality is 
considered, a collusive effect of access price in off-net price would only be 
generated if utility from receiving a call is quite high (Berger 2004). In 
addition, the literature also concludes that non-cooperative on-net price is 
always lower than off-net price regardless of call externality (Hoernig 2007; 
Cricelli et al. 2005).
Termination-based price discrimination induces competition in retail price 
(Laffont and Tirole 2000). To attract subscribers, operators tend to keep a 
high off-net price and set a low on-net price. As indicated in the literature, 
the on-net and off-net price differential is an optimal condition for each 
operator. Therefore, if an operator set its on-net price at similar or close to its 
off-net price, it implies that the price may not maximize its individual profit. 
Furthermore, if two or more competing operators behave similarly, it may 
indicate a possible collusive behavior among the competing operators to 
maximize joint profit.
Moreover, several factors such as structural or regulatory aspects may 
facilitate collusive conduct. Small numbers of operators and cross ownership 
are among two structural aspects that may encourage collusive outcome. 
Duopolistic structure in German and the UK's mobile telephony market has 
enabled tacit collusion between the competing operators (Stoetzer and Tewes
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1996; Valleti and Cave 1998). In addition, passive partial cross-ownership of 
the competing firms may also facilitate collusion (Gilo et al. 2006:82).
In the case of regulatory aspects, most pricing regulation such as price ceiling 
and price filing may also promote collusion. Hausman (2000) blames price 
regulation as a supporting factor behind high prices in US mobile telephony 
in the past. Knittel and Stango (2003) find that non-binding price ceiling was 
used as a focal point to set interest rate in the credit card industry in the US. 
Moreover, Ma (2007:13) also finds that relatively high non-binding price 
ceiling regulation in Taiwan's flour market has facilitated collusive outcome. 
Furthermore, MacAvoy (1995) and Choi et al. (2001:131) conclude that a 
requirement to submit price change plan to the regulator has caused lack of 
price competition in US long distance service and the Korean mobile 
telephony market respectively.
In short, collusive outcome is easier to achieve in a market with two-way 
access structure such as in mobile cellular, especially if there are only a few 
competing operators and ineffective regulations.
1.3. Research Objectives
As discussed above, during the early period of second phase liberalization, 
the telecommunications market structure in Indonesian experienced several 
changes that made dominant incumbents bigger and stronger. In contrast, 
regulatory reform especially related to price regulations progressed slowly. 
This condition may provide chances for the dominant operators to exercise 
power at the expense of rivals and consumers.
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This research examines whether dominant operators in the Indonesian 
telecommunications market behaved anti-competitively during that period.
It focuses on pricing behavior of the dominant operators and takes two 
anticompetitive pricing cases in Internet and mobile cellular services that 
emerged between 2006 and 2007. These cases also represent operators' 
pricing behaviors in two different access models, one-way access and two- 
way access. Moreover, these cases deal with two major anticompetitive 
behaviors, exclusionary and collusion.
Formally, the research is to answer the following questions:
-  Did pricing strategies of dominant operators in two cases of Internet and mobile 
cellular market indicate anticompetitive behaviors?
- What lessons do these experiences have for policy and regulatory consideration?
The first question about operators' behaviors is the main topic of this 
research. Concluding whether a strategy is an anticompetitive behavior is not 
an easy task. Inappropriate analysis would lead to a decision error, either 
punishing an innocent party (type 1 or positive error) or failing to detect 
anticompetitive behavior (type II or negative error). Inappropriate decision 
due to inaccurate analysis would disadvantage market competition and 
consumers, in ways such as less available options or high prices for the 
services. A more thorough analysis and careful consideration may minimize 
mistakes.
In answering the first question, this research uses a standard principle in 
microeconomic theory. The purpose of this analysis is to provide alternative 
views or alternative analysis related to the selected cases by using different 
approaches. It is also of a general interest since the methods in the analysis
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could be modified to analyze other cases with similar conditions in order to 
provide regulators or competition commissions with an alternative approach 
to analyze firms' behavior for case investigation and monitoring purposes.
Furthermore, as a response to the second question, this research briefly 
elaborates some policy implications by relating the findings of the first 
question with related regulatory conditions. The purpose of this discussion is 
to give an alternative opinion to be considered for further policy and 
regulatory improvement.
In addition to these purposes mentioned above, this research also contributes 
to the studies on telecommunications competition in Indonesia. Currently, 
there are only few studies dealing with behaviors of telecommunications 
operators in Indonesia.
1.4. Methodology and Analysis
In microeconomic theory, it is widely accepted that a firm as an economic 
agent has a main objective - to maximize its profit (Tirole 1998; Nicholson 
1998). In this case, a firm can set its endogenous factors that affect profit such 
as quantity of production, inputs combination, or price. This research also 
employs the profit-maximizing assumption to predict operators' behaviors 
by focusing on price as an endogenous factor.
It is assumed that an operator sets price at a level that can maximize its 
individual profit. Therefore, any deviation from the profit-maximizing 
objective is questionable and may indicate a possible anticompetitive motive.
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Furthermore, in order to identify the level of price that maximizes profit, two 
profit function models representing each case are developed. The models are 
constructed by relating profit as dependent variable with relevant dependent 
variables including cost, price, and quantity. Profit maximizing or non- 
cooperative price is calculated by partially differentiating profit function 
with respect to price, assuming other independent variables constant. The 
paragraphs below explain in more detail the methods and analyses for each 
case.
The First Case -  Predatory Effect of Bundling in Dial-up Internet Service
In the case of competition in the dial-up Internet service market, the main 
issue is that Telkomnet as a vertically integrated operator offered significant 
discount to its dial-up Internet bundle. The bundle consists of telephone 
service as a monopolistic upstream product and Internet service as a 
competitive downstream product. Thus, the main concern is to see whether 
significant discount on dial-up internet bundle may indicate an exclusionary 
behavior.
Most common approaches to identify anticompetitive bundling case are 
imputation and the exclusionary bundling test. These tests are similar and 
mainly examine implied-price of an unbundled component in the bundle. If 
the implied-price is below cost, it may indicate an exclusionary bundling 
(Nalebuff 2005). Furthermore, in this case, since the bundling also gives 
predatory effect to rivals, the case can also be analyzed based on predatory 
pricing approaches. A usual test in most predatory pricing cases is the cost- 
based approach. If price is below cost, it may assume a predatory behavior
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(Gelhorn and Kovacic 1994). Both approaches in bundling and predatory 
pricing seem similar and heavily depend on accurate cost information.
By applying the cost-based test to Telkomnet's case, the result shows that the 
implied price of Telkomnet's Internet service in the bundle is quite low. 
However, since there is no accurate information about cost of per unit 
Internet service, we cannot precisely compare calculated implied price to 
actual cost. In addition, the cost-based test might not appropriate for 
telecommunication service because it is difficult to define cost in an industry 
with high fixed cost that produces multiple products.
Alternatively, we can apply the profit sacrifice of predatory pricing concept 
proposed by Ordover and Willig (1981). They argue that predatory behavior 
is not necessarily below cost pricing but includes any profit sacrifice strategy 
that is harmful for competitors. In this research, profit sacrifice shows by any 
pricing strategies that do not maximize profit. In order to check whether 
Telkomnet's Internet bundle price is profit maximizing, we develop a simple 
model representing an integrated operator competing with a competitor in 
the downstream market. The model shows that if demand is elastic, the 
optimal price of the bundle is determined by cost of the bundle, traffic from 
the bundling product, traffic from competitors, and profit margin of the local 
telephone service. Furthermore, if the demand is inelastic, any reduction in 
the price of the bundle will lower profit or will not be profit maximizing. The 
reason is that because the additional revenue it gets from traffic increase 
cannot offset the revenue it sacrifices from lowering price.
Based on simple linear regression analysis on the actual daily traffic data of 
Telkomnet during the period of discount (2006-2007), we find that
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Telkomnet's demand is inelastic. This result implies that the discount of 
Telkomnet's dial-up Internet service is not profit maximizing in the short 
run. In other word, Telkomnet gives up its profit through its discount 
program. However, profit sacrifice itself is not a sufficient condition to 
indicate a predatory behavior until there is evidence of damage to rivals. In 
this case, we use cross-price elasticity estimate as an indicator for injury of 
rivals. This cross-price elasticity measures the effect of Telkomnet's price 
change on rivals' traffic. Furthermore, by using another simple linear 
regression on actual traffic data of the ISPs, we see that the cross-price 
elasticity estimate is sufficiently small. It means that Telkomnet's discount 
program does not give significant effect to rivals' traffic. In short, this static 
analysis shows that even though Telkomnet's discount on its dial-up Internet 
bundle is not profit maximizing, this pricing strategy is not predatory pricing 
because there is no evidence of destruction to rivals.
However, the dynamic game concept may give a different analysis.
Referring to recent theory of predatory pricing, low price and non-profit 
maximizing behavior may indicate a strategy by the dominant operator to 
threaten competitors. Furthermore, based on contestable market theory, by 
price discount, Telkomnet is persuading regulator that the market is 
competitive and does not require regulatory intervention.
For that reason, even though the significant discount of Telkomnet is not 
anticompetitive in the static sense, the regulator still needs to be concerned 
about competition in this market. In addition, there are several lessons that 
can be learnt from this case. Firstly, the regulator or competition authority 
still needs to continuously monitor the market with an unbalanced structure, 
such as one-way access structure. Improper monitoring of this kind of
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market would increase the incentive for a vertically integrated operator to 
behave anti-competitively.
Secondly, the significant discount of dial-up Internet service offered by 
Telkomnet may indicate that the regulated price of upstream local telephone 
service is sufficiently above cost and profitable. It also may contradict the 
common assumption that the regulated local telephone tariff is still below 
cost. Therefore, the regulator should take extra consideration over any 
proposals requiring a tariff increase for the local telephone service.
Lastly, the regulator should relax the dependency of Internet service on the 
local telephone service by allowing and encouraging alternative technology 
that can bypass the bottleneck with a lower price. Eliminating bottleneck 
would reduce the regulatory and monitoring burden and increase 
competition.
The Second Case -  Collusive Behavior in Mobile Cellular Service
In the case of mobile cellular competition, the main issue is possible collusive 
pricing of dominant operators especially between the two biggest operators, 
Telkomsel and Indosat. Furthermore, a foreign holding company partially 
cross-owned these operators. The Competition Commission (KPPU) has 
investigated this case, covering several analyses including retail tariff 
pattern, market share and concentration, relationship between cross­
ownership and management control, profitability, and investment in base 
transceiver stations. Finally, KPPU concludes that partial cross-ownership 
breaches the law and finds that Telkomsel attempted to monopolize the 
mobile cellular market. However, the investigations do not provide a
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convincing analysis, especially with regard to initial allegations about 
collusive behavior and price leadership.
This research contributes to the analysis and examines whether pricing 
behaviors in the mobile cellular market indicated a collusive outcome. It 
focuses on pricing behaviors of the competing prepaid plans because more 
than 95 percent of mobile telephone subscribers use prepaid plans instead of 
post-paid. In addition, subscribers of prepaid plans are relatively sensitive to 
price. Therefore, operators should use price as an important instrument to 
attract additional subscribers. Furthermore, the regulated non-binding 
ceiling price level for prepaid plans is much larger than that of post-paid. It 
means that operators may be more flexible in setting their prices. These facts 
above imply that the incentive to compete in price should be higher in pre­
paid plans.
In the market with two-way access structure where retail price is linear and 
can be discriminated based on call termination, as in prepaid plans of the 
mobile cellular service, it is optimal for the competing operators to set a 
lower price for on-net calls and a higher price for off-net calls as a means to 
attract subscribers (Hoernig 2007). It implies that at a given high level of off- 
net prices, it is profit maximizing for the competing operators to set lower 
on-net prices. In other words, if the competing operators tend to set similar 
or uniform prices for on-net or off-net calls, it may indicate that they behave 
collusively.
The pattern of uniform on-net and off-net prices seems to occur in the mobile 
cellular market in Indonesia. At least until the end of 2007 there was no 
intense price competition between the two major prepaid plans, Simpati of
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Telkomsel and Mentari of Indosat. Their regular prices for inter-network 
calls are similar. Moreover, prices of their on-net calls are also close to or 
equal to prices of their off-net calls even when the third operator, 
Excelcomindo, started to lower its on-net tariff. These facts may support 
allegation about possible collusive pricing. However, this pattern is not 
sufficient to give a strong indication of collusion. The reason is that there are 
many factors that may affect price including demand, preference, and costs.
One basic concept that explains collusive outcome is the prisoners' dilemma 
or coordination game. In this game two prisoners face an investigation 
related to a case. They are in a dilemma whether to confess or deny the 
allegation. If both of them confess, they all will get moderate sentences. If 
neither of them confesses, they will be free without charge because there is 
not enough evidence of criminal conduct. This is the maximum outcome they 
can achieve. However, both prisoners are at risk of receiving the maximum 
charge if he does not confess but the other does. In a static one-shot game, 
where the prisoners only meet each other once, confession is the safest 
strategy that leads to moderate punishment. However, actually they still can 
have an opportunity to be free if they could coordinate for not to confess.
The concept described above is used as a basic principle in analyzing pricing 
behavior in the mobile cellular market. In this case, the competing operators 
act as prisoners in the game. These operators will get the highest profit if 
both set high prices. This collusive outcome can be achieved explicitly 
through co-ordination or tacitly through mutual understanding. The main 
objective of this research is not to investigate explicit or tacit collusion, but 
only to examine whether the actual market price is in collusive outcome. As 
indicated by the game, behaving collusively (not to confess) will give higher
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payoff than behaving selfishly (confessing). Thus, in the mobile cellular case, 
if actual prices for on-net calls of the competing prepaid plan are sufficiently 
above their individual profit maximizing or non-cooperative level, it shows a 
collusive outcome that also may indicate a collusive behavior.
In order to estimate the non-cooperative price for each prepaid plan, we 
develop a simple model of competition in two-way access. The model 
requires some indicators including price elasticity of traffic and subscription. 
Unfortunately, we could not gather actual data to calculate these elasticity 
indicators due to company confidentiality policy. Alternatively, we can 
estimate these elasticity measures based on consumer information collected 
from a survey. In this case, a simple conditional logit model of discrete choice 
analysis is used to estimate price elasticity of subscription and a simple linear 
regression is employed for predicting price elasticity of traffic demand. The 
estimates show that both elasticity estimates are relatively elastic. By 
applying these data into the model, we find that actual intra-network prices 
of the competing pre-paid plans are sufficiently above their non-cooperative 
price. This result shows a collusive outcome that may suggest a possible 
collusive behavior.
In addition to explicit co-ordination, collusive outcome can also be facilitated 
by several factors such as high market concentration, cross-ownership, and 
ineffective regulations. These factors existed in the Indonesian mobile 
cellular market condition at that time. Consequently, the regulator may need 
to re-consider policy related to these factors above. In recent development, 
KPPU's order has eliminated cross-ownership in Telkomsel and Indosat. 
Furthermore, several new operators have entered the market and they will 
reduce market concentration in the next few years.
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In the case of price regulation, before 2008 the mobile cellular market in 
Indonesia still referred to past ceiling price regulation which was designed 
during the monopolistic era. Especially for prepaid plans, the ceiling level is 
quite high, that is, more than twice that of the post-paid plan tariff. In fact, 
some retail prices of prepaid plans were still under ceiling price level, 
meaning that the operators did not set an excessive price even though they 
have the chance to do so. However, since their prices are still above non- 
cooperative level, their pricing is still considered collusive. These operators 
might feel safe to set above non-cooperative retail prices because their prices 
are still below regulated ceiling level. It implies that collusive outcome has 
bee facilitated by ceiling price regulation.
In a recent development, the new price regulation eliminated the ceiling 
price. The regulator seems to assume that the entrance of several new 
operators reduces the risk of collusive behavior. However, the regulator is 
concerned about possible predatory behavior of incumbents toward new 
entrants. Therefore, in order to prevent predation, the regulator determines a 
floor price. Nevertheless, this floor price may also limit price competition.
For that reason, we suggest to remove not only ceiling price but also the floor 
price from price regulation. Furthermore, excessive restriction in pricing such 
as a requirement to file a proposal before applying the new tariff would also 
disadvantage consumers and competition. In an emerging competitive 
market like the mobile cellular market, regulation should only focus on 
access price. Regular and active price monitoring by the regulator or 
competition commission may effectively replace regulation in retail price and 
control possible anticompetitive behavior by the operators.
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1.5. Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters including introduction, five body 
chapters, and conclusion. The information included in body chapters 
(between Chapter 2 and Chapter 6) contains the main and detailed 
discussion of the thesis. The paragraphs below briefly describe these body 
chapters.
Chapter 2 presents a general description of the telecommunications sector in 
Indonesia. It covers four major topics. Firstly, it discusses two institutions 
that oversee the market: the telecommunications regulator and the 
Competition Commission. Secondly, it describes the telecommunication 
liberalization processes. Then it exposes the development of price regulations 
including access and retail price regulations. Finally, it covers in more detail 
about two market segments, Internet service provision and mobile cellular 
service.
Chapter 3 reviews some papers related to operators' behavior in a one-way 
access structure. It identifies motivation to exclude rivals by a vertically 
integrated operator through sabotage and access price discrimination. 
Related to the case, it also explores possible use of bundling as a mean of 
access price discrimination. Since bundling may give a predatory effect, this 
chapter also reviews some approaches in identifying predatory pricing.
Chapter 4 analyzes the first case about competition in the dial-up Internet 
market. It examines possible predatory behavior of Telkomnet through its
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long promotion discount. The discussion covers the background of the case, 
model development, data and analysis, and policy implications.
Chapter 5 studies some papers dealing with operators' behaviors in a two- 
way access structure. The discussion covers four combinations of retail price 
constraints. From several issues, it focuses on a condition that matches the 
Indonesian mobile cellular market especially related to optimal retail price 
conditions. Furthermore, it also reviews literature dealing with the 
facilitating factor of collusion and a simple game theory explanation of 
collusion.
Chapter 6 deals with the second case of competition in the mobile cellular 
market. The analysis concentrates on assessing whether high on-net prices 
are at their non-cooperative level. The chapter includes background, simple 
model of competition in two-way access, data and analysis, and policy 
implications.
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Chapter 2
The Telecommunications Sector in Indonesia
The telecommunications sector in Indonesia is developing toward a more 
competitive market. Financial difficulties, external forces, and crisis play a 
role in accelerating the liberalization. In addition, reluctance and lack of 
resources also colored the reforms. In this early liberalization period, market 
structure experienced a significant change. In contrast, regulatory reform 
progressed slowly. During this imperfect reform, incumbents become more 
dominant and stronger.
This chapter describes several aspects of Indonesian telecommunications 
reforms especially related to regulatory institutions, market liberalization, 
regulatory changes, and the two market segments concerned in this study.
2.1. Regulatory Institutions
In general, there are some institutions that influence policies and regulations 
in telecommunications sectors. However, this chapter only focuses on two 
institutions that have a direct relation with implementation of competition 
policy in telecommunications. These institutions represent a sector-specific 
regulator and general competition authority.
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The first institution is the Telecommunication Regulations Agency of 
Indonesia (BRTi) which comprises the Directorate General of Post and 
Telecommunications (DGPT) and the Committee for Telecommunications 
Regulation of Indonesia (KRT1). BRTI represents a sector-specific regulator 
reporting to the Minister in charge of telecommunications. The other 
institution is the Supervisory Commission for Business Competition (KPPU).
It is an independent body dealing with general competition policy, reporting 
to the President and Parliament.
2.1.1. Sector Specific Regulators
The law on telecommunications mentions that telecommunications is 
controlled by the state and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is 
mandated to manage this sector. In the implementation, the Directorate 
General of Post and Telecommunication (DGPT) acts as an arm of the 
government that administers policies and regulations of telecommunications 
provisions. A director general chairs DGPT and reports to the minister in 
charge of telecommunications. DGPT was established in March 1966 as a part 
of the Department of Transport. In 1983, DGPT became a part of the 
Department of Tourism, Post and Telecommunication and then joined back 
to the Department of Transport in 1998. However, since 2005, DGPT resides 
under the supervision of a newly established Department of Communication 
and Information.
The DGPT had the role of translating national telecommunications policies 
into operational policies and regulations. For that purpose, the DGPT was 
given powerful rights to manage the sector including granting licenses,
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monitoring the market, and evaluating and punishing the operators in the 
corridor of telecommunications law and regulations.
As a country that commits to WTO agreements, Indonesia has to create an 
independent regulatory body in telecommunications as required in WTO 
Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunication. This requirement is 
accommodated in Article 5 of Law No.36/1999, which mentions that in 
managing the sector it needs public involvement through an independent 
body consisting of the people representing associations of the operators, 
professionals, equipment producers, networks and services users, and 
experts in telecommunication. However, several years after the law was 
effective, government still could not establish that independent regulatory 
body.
After a widespread negative public reaction against a plan to raise telephone 
tariffs in early 2003, the parliament forced the government to create this 
independent regulatory body as one of the requirements to approve tariff 
increase. Finally, the body called BRTI (Badan Regulasi Telekomunikasi 
Indonesia / Telecommunication Regulation Agency of Indonesia) was 
established through a ministerial decision in mid-2003. This institution holds 
the mandate to regulate, supervise, and control the sector including 
administering licenses, regulating access price, establishing equipment 
standardization criteria, and controlling quality of telecommunication 
services.
BRTI consists of the whole institution of DGPT and a committee called KRTI 
(Komite Regulasi Telekomunikasi Indonesia / the Indonesian 
Telecommunications Regulatory Committee). The members of KRTI include
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government representatives and some independent people with different 
backgrounds. These independent members are selected through an open 
selection method. The Director General of DGPT automatically becomes a 
member the committee representing the government and chairing this 
institution. Figure 2.1 shows relationship between the minister in charge of 
telecommunications and the BRTI.
Figure 2.1. Relationship between BRTI and the Minister
KRTI
(Committee Members / 
the Committee)
DGPT
(Directorate General Post & 
T elecommunications)
Chairman of BRTI / 
Director General of DGPT
Minister of
Communication and Information
BRTI - the Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory Body
Coordination
Source: BRTI's website (www.brti.or.id), 2006
The first appointment for KRTI was for a two-year term starting from 2004 
and consisted of four independent members and the Director General. From 
these independent members, two of them are: a former high-level officer at 
the ministry in charge of telecommunications, and a former director of an 
incumbent operator. The second appointment was for a three-year position 
starting from 2006 with seven members where five of them are independent
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members and the remaining two are government representatives including 
the Director General. Among the five independent members, two of them are 
previous KRT1 members including the former director of the incumbent 
company.
Leadership and structure of the BRTI may indicate that the government is 
reluctant to reduce its role in managing the telecommunications sector. 
According to Angus et al. (2005:150), because BRTI is led by a government 
representative, its decision would tend to be in favor of the operators where 
government has a share in them. In addition, the structure of BRTI implicitly 
shows that the independent members are not equipped with sufficient 
resources since its relationship to the DGPT is only coordination. Being 
chaired by the Director General and the lack of power of BRTI shows that the 
telecommunications sector is still being politicized by the Government (Eick 
2007:9).
2.1.2. The Competition Commission
KPPU or the Commission for Supervisory of Business Competition is an 
independent body created in 2000 to oversee implementation of Law No. 
5/1999 concerning prohibition of monopolistic practices and unfair business 
competition. The law itself was a result of long discussion started in the early 
1990s and culminated in 1999 as a part of Indonesian commitment to the IMF 
during the recovery process from the 1990s' financial crisis (Pangestu et al. 
2002:213-5).
KPPU has two main tasks including law enforcement toward business 
entities, and thorough evaluation of policies and regulations to comply with
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the law. The candidates for KPPU's commissioners are proposed by the 
president and selected by the parliament through a fit-and-proper test. The 
chairman of the KPPU is elected from these commissioners through an 
annual internal election process. Furthermore, in performing their tasks, the 
commissioners are supported by a secretariat headed by an executive 
director.
In 2000, there were 11 commissioners with various backgrounds including 
from the trade and industry chamber, co-operatives and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME), political parties, economists, lawyers, and government 
and non-government organizations. During that period, more than 50 
percent of the anticompetitive cases were related to bidding undertaken by 
government offices or state-owned enterprises. The main issue is collusion 
among the bidders or between the bidder and the bidding committee. In this 
initial period, except for case handling procedures and bidding principles, 
other important guidelines such as merger and acquisitions were not 
completed yet. Several ambiguities in laws (Pangestu et al. 2002:216-7) may 
also contribute to this delay.
The second period started in 2006. There are 13 commissioners on duty with 
five years' appointment, and five of them are the incumbents from the 
previous period. Interestingly, in this period, the commissioners who have 
connections to political parties increased. It raises the concern of the 
commission potentially being captured by political interests.
In handling an anticompetitive case, KPPU acts as investigator, judge, and 
prosecutor. A multi-roles institution like KPPU is unusual in Indonesia's 
judicial system. Some people see it as monopolization of the law. In fact,
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KPPU's decision can be appealed to the District or Supreme Court. It shows 
that KPPU's power is not as strong as what people think.
For that reason, socialization and policy harmonization still dominated the 
activities of the commission in this early period. In order to create the same 
perception about the rule mandated in the competition law, KPPU organized 
some intense socialization and close co-operation with the police, judges, 
public attorneys, and lawyers to explain that the law is somewhat different to 
the ordinary judicial system. Several cases of support for KPPU's decisions in 
the appealing process in the courts suggest that this socialization approach 
has been successful
In addition, several anticompetitive cases related to telecommunications 
sectors have been decided by KPPU. In the first period, there were at least 
two cases. One of them was about an allegation of unfair bidding conducted 
by a state-owned company. Another one was about an interconnection 
dispute between two competing incumbents leading to the blocking and 
diversion of traffic by the dominant one
Furthermore, in the second period, there have been at least two other cases 
related to telecommunications. Both of them dealt with collusion or price 
fixing in mobile cellular services. The first case was about partial-cross 
ownership of two competing mobile cellular operators causing high retail 
prices. In late 2007, the commission demanded elimination of that cross 
ownership and punished several parties involved. Some observers, 
economists and lawyers, claim this decision lacked economic justification 
(Ramayandi and Kong 2008:25-8). This case will be discussed further in the 
later chapter about competition in the mobile cellular market. Another case
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related to mobile cellular service was about a cartel in short-message-service 
(SMS) by several operators. Based on the information in the contract made by 
these operators and information about the predicted interconnection cost of 
SMS from the regulator, the commission concluded that there was a naked 
collusive conduct and fined these operators.
2.2. Liberalization and Market Reforms
There are several papers explaining and analyzing liberalization processes in 
Indonesian Telecommunications. Sugondo and Bhinekawati (2004) argue 
that the reform should eliminate regulations that constrain development and 
should encourage private participation to finance the industry. Lee and 
Findlay (2005) claim that past partial liberalization was only dedicated to 
solve short-term financing problems, and current liberalization to create a 
competitive market must be supported with proper regulations and credible 
regulatory institutions. Lumanto and Kosuge (2005) also see that the reform 
was not optimal because the institutions developed in the process of reform 
did not function well. Young et al. (2005) conclude that the government is not 
fully committed to the privatization of the state-owned telecommunications 
operators, indicated by the ownership of golden shares with special rights in 
these privatized operators. In addition to privatization, Eick (2007) also 
suggest that the reform should also involve de-politicization through 
elimination of political influence in regulatory institutions.
In brief, these papers noted that Indonesia has faced two liberalization 
processes in 1989 and 1999. They conclude that the result of the first reform 
was not as expected and the on-going reform lacks a regulatory system.
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There are several factors causing these results such as lack of resources, 
strong political interests, and insufficient commitment to improve efficiency. 
The discussion below briefly describes some influencing forces behind these 
liberalization and market conditions during the three periods.
2.2.1. Period Prior to Liberalization (before 1989)
In the period before 1989, the telecommunications sector in Indonesia was 
heavily under government control through its monopolistic state-owned 
enterprises. Until late 1980, there was only one state-owned operator, 
currently known as Telkom, providing a domestic telecommunications 
service. Telkom was founded during the Dutch colonization in Indonesia as a 
division in PIT (Post, Telegraph and Telephone Office). In 1965, the 
provision of post and telecommunications was separated and Telkom 
became a telecommunications operator. In this period, regulatory functions 
and operational functions overlapped. Even after the DGPT was established 
as a post and telecommunications regulatory institution in 1966, due to lack 
of resources the people in Telkom often also held positions in the DGPT.
At that time, Telkom held a role as an agent of development to build and 
operate domestic public telecommunication in profitable as well as in 
economically unfeasible areas (Kartahadimadja 1994: 78). In 1974, Telkom 
was transforming from a semi-government institution to be a more 
commercial state-owned company (from PN Telkom to Perumtel). This 
transformation made Telkom more flexible in its operation.
To provide international telecommunication services, in mid-1967 the 
government invited a foreign company, International Telephone and
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Telegraph (ITT), to build and operate an international satellite system in 
Indonesia. Lack of financial and human resources capability to join in an 
international satellite consortium (Intelsat) were the main reasons to attract 
that foreign direct investment (Winarno 1996: 17-9). ITT then created Indosat 
(Indonesian Satellite Corporation) to provide the services with monopoly 
rights until 1989.
In the early 1980s, several high-level government officers discussed the 
possibility and benefit of self-operating international telecommunication 
services. The calculation indicated that the international telecommunication 
business is highly profitable and there was a rumor that the cost of ITT's 
investment in Indosat had been recovered in two years' operation. Based on 
this calculation and supported by a positive response from the president and 
the good financial condition of the country during the oil boom, the 
government then initiated the idea to terminate the concession and to acquire 
Indosat from ITT. After a tough negotiation, ITT and the government agreed 
to terminate the contract with compensation of USD 43.61 million for ITT. 
Thus, since December 1980 Indosat became a state-owned company 
(Winamo 1996:28-47).
Lately, the government has found it difficult to finance development of 
domestic telecommunication infrastructure. Therefore, it was decided to 
attract private participation. To support this idea, a new law of 
telecommunication was enacted in 1989 that also denoted the first 
liberalization period. In addition to accelerating telecommunication 
development, advice and recommendations from the World Bank, donor 
countries and other international institutions motivated this deregulation 
policy (Supriadi 1995:82).
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2.2.2. Period during First Phase of Liberalization (1989-1999)
The Law No. 3 on Telecommunication launched in 1989 classifies public 
telecommunications into two services: basic services (telephone, telegraph, 
and telex); and non-basic services (paging, data communication, and value 
added services). The government controls public telecommunication by 
mandating provision of basic services to two state-owned operators, Telkom 
and Indosat. As in the past period, Telkom still had the right to monopolize 
domestic telecommunication services and Indosat had the right to 
monopolize international services. The difference from the previous regime 
is that Law No.3 gives the opportunity for private companies to participate 
in telecommunication development and operation through co-operation with 
one of these state-owned companies. In non-basic services, the market was 
more liberalized and there is no requirement for private operators to co­
operate with either Telkom or Indosat.
The desire to keep the power to control telecommunication services under 
the government arm was relaxed a bit with the establishment of Satelindo as 
a new telecommunications operator in 1993. Satelindo, whose shares are held 
by Bimantara group (60%), Telkom (30%) and Indosat (10%), was awarded 
licenses to provide satellite, mobile and international services. Satelindo is 
the first mobile cellular operator deploying second-generation mobile 
cellular technology, known as Global System for Mobile (GSM).
However, the establishment of Satelindo was controversial and influenced by 
political and individual interests rather than the spirit to open the market.
The were two major reasons for the controversy. First, Satelindo did not have 
joint-operation with the monopolists as required by regulation. Second, the
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Bimantara group which dominated Satelindo was a holding company owned 
by the son of the president.
In order to soften the controversy, the government introduced a new 
telecommunication regulation (PP. 8/93) broadening definition of co­
operation in providing basic services. Co-operation with the incumbents to 
provide basic services then was not only limited to joint-operation but also 
joint venture and contract management (Supriadi 1995:101-4). This new 
regulation was followed by establishment of several joint-venture companies.
For example in 1995, two new mobile cellular operators were created. One of 
them is PT. Telekomunikasi Selular Indonesia (Telkomsel) which was a joint 
venture company of Telkom (51%) and Indosat (49%). The other is PT. 
Excelcomindo Pratama (XL) which was a joint venture company of PT. 
Telekomindo Primabhakti (60%), a subsidiary of Telkom, and three other 
foreign companies (40%). At that time, Satelindo, Telkomsel, and XL were the 
only mobile cellular operators that used GSM technology. In contrast, other 
mobile cellular operators only held licenses for first generation analog 
technology.
Furthermore, in early 1994 the government announced a new plan to 
privatize Indosat that was targeted to finish before the APEC meeting in 
Jakarta in November 2004. The privatization was conducted through initial 
public offering (IPO) 35 percent of Indosat shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange and Jakarta Stock Exchange. This partial privatization was mainly 
aimed at obtaining funds for the government budget and for Indosat's 
further investment (Winarno 1996:193-204). One year after privatizing 
Indosat, Telkom had its turn at IPO in November 1995. Around 34 percent of
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Telkom's shares were offered on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, New York Stock 
Exchange and London Stock Exchange (World Bank 2004a:152). Similarly as 
with Indosat, the main objective of this privatization was to get fresh funds 
for development.
The development of telecommunications infrastructure in Indonesia after 50 
years of independence was very limited with only around 3 million fixed 
telephone lines. In order to accelerate the development to meet demand, in 
1996 the government set an ambitious program to built 5 million additional 
fixed telephone lines in the next five years. Telkom, as the company awarded 
monopoly rights in domestic services, should bear this burden. Due to 
limited financial capability to meet the target, a new co-operation scheme 
known as joint-operation scheme (KSO) was created (Invent 1996:6). In this 
scheme, the national telecommunication area was divided into seven regions. 
The two most profitable regions, Jakarta and East Java, were still under 
Telkom's control. Development and operation in the remaining five regions 
were given to the private parties.
In 1996, Telkom signed five joint-operation schemes (KSO) with its partners 
to develop and operate telecommunication services in five regions including 
Sumatera, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Kalimantan, and the Eastern 
Part of Indonesia. The partners are a consortium of foreign big operators 
with local companies. This scheme obliged the partners to develop 
infrastructure in their respective regions during three consecutive years and 
to pay a certain percentage of operational revenue to Telkom. As 
compensation, the government awarded exclusive rights to the partners to 
use and operate Telkom's assets in those areas for 15 years.
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However, this development scheme was considered unsuccessful. The 
financial crisis that hit Indonesia a year later had a negative effect on the co­
operation. In addition to the crisis, several other factors such as uncertainty 
about the continuation of the scheme after the crisis, unsuccessful tariff 
adjustment, and transition management problems also contributed to the 
fiasco (Lee and Findlay 2005:348-50). Finally, Telkom bought back all these 
regions and became the dominant operator for domestic fixed 
telecommunications services again.
The forces to open telecommunications market in Indonesia did not only 
come from domestic financial difficulties. Two foreign forces, WTO and IMF, 
also contributed. In the last minutes of the WTO meeting on 
telecommunication in 1997, the Government of Indonesia signed its 
commitment to open its telecommunication market (Allen 1998:3). This 
commitment was then attached as the annex of the Fourth Protocol of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. The commitments are to reduce 
barriers for new entrants into telecommunication services, to consider other 
operators to compete with the incumbents, to promote competition, to 
increase percentage foreign equity threshold in local telecommunication 
companies, and to follow the principles in the WTO Reference Paper on 
Telecommunication (WTO 1997). As a consequence of the commitments, a 
thorough reform in telecommunication policies is required. These 
commitments lead to a reduced government role in telecommunication 
operation and development.
A few months after signing the commitment to WTO, an economic crisis hit 
Indonesia. This situation led to Indonesia asking IMF's assistance. As a part 
of the recovery program, IMF required Indonesia to restructure and reform
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several sectors including telecommunications. The government's 
commitments related to telecommunication are listed in the Letter of Intent 
(Lol) to IMF. It covers some fundamental reforms such as further 
privatization of Indosat and Telkom, elimination of cross-ownership of 
Indosat and Telkom in several telecommunication companies, promotion of 
private investment, introduction of a new telecommunications law and 
supporting regulations, introduction of new tariff policy and new 
interconnection rules, establishment of a new regulatory agency, and 
competition.
These two external forces brought the Indonesian telecommunications sector 
to the second phase of liberalization. The introduction of the new 
telecommunications law in 1999 is considered as a starting point for the new 
era of telecommunications competition.
2.2.3. Period during Second Phase of Liberalization (1999 - at present)
The Law No.3 of 1999 is a new telecommunications law that classifies 
telecommunications services into network and service provisions. The law 
has a competitive spirit and does not discriminate against the parties that 
want to participate in all market segments.
In 2000, the government announced a plan to introduce a duopoly scheme. 
This policy was set as a transition period toward a competitive 
telecommunication market. Through this policy, both incumbents are 
prepared to be two competing full-service providers (vertically integrated 
service and network operators). Therefore, exclusive rights of both
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incumbents were shortened only until August 2002 for fixed local service and 
August 2003 for long-distance and international services.
In addition, as a part of the plan to create a duopolistic market, in early 2001 
Telkom and lndosat eliminated their cross-ownerships in several 
telecommunication providers. In this case, Telkom acquired lndosat's share 
in Telkomsel, the largest mobile cellular operator, and lndosat took over 
Telkom's share in Satelindo, its competitor in international service and the 
second largest mobile cellular operator.
In December 2002, the government sold 41.96 percent of its share in lndosat 
to Singapore Technology Telemedia (STT). The public opposed Indosat's 
privatization because the government finally held only around 20 percent of 
Indosat's share. This privatization made lndosat a foreign company, as it was 
before. However, even though the government's shares in lndosat is not a 
majority, it still has special rights in appointing Indosat's president director. 
In addition to the government ownership issue, lately people have also been 
concerned about possible anticompetitive effect in the mobile cellular market 
because Telkomsel, Indosat's competitor, is also partially owned by another 
Singaporean company, SingTel. People believe that STT and SingTel are 
controlled under the same holding company, Temasek.
Furthermore, in March 2004, the government released a formal 
announcement about implementation of telecommunication sector reforms.
It was a comprehensive report of current reform activities in 
telecommunication covering several issues such as early termination of 
exclusive rights, some supporting regulations, regulatory institutions, 
supporting institutions, tariff rebalancing, universal service obligation, fixed-
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wireless access provision, licenses for Telkom and Indosat, and management 
of funds generated from frequency utilization fees. This announcement 
clearly stated that monitoring and evaluation of these reforms would be 
conducted by BRTL
As an implementation of that government announcement, the duopoly plan 
continued. Indosat received licenses to provide fixed local service in 2002 and 
domestic long-distance service in 2004. In addition, Telkom was also 
permitted to offer international service in 2004. However, although the 
licenses had been awarded and some broad regulatory principles had been 
introduced, the implementation was not smooth. Interconnection between 
Telkom and Indosat became a problem. Telkom offered a high 
interconnection tariff that meant Indosat could not sell its local service at a 
regulated tariff. Telkom argued that the current regulated local tariff applied 
to the public did not reflect the real operational cost and was subsidized from 
long-distance revenue. Then the government mediated this dispute and these 
operators finally agreed with the interconnection charged. However, the 
problem was not over yet. Telkom was often reluctant and slowly provided 
the access required by Indosat.
In long-distance services, the condition was not much different. In addition 
to the interconnection problem, Telkom was also reluctant to implement a 
new access code to accommodate Indosat's long-distance service in their 
switching system. Telkom argued that it needed time and huge financial 
resources to set up all of its equipment. Finally, through some notices and 
negotiations, the government ordered Telkom to employ new long distance 
code at least in five big cities (Jakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Batam, and 
Medan) in late 2007.
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In mobile cellular service, the market was more competitive, with 
participation of several new entrants and consolidation of existing operators 
that used older technology. In addition, the 2004 government announcement 
also legalized fixed-wireless access provision by the fixed-service license 
holders (Telkom, lndosat, and Bakrie Tel). Fixed wireless access (FWA) 
service allows its subscribers to have a limited mobility in certain areas. In 
some degree FWA is a substitute that threatened ordinary mobile cellular 
service because its tariff was quite low, close to fixed wire line service. 
However, even though competition was more intense, price competition in 
the mobile cellular market was only considered effective after the first 
quarter of 2008. The discussion about this market will be presented in more 
detail in another sub-section of this chapter.
In non-basic service the competition was even tougher. However, there was a 
tendency for the big operators in network provisions (such as Telkom and 
lndosat) to also dominate this market segment as they did in internet service 
provision. This trend raised anticompetitive concern, especially when the 
vertically integrated operators turned out to be new monopolists or 
oligopolists.
In brief, market transformation in different segments during the second 
phase of liberalization is presented in Table 2.1. The table shows that 
liberalization has given the opportunity for Telkom, which previously only 
monopolized domestic network provisions, to be a dominant operator in 
most market segments.
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Table 2.1. Market Transformation in Several Segments, 1999-2007
M arket
O perators
S eg m en t 1999 2002 2007
L oca l S e r v ic e T e lk o m  (n a t io n a l  w id e ) T e lk o m  (n a t io n a l  w id e ) , T e lk o m  (n a t io n a l  w id e ) ,
( f ix e d  w ir e  l in e ) B a ta m -B in ta n  T e le c o m In d o s a t  ( J a k a r ta  & E a s t Jav a ) In d o s a t  (n a t io n a l  w id e )
B a ta m -B in ta n  T e le c o m B a ta m -B in ta n  T e le c o m
L oca l S e r v ic e R a te l in d o -  B ak rie R a te l in d o  - B a k r ie T e lk o m  (n a t io n a l  w id e )
( f ix e d  w ir e le s s ) ( J a k a r ta  & W e s t  Jav a ) (J a k a r ta  & W e s t Ja v a ) B a k r ie T e l (n a t io n a l  w id e )
In d o s a t  (n a t io n a l  w id e )
D o m e s t ic  lo n g - T e lk o m T e lk o m T e lk o m
d is ta n c e  se r v ic e I n d o s a t
In te r n a tio n a l I n d o s a t In d o s a t In d o s a t  - S a te l in d o
ser v ic e S a te l in d o S a te l in d o T e lk o m
B ak r ie T e l
M o b ile  C e llu la r G S M : G SM : 3 G  &  G S M
se r v ic e T e lk o m s e l, T e lk o m s e l, T e lk o m s e l
S a te l in d o S a te l in d o I n d o s a t  (S a te lin d o -  IM 3),
E x c e lc o m in d o E x c e lc o m in d o  (XL) E x c e lc o m in d o  (XL)
In d o s a t  (IM 3) N a t r in d o  (N T S)
A M P S  &  N M T  (a n a lo s) : N a tr in d o  (N T S ) -  E a s t J a v a H u tc h in s o n  (T h re e )
K o m s e lin d o
M e tro s e l A M P S  &  N M T  (an a lo g ): C D M A
T e le s e ra K o m s e lin d o M o b ile -8
M o b ise l (4 5 0 M H z) M e tro s e l S m a r t  T e le c o m
T e le s e r a S a m p o e rrv a  T e l (450 M H z )
M o b ise l (4 5 0 M H z)
M o b i l e  S a te l l i t e :
M o b i l e  S a te l l i t e : P a c ific  S a te ll i te  N u s a n ta r a
P ac ific  S a te ll i te  N u s a n ta r a
In te r n e t S e r v ic e I n d o s a t  (IM 2) T e lk o m  (T e lk o m n e t  In s ta n ) T e lk o m  (T e lk o m n e t  In s ta n )
(d ia l-u p  reta il) I n d o s a t  (IM 2) In d o s a t  (IM 2)
I n d e p e n d e n t  IS Ps I n d e p e n d e n t  IS P s I n d e p e n d e n t  IS Ps
2.3. Reforms in Price Regulations
In contrast to market reform, regulatory reform especially related to price 
regulations slowly progressed. The regulator finally launched new access 
and retail price regulations in early 2006. However, these new regulations
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needed more than one year to be effective. Furthermore, before the new price 
regulations were effective, operators still referred to the past price 
regulations which were designed in the monopolistic environment. This 
subsection describes the past regulatory regime and the processes involved 
in coming to new access and retail regulations.
2.3.1. Access Price Regulation
Prior to the new access regulations, there were at least four past ministerial 
decisions related to access pricing. First was the Memo of the Minister of 
Tourism, Post and Telecommunications Number KU.506/I/I/MPPT-97 which 
regulates the revenue-sharing scheme between Telkom and Ratelindo as 
fixed-line operators. Second was the Decision of the Minister of Tourism, 
Post and Telecommunications Number KM.46/PR.301/MPPT-98 (KM.46/98) 
dealing with the interconnection tariff for telecommunications networks 
between telecommunications service providers. Third was the Decision of 
the Minister of Communications Number KM.37/1999 about revision of 
KM.46/98. Lastly was the Decision of the Minister of Communications 
Number KM.32/2004 emphasizing that cost base will be used as the new 
interconnection regime in telecommunications provision.
In general, access pricing in the first three ministerial decisions above can be 
categorized as revenue sharing and sender-keep-all (SKA) regimes. These 
regulations were still effective until 2007. Table 2.2 summarizes access price 
rules in these three ministerial decisions.
45
Table 2.2. Access Pricing Rules Prior to Regulatory Reform in 2008
T y p e  o f  S e r v ic e A c c e s s  P r ic in g  R u le
PSTN  to PSTN
L o c a l  s e r v ic e
- Telkom  -  Ratelindo
- Telkom  -  BBT
Sender Keeps All / Bill and  Keep and bilateral negotiation 
Sender Keeps All / Bill and Keep
D o m e s t i c  lone; d i s ta n c e  s e r v ic e  
- Indosat - Telkom Rp. 240 per m inute access (bilateral negotiation)
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e r v ic e  
- Indosat / Satelindo - Telkom Access charge = Rp. 850 per call
Usage charge = Rp. 550 per m inute
USO contribution = Rp. 750 per call
PSTN  to M o b ile  C ellu lar
L o c a l  c a ll Access price for PSTN operator = 50% local PSTN tariff 
Access price for mobile operato r = airtim e tariff
D o m e s t i c  l o n g  d i s ta n c e  c a ll Access price for mobile operato r = airtim e tariff + 15%-60% of 
long distance tariff (depends on long distance portion  carried by 
mobile operator)
Access price for PSTN operato r = the rem aining percentage of 
long-distance tariff.
M o b ile  C ellu lar  to M ob ile  C ellu lar
Local call
Short M essage Service (SMS)
Access price = airtim e tariff 
Sender Keeps All / Bill and Keep
KM 32/2004 only informs that the access-pricing regime will be cost based. It 
does not give detailed directions or provide a global principle. It seems that 
this interconnection regulation was not well prepared and created only to 
supplement the government's announcement of telecommunications sector 
reforms. At that time, the detailed discussion on the access pricing method 
was not finished yet.
In fact, the effort to design a cost-based access regime had been initiated from 
2001. At that time, the regulator proposed a draft of cost-based access pricing
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regulation. However, due to its incompleteness, the draft was opposed by 
operators. In order to improve the draft, at least two studies were conducted. 
In 2002, Pan System developed a cost-based access pricing based on the top- 
down long run incremental cost (LR1C) approach. Moreover, Ovum 
completed similar study using the bottom-up LR1C approach in early 2005.
Based on the study by Ovum, the regulator set drafts for cost-based 
interconnection regulations. Socialization and consultation with operators 
took several months to finish. Some changes have been made from the 
original draft to accommodate operators' interests. Due to these long 
processes, the plan to launch a new cost-based access regime in early 2005 
was postponed. Finally, a new ministerial decision on cost-based access price 
(PM.8/2006) was launched in February 2006.
Even though it is stated that the ministerial decision is effective at the date it 
is established, the new regulation still required some adjustment that led to 
quite a long delay in implementation. Finally, the amendment of the new 
access price regime was established in early 2008, to be effective in April 
2008. Interestingly, the new access price for mobile cellular service is much 
lower than previously used and from the study of Ovum. One reason for this 
reduction is that mobile technology is getting cheaper. Table 2.3 compares 
the access price scheme for local PSTN and mobile cellular services.
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Table 2.3. Access Prices Comparison from Several Schemes
A ccess Price S ch em e P ST N M o b ile  C ellu lar
(loca l-p eak ) (local-peak)
P rio r  to  co s t-b ased  reg im e  (before 2008) Rp. 73 Rp. 406
O v u m  S tu d y  (u s in g  in c u m b e n t d a ta  -  2006) Rp. 157 Rp. 449
O v u m  S tu d y  (u s in g  b a sed  p rac tice  d a ta  -  2006) Rp. 80 Rp. 381
M in is te r ia l D ec ision  -  cost b ased  reg im e (2008) Rp. 73 Rp. 261
2.3.2. Retail Price Regulation
In fixed telecommunications service (PSTN), Telkom monopolistically served 
the domestic market. Prices of PSTN services offered by the monopolist were 
strictly regulated. In 1995, the government through the Minister for Tourism, 
Post and Telecommunication established a Ministerial Decision 
(KM.79/PR.301/MPPT-95) dealing with the application of price cap formula 
for monthly and usage tariff adjustment of fixed local and domestic long 
distance services. The basic formula for tariff adjustment is CPI-X. CPI is the 
consumer price index reflected by the inflation level, and X represents the 
productivity measure of the basic service operator set by the Minister. This 
price cap formula implies that maximum tariff adjustment will not exceed 
the inflation rate. However, after the financial crisis in 1997, the price cap 
formula for tariff adjustment was modified to be CPI-X+Z. In this case, 
variable Z is used to accommodate price changes of input factors that are not 
included in inflation. This modified price cap rule indicates that retail tariff 
increase can be above inflation rate depending on the value of Z.
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ln 2002, a calculation based on price-cap formula CPI-X+Z has necessitated 
he decision to increase the telephone tariff on average 45.49 percent, 
distributed over three consecutive years. This calculation was based on the 
assumption that CPI reflected by inflation was 11.05 percent, productivity 
level of operator (X) was targeted to be 4 percent and value of Z was 
assumed 38.44 percent. In the first year of the implementation, 2002, the 
telephone tariff was increased on average 15 percent. In the second year,
2003, this plan did not work due to negative public reaction. The second 
tariff adjustment was finally be implemented in 2004 after the government 
established a new telecommunications regulation agency, BRTI. However, 
the third price adjustment was never carried out.
In the mobile cellular service, the regulator established different ceiling 
prices for post-paid and pre-paid plans. For a post-paid service, the regulator 
set a maximum rate of activation, monthly subscription, and airtime. Airtime 
tariff reflects a one-direction traffic fee. It can also be considered as access 
charge. In this post-paid plan, the regulator also ruled that the maximum 
usage fee is twice the airtime rate. Furthermore, for pre-paid service the 
operator could set a retail usage tariff at maximum 140 percent above the 
post-paid plan's tariff. It is quite a high ceiling level. However, no operator 
sets at the maximum level. Moreover, the airtime rate in mobile service has 
never changed since 2001.
New retail price regulations were introduced in February 2008 through two 
ministerial decisions for PSTN retail pricing (KM.09/2006) and mobile 
cellular retail pricing (KM.12/2006) respectively. The new regulations set two 
rules for PSTN retail pricing including initial tariff setting and adjustment 
method. These two methods require complex calculations. The initial tariff
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setting is computed based on costs and traffic. Furthermore, tariff adjustment 
is still based on the previous price cap method. Moreover, in the mobile 
cellular service, new retail price regulation eliminates the ceiling price rule 
and replaces it with floor price. It determines that retail should not be lower 
than access price. However, there is still a filter before a price plan can be 
implemented. Operators should have approval by the regulator (BRT1) 
before they can apply a new tariff scheme. However, according to Herry 
Nugroho, former independent member of KRTI, this new price regulation is 
only a transitional regulation and the regulator currently is still preparing 
revision of these newly established price regulations (KPPU 2007:19).
2.4. Internet Service Market
Internet access in Indonesia was initiated on campuses, especially in 
University of Indonesia and Bandung Institute of Technology. Commercial 
Internet provision in Indonesia was pioneered in 1994 when an independent 
ISP, Indonet, offered the service to the public using the international direct 
dialing service (APJII 2001:13). At that time, there was no regulation on 
Internet provision. Government involvement in the Internet market was 
started in 1995 when it awarded two licenses for Indonet and Radnet (APJII 
2001:13).
In the early period of Internet provision, the government intended to 
prioritize this business for young entrepreneurs conducting small and 
medium business. This policy was positively responded to by many 
companies, shown by a spectacular increase in ISP licenses of around 27
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licenses in 1996. However, there were only 15 ISPs that could operate due to 
limited access to the networks (APJII 2001:13).
In general, the structure of Internet provision in Indonesia can be illustrated 
in Figure 2.2. In that structure, an independent ISP only acts as an 
intermediary agent that requires access to global Internet networks through 
Network Access Point (NAP) and to its subscriber through PSTN's 
exchanges and local access networks. The bandwidth of access to the NAP 
affects speed of downloading or uploading data from and to global 
networks, while the access to PSTN determines the probability of successful 
Internet connection from end users. ISPs' expenditures for these inputs are 
around 20 percent for access to PSTN and 40 percent for access to 
international networks (Kontan 2008). This cost structure describes how 
external factors heavily affect ISPs' retail price.
Figure 2.2. Structure of Internet Provision in Indonesia
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Moreover, although both connections are crucial, access to PSTN's exchanges 
is possibly the only bottleneck in this service (Economides 2002:393-4). This 
argument may be true since usually there are several competing NAPs while 
access to subscribers is still dominated by incumbent network providers like 
the conditions in Indonesia.
In addition, some ISPs created the association called APJII (The Indonesian 
Internet Service Provider Association) to solve their common problems 
which mainly related to a high access tariff. In mid-1997, APJII successfully 
developed an Indonesian Internet Exchange or IIX (APJII 2001:14). This 
exchange interconnects servers of the ISPs that make domestic Internet traffic 
does not need to re-route through international networks, which in turn 
increases the traffic and the utilization of domestic domain addresses.
Related to the last miles access network, an independent ISP which offers 
dial-up service faces two exogenous problems including price of leased-line 
to PSTN and the retail tariff of local access imposed on its subscribers. These 
problems may affect its Internet price and demand. In this case, an operator 
that provides leased lines and local access networks may exercise its power. 
In fact, there are some alternatives to access networks to reach retail 
subscribers such as mobile cellular service, cable TV, or broadband wireless 
networks, but the utilization is still limited due to some restrictions such as 
higher access tariff, small network coverage, or regulations.
During the economic crisis in 1997, some small ISPs could not operate well 
and the then government eliminated the restriction that prioritized young 
entrepreneurs (Minges 2002:10). Since then, major network operators such as 
Telkom and Indosat have started to participate in the industry. In 1999,
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Telkom, which is also a domestic network provider, entered the Internet 
business through its multimedia division. Telkom offers a popular and 
flexible dial-up Internet service called Telkomnet Instan. It bundles Internet 
service and local telephone service. Moreover, users of this product do not 
need to register or pay a monthly subscription fee, but just dial a specific 
premium number (0809 89999) and the charge for Internet usage will be 
added in monthly telephone billing.
In less than two years, Telkomnet was able to attract more than 100,000 
subscribers, which made it the biggest ISP in Indonesia (Minges, 2002:10). 
Telkomnet's subscribers grew from year to year and reached around 689,000 
subscribers in 2006 (Telkom, 2007:5). Table 2.4 puts together some 
information about the market share of Telkomnet and some big ISPs between 
2000 and 2007 from various sources.
Table 2.4. Market Share of The ISPs
ISP 2000* 2002** 2003** 2004** 2007***
Telkomnet - 55% 60% 72% 73%
IM2 (Indosat) 16% 4% 5% 5 % 4%
CBN 11 % 7% 7% 6 % 4%
Radnet 8% 3% 3% 3 % 1%
Centrin 8% 6% 5% 6 % 3%
Indonet 6% 14% 9% 4 % 3%
Others 51% 11 % 5% 4 % 12%
Sources: *) APJII (2000:8), **) Processed from APJII data, ***) Susatyo (2008:8)
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However, Telkomnet's achievement is also often associated with its behavior. 
Telkom's participation in Internet service provision obviously shows a 
vertically integrated operator because Telkom dominates the fixed-network 
service market, which is essential for Internet service provision. Figure 2.3 
shows the position of Telkom's Internet service in the network structure. This 
unbalanced condition followed by Telkom's progressive pricing strategies 
often raises anticompetitive allegations from competitor ISPs.
Figure 2.3. Telkom's Position in Internet Service Market
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Several complaints were addressed to Telkomnet. For example, Indosat 
claimed that the stagnation in its customer growth in 2000 was due to the 
difficulties of leased-lines connection to Telkom (Minges, 2002:10). In 
addition, in the report to the KPPU (Competition Commission), APJII 
indicated a discriminatory conduct, that is, Telkom charges a different 
commitment fee for the lines leased by ISPs in some regions. Moreover, 
Telkom often rejected independent ISPs' proposals to have an additional 
leased line channel, but it always provided an additional channel for
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Telkomnet (Koran Tempo, 2002). In addition to access problems 
(discrimination and the difficulty to have a connection to PSTN networks), 
Telkomnet's retail pricing strategies may also engage in unfair conduct. Heru 
Nugroho, former APJ1I Secretary General, argued that Telkomnet is not fair 
because it only offers bundle price and integrated billing (Swa 2002:78).
In fact, that Telkomnet's product is superior in term of flexibility and 
bundled price is not necessarily anticompetitive. However, if a vertically 
integrated operator bundles its bottleneck facility, in some condition its 
behavior can be anticompetitive. Unfortunately, there has been no in-depth 
analysis related to this issue neither by the KPPU as competition watchdog 
nor by BRTI as sector specific regulator.
2.5. Mobile Cellular Service Market
The mobile cellular service was introduced in Indonesia in the early 1990s. In 
the early period of mobile cellular service, there were several operators 
which used analog technology including Komselindo, Metrosel, and Telesera 
with Advance Mobile Phone System (AMPS) technology and Mobisel with 
Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT-450 MHz) technology. At that time, among 
these operators, only Komselindo and Mobisel had licenses for national 
operation and the rest could only serve certain regions.
In 1994, Satelindo was established as a new telecommunications operator. It 
is the first operator that used digital mobile cellular service based on Global 
System for Mobile (GSM) technology. A year later, Telkomsel and 
Excelcomindo also entered the market. Furthermore, Indosat also entered the
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market in 2001. These four operators were awarded licenses for national 
operation. In addition, lately Natrindo also received a license as GSM 
operator but only for serving the East Java region. Furthermore, after 
acquisition of Satelindo by Indosat in 2002, practically there were only three 
national GSM operators. Moreover, former analog operators also adopted 
another digital system based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
technology in 2003. However, for more than a decade these three national 
GSM operators still dominated the mobile cellular market.
In 2006, the government awarded licenses for third generation technology to 
five operators including these existing four GSM operators and a new 
entrant, Hutchison ('S'). Table 2.5 presents mobile cellular operators with 
national coverage licenses and the technology they used operating in late 
2006. Table 2.6 shows market shares and subscriber distribution among these 
operators.
Table 2.5. Mobile Cellular Operators and Their Technologies
No Operators Technology
1 T elk o m sel G SM -900/1800M hz a n d  3G -2 .1G H z
2 In d o sa t (S a te lin d o  a n d  IM3) G SM -900/1800M hz a n d  3G -2 .1G H z
3 E x ce lco m in d o  (XL) G SM -900/1800M hz a n d  3G -2.1G H z
4 M obile-8 C D M A 20001X -800 M h z
5
S a m p o e rn a  T e lek o m u n ik a s i 
In d o n e s ia
C D M A 20001X -450 M h z
6 N a tr in d o  T e lep o n  S elu le r G SM  a n d  3G -2 .1G H z
7 H u tc h in so n  C P  In d o n es ia  ('3 ') G SM  an d  3G -2 .1G H z
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Table 2.6. Operators' Subscribers and Market Shares
Operators
Subscribers Share
2004 2005 2006 2006
1 Telkomsel 15,101,000 24,269,000 35,597,000 55.79%
2 Indosat (Satelindo and IM3) 9,754,607 14,512,453 16,704,729 26.18%
3 Excelcomindo (XL) 3,791,000 6,978,519 9,527,970 14.93%
4 Mobile-8 500,000 1,200,000 1,825,888 2.86%
5 Sampoerna Telekomunikasi 
Indonesia - - 134,713 0.21%
6 Natrindo Telepon Seluler - - 12,715 0.02%
TOTAL 29,148,611 46,961,977 63,803,015
Source: DGPT in Table 5 of KPPU (2007:14-15)
The tables above indicate that until the end of 2006, the three biggest GSM 
operators (Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo) still dominated the mobile 
cellular market with around 96.9 percent of market share. Moreover, among 
these three, the two largest operators, Telkomsel and Indosat, held almost 82 
percent of the market share. This dominance continued until late 2007 even 
though some new operators entered the market.
At that time, the shares of Telkomsel and Indosat were partially held by two 
different Singaporean companies, SingTel and Singapore 
Telecommunications and Telegraph (STT) respectively. These two 
Singaporean companies are believed to be under the command of Temasek 
Holding Company. Moreover, Excelcomindo were also partially owned by a
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foreign investor, Telecom Malaysia, but it has no cross relationship with its 
competitors. Since price-competition was less intense, that is, the operators 
tended to set retail price at/close to the maximum regulated price, partial 
cross-ownership of Telkomsel and Indosat was suspected to facilitate 
collusion.
This partial cross-ownership and identical tariff pattern of Telkomsel and 
Indosat in mobile cellular service has led to allegations of possible price 
fixing or collusive pricing. Initially, a non-governmental organization called 
FSP-BUMN filed a formal allegation to the competition commission (KPPU) 
in late 2006. KPPU continued the investigation even though FSP-BUMN has 
withdrawn its report. In late 2007, KPPU concluded that the cross-ownership 
is one factor causing the high tariffs of Telkomsel and Indosat. Details about 
this case will be discussed further in the chapter about competition in the 
mobile cellular market.
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Chapter 3
Exclusionary Behavior in One-way Access
One-way access structure is a condition when there is a vertically integrated 
operator monopolizing or dominating the upstream market with its own 
bottleneck facility who competes with non-integrated operators in the 
downstream market. In this case, only the vertically integrated operator has a 
direct access to subscribers. Downstream competitors cannot by-pass the 
bottleneck network to reach their subscribers due to several reasons, such as 
high investment cost or regulatory constraints. A simple description of a 
market with one-way access structure is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Illustration of One-way Access Model
vertically integrated operator
Access / 
Interconnection
Subsidiary of 
integrated 
operator
Independent
non-integrated
operators
Access
Networks
Upstream
market
Downstream
m a r k p t
Subscribers
Services provided by the downstream competitors can only be delivered if 
they are connected to bottleneck networks of the vertically integrated 
operator. This structure creates unbalanced competition because
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independent downstream operators highly depend on the access service of 
their competitor, a vertically integrated operator. Furthermore, the structure 
provides the vertically integrated operator with a chance to discriminate 
access provision to rivals either through access-price or non access-price 
strategy. Discriminatory practice would weaken the position of non- 
integrated operators in the market and in the extreme case it can exclude 
them from the market. However, the literature argues that strategies which 
force rivals out of business are not necessarily realized. The incentive to 
exclude rivals is influenced by several factors such as regulation in access 
price, level of competition in the downstream market, and substitutability of 
the downstream product.
In a market with one-way access structure, bundling is one strategy that can 
be used by an integrated operator to exclude downstream rivals. In this case, 
a practice that bundles monopolistic and competitive products by a vertically 
integrated operator in one-way access structure may be used to implement 
access price discrimination. Access price discrimination makes the retail price 
of the integrated operator lower than that of rivals. Therefore, this practice 
may predate downstream rivals. However, access price discrimination 
practice either through bundling or other strategies is also often used to 
maximize profit. Therefore, bundling in one-way access structure that is 
suspected as a mean to implement price discrimination is not necessarily 
anticompetitive. Bundling in one-way access can be considered as a 
predatory behavior if the pricing of the bundle leads to profit sacrifice and it 
gives adverse impact to rivals.
This chapter discusses three major topics. Section 3.1 describes some possible 
strategies of a vertically integrated operator in one-way access toward its
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downstream rivals. This section shows that bundling is able to be used as a 
strategy to exclude rivals. Section 3.2 presents some argument from the 
literature about some motivations for these strategies. This part explores 
some papers indicating that access-price discrimination strategies, including 
bundling, are not necessarily anticompetitive. Section 3.3 looks at literature 
on anticompetitive bundling and the methods to identify it.
3.1. Exclusionary Strategies of a Vertical Integrated Operator
The incentive for an upstream monopolist to operate vertically integrated is 
influenced by the existence of access regulation and level of competition in 
the downstream market. If the downstream market is perfectly competitive 
and the price of upstream product is not regulated, the upstream monopolist 
might be less motivated to provide downstream service because it can extract 
all monopoly rent just from providing access (Tirole 1988:175). However, in 
most of the cases, the downstream market is not perfectly competitive and 
access price is regulated or at least tightly observed by the competition 
authority. This condition then encourages the bottleneck owner to compete 
in the downstream market as a vertically integrated operator to maximize its 
profit (Mandy 2000:157).
A vertically integrated operation enables the operator to internalize access- 
related problems, especially those related to cost or technical matters. This 
internalization can eliminate double marginalization which in turn increases 
efficiency. However, participation of the upstream monopolist in the down 
stream market as a vertically integrated operator in one-way access makes 
market competition unbalanced. A vertically integrated operator may have a
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chance to abuse its power in the upstream market to exclude rivals or to 
soften competition. The risk of anticompetitive conduct is the main problem 
of allowing vertical integration (Vickers 1995:12). This risk made the 
regulator in the US decided to vertically separate an existing integrated 
incumbent into several independent companies in 1982.
However, the risk is believed to be controllable especially with appropriate 
access pricing regulation. The World Bank (2002:155-7) argues that allowing 
vertically integrated telecommunication operators owning essential facilities 
to compete with entrants should not weaken competition because (i) the 
industry/network has large economic scope, (ii) accounting separation 
between each segment of integrated operation to monitor possible price 
discrimination practices can be applied, (iii) undetected price discrimination 
has no significant effect on competition, and (iv) there are many operators 
interested in providing services in competitive segments that improve 
efficiency and choices for consumers. It implies that if regulation is effective, 
potential anticompetitive behavior in a vertically integrated operation can be 
minimized. For that reason, most of the countries permit vertical integrated 
operation. For example, the regulator in the UK permitted the vertically 
integrated incumbent to compete with new entrants with several restrictions 
(Laffont and Tirole 1994:1673-4). Moreover, in 1996 the US regulator finally 
relaxed a prohibition of vertical integrated operation by awarding a long 
distance service license for Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC), a 
dominant local access provider (Zimmerman 2003:269-70).
In fact, regulating a vertically integrated operator in one-way access is not 
easy (Vickers 1995:12). Determining appropriate access price can be very 
complex due to asymmetric information between regulator and operators.
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Furthermore, even though access price is regulated, the vertically integrated 
operator may still be able to behave anti-competitively through some 
strategies. Most papers on one-way access pay attention to some strategies 
implemented by a vertically integrated operator to exclude downstream 
rivals from the market. In most of these papers, anticompetitive conduct in 
one-way access is known as exclusionary behavior. However, there are 
slightly different definitions of exclusionary behavior.
On the one hand, some papers use a narrower definition for exclusionary 
behavior. For example, Salop and Schcffman (1983:267) regard exclusionary 
behavior only as a strategy that does not require profit sacrificing, such as 
raising rivals' cost. Moreover, Laffont and Tirole (2000:161) limit the 
definition of exclusionary conduct only to non-price strategies including 
refusal to deal, raising rivals' costs, and lowering rivals' demand as non-price 
strategies by utilizing domination in a bottleneck to create market power in a 
competitive market.
On the other hand, some other papers define exclusionary behavior in 
broader terms. For example, Weisman (2001:121-2) classifies exclusionary 
conduct into two major strategies including access price discrimination and 
non-price discrimination or sabotage. In addition, Fallon and Menezes 
(2005:197) consider exclusionary conduct as the strategies implemented by a 
company with market power with intention to make rivals unable to 
compete profitably including predatory pricing, raising rivals' costs, 
exclusionary agreement, tying and bundling.
This review tends to follow the broader definition of exclusionary behavior.
A general classification of exclusionary behavior is shown in Figure 3.2. In
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one-way access structure, price of access to the bottleneck facilities owned by 
a vertically integrated operator is usually regulated or monitored by 
competition authority. In this case, behaviors of the operators are affected by 
regulation on access and consistency of its implementation.
Figure 3.2. Several Strategies of Exclusionary Behaviors
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On the one hand, if price regulation is quite strict, the vertically integrated 
operator cannot discriminate access price between its subsidiary and rivals. 
Alternatively, the integrated operator still can realize its anticompetitive 
intention by means of non-price discrimination or sabotage strategies such as 
through lowering quality of access for rivals, tying or bundling the access 
and unnecessary services, refusing to give access, and boycott. The main 
objective of sabotage is to raise rivals' cost. Sabotage makes rivals unable to 
compete effectively in term of price, quality or availability that in turn would 
reduce rivals' demand and in the extreme case, would force rivals out of the 
market.
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On the other hand, if regulation on access price is not severe, such as there is 
no absolute requirement of accounting separation between upstream and 
downstream operation, the integrated operator still has a chance to 
discriminate access price between its subsidiary and rivals. Since explicit 
price discrimination is usually illegal, the operator can implement implicit 
discrimination such as by giving access discounts to its subsidiary or by 
bundling essential and competitive products. By discriminating access price, 
the integrated operator is able to offer lower price by squeezing its prices or 
profit margin, which in turn may have a similar effect as predatory pricing 
on its rivals.
However, these exclusionary strategies are not necessarily implemented by 
the vertically integrated operators in one-way access structure even though 
they have the opportunity to do so. The main reason is that downstream 
rivals are also revenue contributors for the upstream division of the 
integrated operator. The following section presents the discussion in some 
papers related to motivation of a vertically integrated operator in the market 
with one-way access structure.
3.2. Motivation to Implement Exclusionary Strategies
As discussed above, the opportunity to implement either sabotage or access- 
price discrimination strategy by a vertically integrated operator is influenced 
by regulation on access. However, these exclusionary strategies are not 
necessarily exercised even though there is a chance to do so. In addition to 
the strictness of access regulation, the motivation to behave anti- 
competitively is also determined by other factors such as the level of access
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price. If access price is sufficiently above cost, the integrated operator may 
not be motivated to implement exclusionary strategies either through 
sabotage or access-price discrimination. The main reason is that the strategy 
that leads to the exclusion of rivals would lower demand of the upstream 
market, which in turn reduces overall profit. Furthermore, if access price 
were relatively low or close to cost, the vertically integrated operator would 
be more aggressive and may be more motivated to exercise sabotage or 
access-price discrimination.
However, the motive to implement sabotage or access-price discrimination 
can be different. The motive to exercise sabotage strategies tends to be 
considered as anticompetitive. The reason is that, in addition to producing 
harmful effects on rivals and consumers in term of low quality, high retail 
price, or less product options, sabotage does not necessarily increase short- 
run profit. In this case, sabotage can be considered as an economically 
unjustified strategy that disadvantages the economy.
In contrast, motivation of an integrated operator to implement access-price 
discrimination strategy is not necessarily for anticompetitive purposes. Some 
literature indicates that price discrimination may also be intended to 
maximize profit. The logic is that low price due to access price discrimination 
stimulates downstream demand, which in turn may increase access revenue 
and total profit. Access price discrimination may have a predatory effect on 
rivals but it also gives benefit to consumers. Therefore, an implementation of 
access-price discrimination strategies such as through access discount or 
bundling is not a sufficient condition to conclude an anticompetitive 
behavior. For that reason, a careful analysis should be taken in examining
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behavior of a vertically integrated operator in one-way access structure 
especially when an access-price discrimination strategy is exercised.
A brief description of the discussion about the incentive to sabotage and 
discriminate access-price in the literature is presented in two sections below.
3.2.1. Incentive to Sabotage
The papers dealing with sabotage have slightly different views about 
motivation to exclude rivals. One view tends to conclude that a vertically 
integrated operator most likely exercises sabotage. The others argue that 
exclusionary behavior is not necessarily implemented especially when access 
price is set above cost. One main reason is that the downstream competitors 
are also contributors to upstream revenue and raising rivals' costs might 
reduce the total profit of the integrated operator. Below are more detailed 
discussions about the findings from the papers on sabotage or non-price 
discrimination.
Economides (1998) is the one who argues that a vertically integrated operator 
will always undertake sabotage. His argument is based on a model assuming 
that downstream market of one-way access structure competes according to 
Cournot oligopoly. In his model, a variable that represents non-price 
discrimination is added in the profit function of the independent 
downstream operators. An increase in this variable reflects an escalation of 
rivals' costs. By maximizing profit with respect to this non-price 
discrimination variable, he concludes that any increase in this variable raises 
the profit of the vertically integrated operator (Economides 1998:278). This 
finding implies that a vertically integrated operator always has the incentive
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to sabotage its rival to maximize profit. Moreover, by assuming linear 
demand in the model, the incentive to sabotage still exists regardless of the 
efficiency of the downstream subsidiary of the vertically integrated operator 
(Economides 1998:281).
In contrast, there are several papers that argue that a vertically integrated 
operator is not necessarily motivated to exclude downstream rivals. These 
papers are based on the analysis of possible behavior of Regional Bell 
Operating Companies (RBOC) if they are allowed to enter the competitive 
long-distance market. In this case RBOC are monopolists in the local 
telephone service (upstream market) providing access for operators of long­
distance service (downstream market). RBOC's participation in long distance 
service will create vertically integrated operators competing with 
independent downstream operators which need access to RBOC. Prior to 
entrance, the regulator in the US requires that the local telephone market 
should have been opened for competition and RBOC's market share has been 
reduced. In general, these papers conclude that RBOC may have an incentive 
to discriminate if any of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) access price 
is set at cost, (ii) market share of the integrated operator in the downstream 
market has been relatively large, or (iii) domination in upstream market is 
threatened. This finding suggests that the policy which asks for reduction in 
upstream market share would have an adverse effect on the competition and 
encourage discriminatory practice towards downstream rivals. Below is a 
brief description of the analyses and findings of these papers.
Firstly, Weisman (1995) analyzes the case of RBOC entrance based on 
Stackelberg's leader-follower model and assumes that access price is 
regulated but RBOC still can raise rivals' costs through non-price strategy.
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He concludes that if the share in the downstream market is still relatively 
small and it receives sufficient profit margin from the access market, RBOC 
would prefer a low downstream price in order to eliminate double 
marginalization and to stimulate downstream demand that increases its 
profit from access service (Weisman 1995:255-6). This conclusion implies that 
an integrated operator does not have an incentive to raise rivals' cost if it acts 
as a new entrant in the down-stream market and has sufficient profit margin 
in the upstream market.
Sibley and Weisman (1998a) investigate the same case based on the Cournot 
model. They argue that RBOC would be less motivated to behave anti- 
competitively if the price of the upstream product is set above cost and its 
downstream market share is still relatively small (Sibley and Weisman 
1998a:457). These findings are similar with the one of Sibley and Weisman 
(1998b). In that case, the vertically integrated operator prefers to have more 
downstream competitors to increase upstream profit (Sibley and Weisman 
1998b:88). In addition, they argue that efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) 
which requires access price to be set at marginal cost plus opportunity cost of 
providing access may be able to reduce anticompetitive motive of the 
upstream provider (Sibley and Weisman 1998b:81). Weisman (2001:124) also 
argues that access price below ECPR level would induce the integrated 
operator to sabotage its rivals.
Related to the case of RBOC entry in the competitive long distance market, 
Zimmerman (2003) undertakes an empirical study using state level panel- 
data between 1996 and 2001. During that period RBOC's upstream market 
started to open for competition. The study indicates that RBOC was engaged 
in quality discrimination strategy soon after it was allowed to enter the long
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distance market (Zimmerman 2003:271). This finding shows that a vertically 
integrated operator is likely to sabotage downstream competitors if its 
upstream market is threatened.
In addition to the papers about RBOC above, Mandy (2000) reviews some 
literature related to non-price discrimination in one-way access. He finds 
several parameters that influence the motivation to exclude rivals and 
concludes that sabotage is likely if (i) downstream product is relatively 
homogeneous, (ii) cost of sabotage is relatively small from the gain it nets,
(iii) downstream product has a decreasing return of scale, (iv) downstream 
rivals are relatively less efficient, (v) upstream and downstream subsidiaries 
are closely managed, (vi) downstream market is less competitive, (vii) lack of 
competition in upstream market, and (viii) upstream margin is relatively 
small (Mandy 2000:160-1). Furthermore, Mandy reexamines the model of 
Economides (1998) by varying three parameters related to competition and 
efficiency in the downstream market, and the profit margin of the upstream 
product. He finds different conclusion from Economides (1998): that the 
incentive to sabotage diminishes if the upstream margin is relatively high 
regardless of the downstream market conditions (Mandy 2000:166-7).
3.2.2. Incentive to Discriminate Access Price
Access-price discrimination by a vertically integrated operator, a practice 
that charges different access prices between its downstream subsidiary and 
competitors, is often considered illegal because it breaches equal treatment 
principles in access provision. Moreover, access-price discrimination can also 
be used to exercise an anticompetitive motive that may endanger market 
competition. In the short term, the low retail price because of access-price
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discrimination may benefit customers, but after the competitors are excluded 
from the market, the integrated operator may be able to exercise its market 
power leading to high retail price.
The incentive to discriminate access price is stronger if access price is 
relatively low. In this case, access price discrimination is not necessarily 
implemented explicitly but can also be realized through indirect or in­
disguise strategies such as access discount or bundling. However, in addition 
to anticompetitive purpose, the motivation for exercising access-price 
discrimination may also be aimed at maximizing profit.
In fact, in one-way access structure, the cost to serve one's own subsidiary 
can be lower than to serve rivals due to some factors such as location, 
economies of scale, or co-ordination process. Therefore, access price can also 
be different and the discrimination reflects the efficiency of a service. In other 
words, access-price discrimination can reduce double marginalization of 
upstream and downstream services. Since efficiency leads to lower price and 
higher demand, the discrimination can be considered as an effort to 
maximize overall profit. It implies that, even though low prices due to 
access-price discrimination may give predatory effect to downstream rivals, 
the discrimination is not always considered as a predatory conduct. The 
paragraphs below describe some papers arguing that access-price 
discrimination can be a profit-maximizing strategy.
King (1999) compares profit functions between an integrated operator and 
downstream competitors based on the Cournot model. He argues that access- 
price discrimination may adversely impact downstream competitors but it 
increases social welfare, which is desirable (King 1999:23). If the downstream
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market is entered only by one competitor, an integrated operator would 
discriminate access price and set aggressive pricing leading to higher 
downstream output and lower retail price (King 1999:30). Furthermore, if 
there are several operators entering the downstream market, the aggressive 
pricing may give an exclusionary effect to downstream rivals but it increases 
total surplus (King 1999:32). In both cases, the incentive to discriminate 
access price is aimed at maximizing total profit of the vertically integrated 
operator.
Similarly, using a variation of the Cournot model, Krouse and Krouse (2005) 
examine the incentive to discriminate access price through an access discount 
offered by the integrated operator to its downstream subsidiary. They 
conclude that price discrimination is likely exercised because it increases 
downstream market share and profit (Krouse and Krouse 2005:41). 
Furthermore, even though regulated access price is at incremental cost, 
access-price discrimination is still likely exercised, especially if downstream 
products are sufficiently substitutable and the upstream-downstream 
divisions of the integrated operator can effectively co-ordinate their strategic 
behavior (Krouse and Krouse 2005:43). Their finding implies that the 
integrated operator may charge below cost access price to its subsidiary in 
order to maximize its total profit.
Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) analyze two-period game competition in one­
way access based on the Hotelling model of product differentiation by 
including an assumption that the downstream competitors are uncertain 
about the relative advantage of the integrated operator. They find that the 
incentive to set low retail price diminishes if access price is sufficiently high 
(Biglaiser and DeGraba 2001:311). The reason is that low downstream price
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can predate rivals that reduce upstream demand and revenue (Biglaiser and 
DeGraba 2001:311). Furthermore, it implies that the decision to set low price 
that gives predatory effect to downstream rivals is influenced by short-run 
profit maximizing objective. This finding contradicts with the general 
perception that high access charge would give more room for an integrated 
operator to squeeze its price through access-price discrimination.
Fjell and Foros (2008) examine a similar case based on the Bertrand model of 
price competition with product differentiation. Similar to Biglaiser and 
DeGraba (2001), they conclude that if upstream input price is above cost a 
vertically integrated operator has less incentive to set low downstream price 
because it lowers total profit (Fjell and Foros 2008:23). If access price is 
lowered, the downstream integrated operator's pricing would be aggressive 
in order to maximize total short-run profit (Fjell and Foros 2008:23).
3.3. Anticompetitive Bundling
Bundling is a common business strategy that sells two or more different 
products in one package. In general, there are two types of bundling, pure 
and mixed bundling. In pure bundling the products are only sold as a 
package. In contrast, in mixed bundling consumers are provided with 
options whether to buy the package or individual products in the package.
Bundling, especially mixed-bundling, may benefit consumers in the form of 
low bundled price or availability of options that match their need. Flowever, 
in certain circumstances bundling can also be used as a strategy to behave 
anti-competitively. A potential anticompetitive effect of bundling arises in
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the situation when the firm offering the bundle monopolizes or dominates 
one or more elements in the package (Gans and King 2005:30). Therefore, a 
practice that bundles monopolistic upstream and competitive downstream 
products by a vertically integrated operator in a market with one-way access 
can be suspected as an anticompetitive behavior.
If upstream and downstream products are purely bundled, in which the 
upstream and downstream products are only sold as a package, this practice 
leads to high retail price because rivals' customers are forced to buy 
unnecessary downstream products in the bundle. This pure-bundling 
practice is also not a profit-maximizing strategy (Lewbel 1985:106).
Therefore, this practice can be concluded to be an anticompetitive behavior. 
Furthermore, in the case of mixed bundling, that is when upstream and 
downstream products are offered in a bundle as well as separately, bundling 
can also be suspected as a mean to implement hidden predatory pricing or 
cross subsidy, especially if there is a significant bundled discount to the 
package (Gans and King 2005:33).
However, a mixed-bundling can also be considered as a profit-maximizing 
strategy, especially if the demands of competitive downstream product and 
the bundle are negatively correlated (Lewbel 1985:106). As discussed in the 
previous section, this profit-maximizing strategy may have exclusionary 
effect to the rivals but it may have no anticompetitive intention. It suggests 
that mixed-bundling in one-way access is not necessarily anticompetitive. 
Therefore, a careful analysis and judgment need to be made in identifying 
whether a strategy can be categorized as anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct or efficient competitive strategies (Motta 2004:411; Melamed 
2005:1249).
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The following two sections explore some approaches to examine 
anticompetitive bundling and present an alternative concept to identify 
predatory behavior, which can be used in analyzing anticompetitive 
bundling.
3.3.1. Identifying Anticompetitive Bundling
There are several methods for identifying anticompetitive bundling. 
Economides and Lianos (2008) classified existing empirical approaches of 
bundling into two categories including (i)the anticompetitive foreclosure 
approach to bundling, and (ii) the modified predatory pricing rule approach 
to bundling. The decision in the case of LePage's vs 3 M  in 2003 is one example 
of the anticompetitive foreclosure approach to bundling. Moreover, a recent 
decision of the Ninth Circuit of the United States in the case of Cascade Health 
vs PeaceHealth in 2007 is an instance of a modified predatory pricing 
approach to bundling. In addition to empirical methods, there is also a 
concept to identify exclusionary bundling proposed by Professor Nalebuff 
(2005) of Yale that can be considered as one variant of the modified 
predatory pricing approach to bundling. The following paragraphs briefly 
illustrate these three approaches.
Anticompetitive foreclosure approach -  LePage's vs 3M
A brief description of the case LePage's vs 3M  in 2003 summarized from 
Ramirez (2005) is presented as follow. 3M is a dominant producer of 
transparent tape with around 90 percent of market share that also supplies 
other various products. LePage is a small producer of private transparent 
tape. Lately, 3M also produces private transparent tape and competes
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directly with LePage. 3M offers its distributors a discount if they purchase 
private transparent tape in a bundle with other 3M products. LePage alleges 
that 3M's bundled discount is an exclusionary strategy. In fact, the difference 
between prices of 3M's bundle and the sum of prices of 3M's individual 
elements in the bundle without transparent tape is still above cost of 
transparent tape. However, 3rd Circuit Court does not merely stand its 
analysis on cost calculation. It then decides that 3M's bundled discount is 
anticompetitive in the sense that 3M as a dominant multi-products firm 
implement a strategy that may give potential exclusionary effect to its 
competitors, which only offer a limited number of products.
In this case pricing above cost still can be considered as anticompetitive if it 
is undertaken by a firm with power in several markets and it has potential 
exclusionary effect on small competitors in one of its markets. However, this 
decision faces some critiques because it does not gives clear principle in 
determining anticompetitive behavior.
Modified predatory pricing rule approach -  Cascade Health vs PeaceHealth
A brief description of the case Cascade Health vs PeaceHealth in 2007 
summarized from the published report of the United States Court of Appeal 
for the Ninth Circuit (2007) is presented below.
PeaceHealth and McKanzie are two providers of hospital service in a county 
in Oregon. PeaceHealth provides primary, secondary, and tertiary services of 
health care while McKanzie only offers the first two services. The tertiary 
service is a more complex health service. PeaceHealth offers higher discount 
to the insurance companies if they buy all these services in bundle. McKanzie
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claims that strategy is exclusionary because it will prevent the insurance 
company to buy first and secondary services from it.
The Ninth Circuit applies a different principle from the Third Circuit. In this 
case, a bundled discount is considered anticompetitive if the implied price of 
the competitive product (the difference between the price of the unbundled 
competitive product and the bundled discount) is under average variable 
cost of the competitive product. The following paragraph shows a quotation 
from the Ninth Circuit decision about exclusionary bundled discount.
.... to prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for 
the purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after 
allocating the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of 
products to the competitive product or products, the defendant sold 
the competitive product or products below its average variable cost of 
producing them.
(Ninth Circuit 2007)
In other words, the principle used by the Ninth Circuit can be expressed as 
follow. Assume there are two products x and y where x is competitive and y 
is monopolized. Their respective prices are px and py. A bundle of x and y is 
priced at pb where pb < px + py. Discount for the bundle is d = (px + py)- pb. 
This bundled discount can be considered anticompetitive if (px -  d) is less 
than average variable cost to produce x.
The method used in this case is similar with the below cost pricing 
principle as commonly used in identifying predatory pricing. The 
decision also receives appreciation because it gives clearer principles.
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Exclusionary Bundling Concept
In addition to these empirical cases, Prof. Barry Nalebuff also proposes a 
framework to identify exclusionary bundling based on incremental cost. He 
proposed a theory on exclusionary bundling, which is defined as below.
Exclusionary bundling arises when a firm has market power in 
product A and faces competition in product B. A firm engages in 
exclusionary bundling when the incremental price for an AB bundle 
over A alone is less than the long-run average variable cost of B.
(Nalebuff, 2005:328)
In other word, the test of exclusionary bundling can be expressed as follow. 
There are two products x and y where x is competitive and y is monopolized. 
Their respective prices are px and py. The competitive products are relatively 
homogeneous. Dominant or monopolist of product B provides a bundle of x 
and y which is priced at pb where pb < px + py. Exclusionary bundling exists if 
implied price of competitive product x or (pb -  py) is less than its long-run 
average cost.
He also argues that exclusionary bundling differs with predatory pricing 
because the bundle does not necessarily incur loss and consequently does not 
require recoupment of that loss, but it may be equivalent to vertical price 
squeeze (Nalebuff, 2005:322). In general, for some extent, the principle of 
exclusionary bundling is similar with the approach used in Cascade Health vs 
PeaceHealth in 2007.
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3.3.2. The Predatory Pricing Rule Approach to Bundling
As indicated above, the development of methods for identifying 
anticompetitive bundling tends to favor an approach based on the 
predatory pricing rule. In its standard concept, predatory pricing 
analysis requires at least three conditions to satisfy: (i) the predator to 
give-up its short-run profit, (ii) exclusion of rivals from the market, and 
(iii) recoupment of loss. In the modified predatory pricing rule 
approach to bundling, this requirement is much simpler, it only needs 
to prove that bundling practice indicates a profit sacrifice and evidence 
of injury of rivals, and it does not require the evidence of loss 
recoupment. The main reason is that anticompetitive bundling is not 
necessarily a loss-making strategy as in predatory pricing, but it may 
only be a price or margin squeeze strategy where in total the firm still 
retains a certain profit margin. In addition, this strategy is not always 
followed by the exit of competitors from the market.
In most practical anti-trust cases, profit sacrifice is mainly analyzed based on 
cost and price information or known as the cost-based approach. The initial 
idea of the cost-based approach was proposed by Areda and Turner, who 
suggest that below marginal cost pricing by dominant firms is considered as 
un-lawful predatory conduct (Gelhorn and Kovacic 1994:137-8). Since 
information on marginal cost is sometimes hard to estimate, in practice, 
average variable cost or average incremental cost was used as a proxy. In 
general, the modified predatory pricing approach to bundling is similar to 
the cost-based approach of predatory pricing, in that anticompetitive 
bundling is also indicated if the implied price of an unbundled product is 
below cost.
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Joskow and Klevoric (1979) propose an alternative view of profit sacrifice in 
predatory pricing. They argue that profit sacrifice does not necessarily 
require the below-cost pricing condition. Any price reduction, even though it 
is above cost, can also be considered as a predatory strategy as long as it has 
adverse effect on rivals. Their definition of predatory pricing is presented 
below.
Predatory pricing behavior involves a reduction of price in the short run 
so as to drive competing firm out of the market or discourage entry of a 
new firm in an effort to gain larger profits via higher prices in the long- 
run than would have been earned if the price reduction had not 
occurred.
(Joskow and Klevoric 1979: 219-20)
They also propose a two-tier framework of predatory pricing test which 
consists of structural analysis and cost-based test (Joskow and Klevoric 
1979:245-55). The first tier is a structural analysis that examines the market 
power of the firm. In this stage, if the predating firm does not have market 
power, allegation of predatory behavior is rejected. The second tier is a 
behavioral analysis which observers the cost-price relationship. There are 
three criteria of pricing behaviors in the second tier test including (i) price 
below average variable cost is unlawful predatory behavior if it deters rivals, 
(ii) price above average total cost is considered lawful if there is no price 
increase in a certain period of time, and (iii) price between average variable 
cost and average total cost may imply possible predatory behavior if there is 
no convincing reason (Joskow and Klevoric 1979:250-5).
These methods, the cost-based approach and Joskow and Klevoric's 
predatory pricing test, seem to heavily rely on accurate cost information. In 
some industries cost information is more feasible to calculate. But in high
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technology industries with high fixed assets producing multiple products, 
such telecommunications, the marginal or variable cost is almost negligible. 
It makes the approaches which depend on cost information less appropriate 
to apply because it would lead to inaccurate analysis and tend to pass these 
tests. In addition, these approaches seem only to rely on supply side 
information. In fact, demand also affects pricing behavior of the firms. 
Moreover, these approaches also assume that the competing products are 
relatively undifferentiated and consumers' preference to these products is 
similar. Actually, the products are often sufficiently differentiated and 
consumers' preference is different.
Another alternative concept of profit sacrifice is proposed by Ordover 
and Willig (1981). Their definition of predatory pricing is presented 
below.
....  a predatory behavior is a response to a rival that sacrifices part of
the profit that could be earned under competitive conditions, were the 
rival remain viable, in order to induce exit and gain consequent 
additional monopoly profit.
(Ordover and Willigl981:9-10)
Their definition above indicates that indication of predatory pricing requires 
three conditions including (i) short-run profit sacrifice, (ii) exclusion of 
competitors, and (iii) additional profit gain after exclusion. The main 
difference of this concept to the traditional cost-based approach is that profit 
sacrifice does not necessarily require below-cost pricing. If the main objective 
of a firm is to maximize its profit then profit sacrifice can be interpreted 
simply as a pricing strategy that does not maximize profit. The principle to 
determine profit sacrifice seems more suitable to be used in this research 
because it does not highly depend on cost information.
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As mentioned above, the modified predatory pricing approach to 
bundling is simpler than the standard predatory pricing test, it only 
requires two conditions including (i) profit sacrifice, and (ii) indication 
of an adverse effect of the bundling on rivals. It does not entail the 
evidence of exclusion of rivals and loss recoupment. Applying the profit 
sacrifice concept of Ordover and Willig (1981) in the modified predatory 
pricing approach to bundling, the test of anticompetitive bundling 
requires two concurrent conditions:
(i) price of the bundle shows an economically unjustified 
strategy which is not profit maximizing;
(ii) there is an indication of injuries or adverse effect to rivals.
The requirements imply that any profit sacrifice pricing that does not harm 
competitors is not considered as an anticompetitive behavior. It may indicate 
that the firm is pursuing another objective instead of profit maximization. 
Furthermore, profit-maximizing pricing by a vertically integrated firm that 
adversely affects rivals is not assumed to be anticompetitive conduct. These 
principles are used in analyzing anticompetitive pricing of bundling by a 
vertically integrated operator in one-way access in this research.
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Chapter 4
Competition in the Dial-up Internet Market
A Case of Exclusionary Bundling in One-way Access
Competition in providing dial-up Internet service has an unbalanced 
structure. Telkom, a vertically integrated operator dominating the upstream 
local telephone service, competes with independent Internet service 
providers (ISPs) in the downstream dial-up Internet service market through 
its subsidiary, Telkomnet. In this case, subscribers of the independent ISPs 
need local telephone service to access dial-up Internet service and pay both 
services, local telephone and Internet services, separately. In contrast, 
Telkomnet bundles dial-up Internet and local telephone services with flexible 
terms and conditions. An anticompetitive concern emerges when Telkomnet 
offers a significant discount on its Internet bundle that may predate 
downstream rivals.
This chapter analyses one case related to the discount program of 
Telkomnet's Internet bundle known as the WeekendNet promotion discount 
program. It is the longest Telkomnet discount program offered between 2006 
and 2007. The discount is for weekend usage with a significant rebate that 
makes the price of the bundle close to the local telephone tariff. It implies 
that Telkomnet's Internet service is sold at a very low price. However, since 
there is no accurate information about the cost of dial-up Internet service, it is
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not clear whether this low price is below cost and consequently cannot be 
used to identify predatory pricing strategy through bundling.
An alternative approach argues that predatory pricing is not necessarily 
below-cost pricing but also includes any unreasonable pricing strategy that 
sacrifices profit and adversely affects rivals. A static analysis based on actual 
traffic shows that own-price elasticity of Telkomnet demand is inelastic, 
meaning any discount program is not profit maximizing or sacrifices overall 
profit. Furthermore, the data also show overall ISP traffics is almost 
independent from Telkomnet pricing behavior. For that reason, the 
WeekendNet discount program is not considered an anticompetitive 
behavior.
However, in the dynamic sense, the discount can be considered as a strategy 
to threaten competitors or to persuade the regulator to relax its control over 
this market. Consequently, the regulator still should be aware of possible 
anticompetitive effect from the discount and be able to take lessons from 
Telkomnet's pricing behavior. The implications are that the regulator should 
be more critical in assessing Telkom's proposal to increase regulated local 
tariff, promote low Internet price not only on the weekend but also during 
any off-peak hours, force Telkomnet to give the ISPs similar opportunity to 
offer Internet bundles, and encourage alternative technologies to relax the 
bottleneck in local telephone services.
The following sections present more detail about the background of the case, 
methodology, analysis, and some policy implications.
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4.1. Background of the Case
Dial-up Internet service is a simple method to provide Internet service that 
connects the computers of the users to an Internet service provider (ISP) 
through the public telephone network. In accessing the Internet, a subscriber 
needs to dial the ISP's telephone number and local telephone network 
forwards the call to the server of that ISP. In this case, an Internet user incurs 
a local telephone charge in addition to the Internet service fee. This type of 
service was extensively used in the early period of Internet provision for the 
public and is still popular, especially in locations where fixed-telephone 
(PSTN) is the only telecommunication service available or affordable. In 
Indonesia, despite recent growth in broadband and wireless Internet 
services, dial-up service is still dominant. The data from Synovate, a market 
research firm, shows that in 2007 the market share of dial-up service in 
Indonesia was still around 73 percent (Susatyo, 2008:10).
Commercial Internet service provision in Indonesia was pioneered by two 
independent ISPs in 1994. The market grew rapidly in very short period and 
has become very competitive. However, most of these ISPs are small 
operators. Competition in the market became unbalanced when Telkom and 
Indosat entered the dial-up Internet market in the late 1990s. These two 
operators are network providers in which the ISPs as independent service 
providers need access to their networks. Among these two, Telkom has a 
stronger position in the market because it dominates the upstream local 
telephone network, which is an essential facility to reach subscribers.
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Participation of Telkom in the competitive downstream Internet service 
market through its subsidiary, Telkomnet, makes it possible to consider the 
dial-up Internet service market as a market with one-way access structure. In 
this structure, the vertically integrated operator has an advantage over its 
rivals especially in term of access to a bottleneck facility. For that reason, it is 
not surprising that Telkomnet as a new player in commercial Internet 
provision is also able to lead the dial-up Internet market with more than 70 
percent of market share in 2007 (Susatyo, 2008: 8).
Telkomnet Instan is one of Telkomnet's popular products that bundles 
telephone and Internet service for Telkom's telephone subscribers. The 
regular price of Telkomnet's Internet bundle is relatively high for an 
intensive Internet user. Telkomnet's regular rate is Rp.165,- per minute of 
access, including fees for local telephone access and Internet service. If the 
local telephone access fee for Internet access is Rp.100,- per minute, the 
implied price of Telkomnet's Internet service is Rp.65,- per minute (=Rp.l65 
-  Rp. 100). It is relatively higher than ISPs' Internet service which is between 
Rp. 30,- and Rp.50,- per minute.
Although the price of the bundle is relatively high, Telkomnet is still very 
popular. Several awards were granted to Telkomnet, such as the Indonesian 
Customer Satisfaction Award (ICSA) in 2002, the most popular ISP during 
2001 and 2004, and Cap Superbrand 2005-2006 (Info Komputer, 2005). One 
factor of this popularity is because Telkomnet offers some advantages such 
as instant usage without prior registration, free monthly fees, and integrated 
billing with telephone payment.
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The ISPs as rivals in the downstream market complained about these 
Telkomnet features. They claimed that the competition is unfair because 
Telkomnet may have privilege as a subsidiary of Telkom that is not equally 
offered to the ISPs. A formal complaint1 has been filed to the Competition 
Commission (KPPU) in 2003 but the investigation was not continued. Since 
the regular price is relatively higher than competitors', it seems less 
reasonable to argue that the flexibility offered by Telkomnet is an 
anticompetitive behavior.
An anticompetitive pricing concern emerges especially since Telkomnet 
Instan often offers significant price discount on its bundle. These discounts 
are usually in the form of promotional programs which are often associated 
with certain national or regional events. Table 4.1 presents several promotion 
discounts offered by Telkomnet between 2001 and 2008. The ISPs claim that 
Telkomnet's promotion programs make their product much less competitive 
compared to Telkomnet Instan, especially if the discount is high enough. 
However, among these promotion programs, only Telkomnet's progressive 
discount in Region 5 East Java in 2005 was formally opposed by the ISPs 
through the regional KPPU office. The case then could be solved by an 
agreement out of court. It seems that ISPs avoid having a conflict with 
Telkom to secure their businesses, which highly depend on Telkom's 
networks.
1 APJII's report to KPPU, 2003.
Table 4.1. Promotion-Discounts of Telkomnet's Bundled Price
October-December 2001
40 percent discount between 00:00 and 08:00 
20 percent discount between 08:00 and 16:00
Mei-July 2002
40 percent discount between 00:00 and 08:00 
20 percent discount between 08:00 and 16:00
End November-December 2002
40 percent discount between 00:00 and 08:00 
20 percent discount between 08:00 and 16:00
September-December 2003 - only in Region 5 (East Java) 
20 percent discount between 22:00 and 06:59
August-December 2004 - only in Regional 3 (West Java) 
Progressive discount up to 40 percent
January-March 2005 - only in Regional 5 (East Java). 
Progressive discount up to 50 percent
April-June 2006
WeekendNet promotion discount - Rp. 100/minute 
(almost 40 percent discount during the weekend)
July-December 2006
WeekendNet promotion discount - Rp. 100/minute 
(almost 40 percent discount during the weekend)
January-March 2007
WeekendNet promotion discount - Rp. 100/minute 
(almost 40 percent discount during the weekend)
October-December 2007 - only in Region 2 (Jakarta) & 5 (East Java) 
WeekendNet promotion discount - Rp. 100/minute 
(almost 40 percent discount during the weekend)
Source: compiled from various news, press releases, and advertisements
In general, most of Telkomnet's promotion-discounts are only for short 
periods except for the WeekendNet program. This program was initially 
offered only for three months between April and June 2006, but it was 
extended twice. The first extension period was between June and December 
2006 and the second one was between January and March 2007. In total, the 
WeekendNet program that covers nationallly lasted for around one year. In
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addition, Telkomnet also re-introduced the WeekendNet program between 
October and December 2007 but it was limited to Region-2 Jakarta and 
surroundings, and Region-5 East Java.
In its press release, Telkom mentions two reasons behind the extension of the 
WeekendNet program (Telkom 2008b). Firstly, during the first three months 
of the program, Telkoment experienced 17.36 percent and 27.11 percent 
traffic increase for Saturday and Sunday respectively. This rise was actually 
much lower than its target which was 50 percent. Secondly, the WeekendNet 
program is a kind of corporate social responsibility to educate people. The 
effect on the corporate financial aspect is expected to be in the longer term.
In the WeekendNet promotion discount, Telkomnet's bundled price was 
reduced up to Rp.100 per-minute for usage during the weekend. In other 
words, the discount in the WeekendNet program was almost 40 percent off 
the regular price. This significant discount makes the price of Telkomnet's 
Internet bundle equal to the telephone tariff for Internet access or port- 
wholesale tariff which is also Rp.100,- per minute or close to the lowest tariff 
of local telephone service, which is Rp. 83.3,- per-minute2. It implies that 
during the WeekendNet program, Telkomnet's Internet service was sold at a 
very low price between Rp. 0,- and Rp. 16.7,- per minute. Table 4.2 compares 
prices between regular periods and the WeekendNet promo period and
2 At that time, telephone tariff for local call service was Rp.250 per pulse. The duration of a 
pulse is determined by distance and time of the day (peak or off-peak) and it ranges between 
1.5 and 3 minutes. The cheapest local tariff was Rp.250,- per 3 minutes or on average Rp.83.3 
per-minute.
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shows the incremental or implied price of Internet service offered by 
Telkomnet based on two methods of accessing dial-up Internet service3.
Table 4.2. Tariff Comparison - Regular and WeekedNet Promo
R e g u la r
T a r iff
(Rp/minute)
W e e k e n d N e t  P ro m o  
(A p r06  -  M ar07)
(Rp/minute)
T e lk o m n e t  ta r iff 165 100
Telephone tariff for Internet access 100 100
Incremental price of the bundle or 
Im p lie d  p r ic e  o f  T e lk o m n e t 's  In tern e t s e r v ic e
(based on telephone ta r if f fo r  In tern e t access)
65 0
The cheapest local call tariff. 83.3 83.3
Incremental price of the bundle or 
I m p lie d  p r ice  o f  T e lk o m n e t 's  In tern e t s e r v ic e
(based on the cheapest local telephone tariff)
81.7 16.7
The ISP actually complained4 about this significant discount, but they never 
formally filed the objection to the regulator or to KPPU. As a comparison, 
independent ISPs charge Internet service between Rp.30,- and Rp.60,- per- 
minute. This large price differential may indicate that Telkomnet's
3 In accessing Internet service, a subscriber can use the ordinary telephone number of his ISP 
and the charge refers to the normal regulated tariff of a local telephone call which is Rp. 250 
per pulse (between 1.5 and 3 minutes). Alternatively, if his or her ISP subscribes to a port- 
wholesale service, he or she can use a premium number which charges a flat rate of Rp.100 
per-minute regardless of distance and time.
4 In an informal discussion with an ISP CEO in early 2007, He mentioned that it is getting 
harder to compete with Telkomnet especially when it provides long promotion discounts 
through the WeekendNet program.
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WeekendNet program engages in a cross-subsidy or loss-selling practice. 
However, no convincing conclusion can be made just based on this price 
information. There should be a more thorough analysis of this problem.
The discussions in Chapter 3 indicate that the cost-based method has become 
more popular to analyze bundling problems based on the predatory pricing 
rule principle. In this approach, the price discount of Telkomnet's Internet 
bundle is considered anticompetitive if two conditions are met. These are (i) 
the implied price of Telkomnet's Internet service is below long-run average 
cost or average variable cost, and (ii) the ISPs are adversely affected by the 
discount.
The analysis to assess whether Telkomnet price is below cost requires cost 
information. Table 4.2 above shows that the implied price of Telkomnet's 
Internet service is at maximum Rp. 16.7 per-minute. Assuming that the profit 
margin of the Internet service is 15 percent3, the minimum cost of Internet 
service produced by independent ISPs is around Rp.25.5 per-minute5 6. Based 
on this calculation, one may think that Telkom is possibly engaged in below- 
cost pricing practice because the implied price of Telkomnet's Internet 
bundle is sufficiently below the ISPs' Internet cost.
5 Based on information in the Income Statement of PT Centrin's financial report (Centrin 
2005), it is known that the ratio between operating profit (before interest, tax, and other 
indirect expense) and gross income or profit margin is 14.3 percent« 15 percent.
6 The lowest per-minute Internet service tariff offered by an ISP is Rp.30,-. If maximum profit 
margin is 15%, the minimum cost to produce per-minute Internet service is Rp.30x85% = 
Rp.25.5,- This cost reflects short-run average variable cost which is usually higher than long- 
run average variable cost.
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This conclusion can be true under a strong assumption that the per unit cost 
of Telkomnet's Internet service is equal to the ISPs'. In fact, it is possible that 
Telkomnet's cost structure is more efficient due to vertical integration. As a 
result, without detailed and accurate information on costs, the conclusion 
based on the simple analysis above is also not convincing.
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is an alternative approach in 
identifying predatory pricing. The method proposed by Ordover and Willig 
(1981) is known as profit sacrifice. Basically, the profit sacrifice principle 
suggests that predatory pricing does not necessarily require a below-cost 
pricing condition but it includes any pricing behavior that sacrifices profit. It 
is the main difference between the profit sacrifice concept and the common 
predatory pricing rule approach to bundling. It reduces the dependency on 
accurate cost information which is not easily calculated, especially in an 
industry with high fixed-costs producing multi-products, like 
telecommunications.
In brief, by applying the profit sacrifice concept to the case, the price 
discount of Telkomnet's Internet bundle during the WeekendNet 
program is considered anticompetitive if the discount sacrifices profit 
and is harmful for rivals. However, it is just a main principle to analyze 
anticompetitive behavior. The next step is how to make this concept 
operational. The following section presents a method to identify profit- 
sacrifice pricing based on the profit-maximizing principle.
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4.2. The Profit Maximizing Model of Dial-up Internet Service
In most economics literature, profit maximizing has been widely accepted as 
the main objective of firm (Tirole 1988). This principle basically assumes that 
a firm as an economic agent tends to maximize its profit by controlling its 
endogenous factors that can affect profit, such as quantity of production, 
inputs combination, or output prices. Consequently, if a firm does not set 
these factors to maximize its profit, this behavior can be considered as a 
strategy that sacrifices potential profit. In fact, a firm may deviate from the 
profit-maximizing objective for reasons such as social responsibility 
objective, accommodating regulatory mandate, or anticompetitive motive. 
For that reason, profit sacrifice is not necessarily anticompetitive but it is a 
necessary condition to conclude an anticompetitive behavior.
In case of the WeekendNet discount program, Telkomnet uses the price of its 
Internet bundle as an instrument to control its profit. Basically, the 
relationship between profit and some other endogenous factors can be 
expressed in a profit function as shown in Equation (4.1) where n, q, p, and c 
respectively represent profit, quantity, price, and cost.
(4.1) 7T = f(q ,p ,c )
In addition, the structure of service provision determines the construction of 
variables q, p, and c in the Telkomnet profit function. Figure 4.1 illustrates a 
simplified structure of Internet provision for modeling purposes. In this 
structure, it is assumed that ISPs are relatively homogeneous and can be 
represented by one ISP. Furthermore, the dash line simplifies the business of
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Telkom represented only by Telkomnet's Internet server and local telephone 
exchange.
Figure 4.1. Structure of Internet Provision for Modeling
Telkom
Telkomnet's
Server
Independent
Telkom's
Telephone
Exchange
ISPs' subscriber pays Telkomnet's subscriber pays 
pi + pi pt
An Internet user who wants to access an ISP's Internet service must use the 
local telephone service to be connected to the ISP's server. Consequently, he 
incurs two types of charge: a local telephone fee {pi) from Telkom; and the 
Internet services fee {pi) of the ISP. Furthermore, the ISP's profit is 
determined by its price Internet service {pi), per unit cost to produce Internet 
service {a), its Internet traffic (qi), and related fixed-cost (fi). Mathematically, 
the profit function of the ISP is expressed as in Equation (4.2).
(4.2) 71, = (p ,  -  c, )q, -  f ,
In contrast, Telkomnet's user only pays one price for a bundle of Internet and 
local telephone services (pt). Furthermore, Telkom's profit as a vertically 
integrated operator does not only come from Telkomnet's Internet bundle 
but also from delivering the Internet traffic of the ISP. In other words,
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Telkom's profit is more complex because it is not only determined by the 
price of Telkomnet's Internet bundle (pi), per-unit cost to produce 
Telkomnet's Internet bundle (a), Telkomnet's Internet traffic (qi), and 
Telkomnet's fixed cost (ft), but also by the price of the local telephone service 
(/?l), cost of the local telephone service (cl), the ISP's internet traffic (qi), and 
the fixed cost of local telephone service (/l). Equation (4.3) expresses the 
relation between Telkom's profit function and these variables.
(4.3) n, = (/>, - c ,  )q, + ( />, -  c,)q, ~ f,
In dial-up Internet service competition, Telkomnet uses price as an 
instrument to stimulate Internet demand, especially in weekend or off-peak 
periods. Supposing that the Internet service is a normal good, thus, its own- 
price effect on traffic is negative and cross-price effect is positive. Moreover, 
the effect of local telephone price to traffic is negative for the ISP and positive 
for Telkomnet. These relationships between relevant prices and the traffic 
demand of Telkomnet and the ISP are summarized in Equation (4.4) and (4.5) 
respectively. Furthermore, it is also assumed that price change does not have 
an effect on constant marginal cost and fixed costs.
(4.4) qt = f  (p t , p ,, p j ) where dqt/dpt < 0; öqt/öpi > 0; öqt/öpL> 0
(4.5) q, = f ( P i , p , , p L) where dqi/dpi < 0; öqi/öpt > 0; öqi/öpL < 0
The analysis follows the Bertrand competition model because Telkomnet 
uses price as the main instrument in the competition and there is no issue 
about capacity constraint, especially the period of discount. In addition,
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considering that Internet services offered by Telkomnet and the ISP are not 
exactly similar, differentiation of the products is also taken into account. A 
combination of the Bertrand model with product differentiation implies that 
equilibrium prices of the competing operators can be different, and the one 
which sets higher price does not necessarily lose all of its subscribers (Baye 
and Kovenock 2008). Moreover, in equilibrium, these prices are at their 
optimal levels which maximize profit.
One main objective of this chapter is to examine the optimal price of 
Telkomnet. Basically, the optimal price or profit-maximizing price can be 
analyzed by setting the first order condition equal to zero as shown in 
Equation (4.6). Partially differentiating Telkom's profit function as in 
Equation (4.3) with respect to Telkomnet price provides Equation (4.7).
(4.6) A  = = Q
dp dp
(4-7) ^ l  =  ‘I , + ( P , - c , ) ^ l + ( p l - c l ) ^ l  = 0
dp, dp, dp,
Furthermore, own-price elasticity of demand (rjt) is defined as a measure of 
sensitivity of Telkomnet's traffic with respect to price of the bundle, as 
presented in Equation (4.8). The negative sign in the equation shows that, as 
a normal good, the relationship between price of the bundle and traffic is in 
the opposite direction where an increase of price decreases the demand, and 
the reverse is true. In absolute terms, the value of own-price elasticity of 
demand lies between 0 and infinity where Telkomnet's demand is concluded 
inelastic if rj t< 1 , unitary elastic if ijx= 1 , and elastic if rjx>l.
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(4-8) ’1 , = ~ -
dp, q,
In addition, a cross-price elasticity of demand (77/f) is also described as the 
effect of the price of the bundle on the ISP's traffic as shown in Equation (4.9). 
The positive sign of the cross-elasticity indicates that the price of Telkomnet's 
bundle has a positive relationship with its rival's traffic. The value of cross­
price elasticity ranges between negative infinity and positive infinity. 
Negative cross-elasticity means that the products are complementary and 
positive cross-elasticity indicates that the products are substitutable. 
Furthermore, zero elasticity suggests that the products are independent of 
each other.
By substituting Equations (4.8) and (4.9) into (4.7), the optimal price of 
Telkomnet's Internet bundle can be expressed in a common mark-up form7 
as shown in Equation (4.10)8.
7 As in monopolistic conditions, in the Bertrand model with differentiation optimal price is
also determined by its own-price elasticity of demand (Werden, 1997:371).
dp, q,
(4.10) p, =
8 Assuming equilibrium condition is met, or d27r, d 1n l d 1 n , d 2n l > 0 is satisfied.
d2p, d2p, dp,dp, dp'dp,
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The result implies that a price discount in the Telkomnet bundle is profit 
maximizing only if one or some of the following conditions occurs:
(i) there is a cost reduction in producing the Internet bundle service (a), for 
example, due to efficiency or technological factors;
(ii) there is a decline in the profit margin of Telkom's local telephone 
service (pi-cl), for instance because of a regulatory or competitive 
pressure that pushes down the local telephone tariff;
(iii) there is a decrease in the ISP's Internet traffic which utilizes local 
telephone; there is an increase in Telkomnet's Internet traffic;
(iv) the ISP's traffic becomes less sensitive over Telkomnet's price change
(hit);
(v) Telkomnet traffic is more responsive over its own-price (qi).
In other words, in the absence of any of these conditions, a price reduction is 
interpreted simply as a pricing strategy that does not maximize profit or a 
behavior that sacrifices profit.
However, it is important to note that Equation (4.10) is only valid if 
Telkomnet's demand is elastic or the absolute value of 77/ is greater than one. 
In the case that Telkomnet's demand is inelastic or the absolute value of 77/ is 
less than one, the mark-up factor 177/1 /(177/1-1) becomes less than zero, as 
shown in Figure 4.2. Thus, Equation (4.10) produces a negative optimal price 
which does not make sense. In this case, as in microeconomics theory, if 
demand is inelastic, price reduction w ill reduce profit because additional 
revenue as a result of an increase in traffic can not off-set the loss from the 
price cut. In short, if demand is inelastic, price discount is not a profit- 
maximizing strategy and it indicates a profit sacrifice behavior.
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Figure 4.2. Own-price Elasticity and Mark-up Factor
'i t ' l - i t
•1 \
In sum, Telkomnet's WeekendNet discount program sacrifices profit if it has 
inelastic demand, or in the case that it has an elastic demand, the price after 
discount is much lower than its optimal bundle price. That statement can be 
expressed as in Equation (4.11).
\rji\< 1;
(4.11) discount sacrifices profit IF < OR
1 7 7/ 1 > 1 and p, »  p,_afier_discmM
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4.3. Analyzing Pricing Behavior of Telkomnet
The profit sacrifice approach discussed above indicates that the price 
discount of Telkomnet's Internet bundle can be considered anticompetitive if 
it is not profit maximizing and adversely effects rivals. If any of these 
requirements could not be proved, Telkomnet's price discount is not 
considered as an anticompetitive behavior. This section identifies whether 
these two conditions are satisfied. A brief description of the analysis is 
presented below.
Firstly, it identifies whether the discount is profit maximizing or profit 
sacrifice. The main objective at this stage is to examine whether Equation 
(4.11) is satisfied. Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand is analyzed 
first. If the demand is inelastic or Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand 
is less than one, then it can directly be concluded that Telkomnet's price 
discount is not profit maximizing and it sacrifices profit. In contrast, if the 
demand is elastic then all other variables in the equations need to be 
estimated. Furthermore, profit sacrifice is assumed if the actual price of the 
bundle after discount is much lower than Telkomnet's optimal price. 
However, if Equation (4.11) is not satisfied or there is no evidence of profit 
sacrifice, allegations about Telkomnet's anticompetitive discount should be 
dismissed.
Secondly, if there is evidence of a profit sacrifice then whether the discount 
has a negative effect on ISPs needs to be examined. In this research, cross­
price elasticity of demand is used as an indicator of that effect. This cross­
price elasticity represents the effect of Telkomnet's price change on ISPs'
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traffic. High cross-price elasticity of demand means that Telkomnet's price 
discount reduces ISPs' traffic significantly and the discount is 
anticompetitive. Conversely, a small cross-price elasticity estimate suggests 
that ISP traffic is relatively unaffected and the discount is not 
anticompetitive.
Alternatively, these two conditions to assess anticompetitive discount can be 
written as in Equation (4.12).
I T]i I <1 OR i Tji \ >1 and p* »  p ,
(4.12) discount is anticompetitive IF < AND
 ^ i]it is relatively high
In brief, the analysis based on actual traffic data finds that the absolute value 
of Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand is less than one or inelastic. 
Consequently, based on Equation (4.11), it can be directly argued that 
Telkomnet's WeekendNet discount program is not profit maximizing nor 
does it sacrifice profit. Furthermore, examinations on the cross-price effect 
show that traffic of the ISPs is not significantly affected by the discount. For 
that reason, according to Equation (4.12), Telkomnet's price discount is not 
an anticompetitive behavior. Details of the analysis are presented in the 
following paragraphs.
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4.3.1. Data and Elasticity Estimation
Estimating own-price and cross-price elasticity of demand requires several 
types of data, including Telkomnet's price (pt), and the traffic data of 
Telkomnet (qt) and the ISPs (qi). The data about Telkomnet price is 
summarized from Telkom's press releases and some publications related to 
the WeekendNet discount program. Actual traffic data is gathered from the 
Multimedia Division of Telkom. Furthermore, if needed, other data required 
to examine Equation (4.10), such as local telephone cost and tariffs, can be 
extracted from several government and Telkom publications.
The actual traffic data provided by Telkom consists of Telkomnet's Internet 
call-data-record (CDR) for 2006, daily Telkomnet Internet traffic data for 
2007, and daily ISP Internet traffic for 2006 and 2007. The ISPs' data only 
includes Internet traffic through port-whole sale (PWS) service from twelve 
ISPs. These twelve ISPs are mostly big, with a large consumer base and 
heavy traffic. Actually, there are many other independent ISPs which do not 
subscribe to PWS service but their traffic data are not available. However, 
these ISPs are relatively small in terms of size and traffic. For that reason, it is 
assumed that the traffic of these twelve ISPs is sufficient to represent the 
independent ISPs.
In addition, since Telkomnet's 2006 data has a different format, it needs to be 
transformed into a daily format. The processes to aggregate CDR into daily 
data were done by using Microsoft Access, a database-software. Finally, a 
series of traffic data for Telkomnet and the ISPs between 2006 and 2007 in 
each region are available for analysis. Unfortunately, there are two missing 
days in that series: these are Sunday, 26 November 2006 and Saturday, 3
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February 2007. However, it does not have significant effect on the overall 
estimation results.
Elasticity of demand can be estimated based on simple linear regression. In 
this case, log-linear estimation is used because the coefficient belonging to 
variable price directly indicates an elasticity measure. The equations for 
estimating own-price and cross-price elasticity based on daily traffic data are 
presented in (4.13) and (4.14) respectively.
(4.13) log(q, ) = c, +rj, log(/?,) + at (weekend _ dummy)
(4.14) log(g,) = c;. + r\u log(p,) + a, (weekend dummy)
In these equations, p t , qt,  cji, and c  respectively represent Telkomnet price, 
Telkomnet traffic, ISP traffic, and constant. Furthermore, i]t and ijn are the 
coefficients that correspond to Telkomnet's price elasticity of demand and 
cross-price effect of Telkomnet's price to ISPs' demand. Theoretically, the 
sign of rjt should be negative, implying that own-price and own-traffic has an 
opposite relationship. In contrast, the sign of i]n should be positive for 
substitute products, meaning that Telkomnet's price change would affect ISP 
traffic in the same direction.
Moreover, a weekend_dummy is employed to accommodate variation of traffic 
during peak and off-peak periods. If the observed day is a weekend or any 
public holiday, weekend_dummy is set as '1' and otherwise it is 'O'. The sign of 
coefficient a in variable weekend_dummy shows the effect of holiday to traffic.
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If the sign of a is negative, it means that during weekends and public 
holidays Internet traffic decreases.
Alternatively, instead of using weekend Jtummy, the estimation can also use 
weekend traffic data alone. Consequently the linear equations are simplified 
as in (4.15) and (4.16) for own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticity 
respectively.
(4.15) \og(q,) = c,+rj, log(p,)
(4.16) log(qi) = ci +rjll log(/?,)
Furthermore, since the data is sufficiently detailed, the estimations can be 
run with several variations of data. Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of 
demand is estimated based on regional and national traffic data. 
Furthermore, cross-price elasticity of demand is estimated based on the 
individual ISP's traffic, regional and national traffic data. Results and 
explanations of these estimations are presented in the following sections.
4.3.I.I. Telkomnet's Own-price Elasticity of Demand
Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand is estimated based on aggregate 
regional traffic as well as national traffic data. In general, either based on 
daily traffic or weekend traffic data, the results show that the coefficients 
related to price are well below than one. Furthermore, most of these 
coefficients have expected signs and are statistically significant.
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Consequently, it suggests that Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand is 
inelastic. The details are described below.
Estimation Based on Regional Traffic
Telkom divides its operational region into seven regions. These regions are 
Region-1 Sumatera, Region-2 Jakarta and surroundings, Region-3 West Java 
and Banten, Region-4 Central Java and Yogyakarta, Region-5 East Java, 
Region-6 Kalimantan, and Region-7 Eastern part of Indonesia. In terms of 
dial-up Internet traffic, Region-2 contributes the highest traffic with a daily 
average achieving more than 4 million minutes or around 40 percent of the 
daily traffic in periods 2006 and 2007. Region 6 generates the lowest daily 
traffic with only around 521 thousand minutes.
Telkomnet's Internet traffic in all regions is still much higher than the ISPs'. 
The differences are between 25 to 80 times. The largest traffic disparity is in 
Region-2 and the smallest is in Region-4. Figures 4.3 to 4.9 compare daily 
traffic of dial-up Internet services between Telkomnet and ISPs in these seven 
regions of Telkom. In addition, the figures also show that in most of the 
regions, except in Region 7, Telkomnet's traffic has an increasing pattern 
during the WeekendNet discount program. It indicates that Telkomnet users 
are relatively sensitive to price change. The magnitude of this sensitivity is 
represented by own-price elasticity of demand. This elasticity is estimated by 
regressing these traffic data and price as in Equations (4.13) and (4.15). The 
observed days for regression based on regional traffic data are between 1 
January 2006 and 31 December 2007. Summary statistic and the estimations 
based on daily and weekend data are summarized in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 
respectively.
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Figure 4.3. Daily Traffic in Region 1 (Sumatera)
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Figure 4.4. Daily Traffic in Region 2 (Jakarta & Surroundings)
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Figure 4.5. Daily Traffic in Region 3 (West Java)
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Figure 4.6. Daily Traffic in Region 4 (Central Java & Yogyakarta)
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Figure 4.7. Daily Traffic in Region 5 (East Java)
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Figure 4.8. Daily Traffic in Region 6 (Kalimantan)
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Figure 4.9. Daily Traffic in Region 7 (Eastern Indonesia)
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Table 4.3. Own-Price Elasticity -Daily Traffic
T e lk o m n e t's  D a ily  T ra ffic  (in  m in u te s )
R eg io n  1 R egion 2 R egion 3 R eg ion  4 R eg io n  5 R egion  6 R egion  7
M ean
S tan d .D ev
M in im u m
M ax im u m
1,411,953
133,623
864,109
1,700,685
4,156,945
433,374
1,874,635
5,314,406
742,975
82,322
394,444
952,452
746,113
85,884
149,580
897,502
1,200,909
129,227
594,075
1,584,100
521,472
53,000
180,692
696,239
1,223,062
151,458
428,684
1,548,984
P a ram e te r R eg io n  1 R eg ion  2 R eg ion  3 R eg io n  4 R eg io n  5 R eg ion  6 R eg ion  7
T e lk o m n e t_ -0.339* -0.286* -0.361* -0.325* -0.270* -0.343* 0.007
price  (in log) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.033)
w e ek en d _ -0.134* -0.070* -0.054* -0.198* -0.143* -0.141* -0.085*
d u m m y (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
C o n s ta n t 15.911* 16.94* 15.346* 15.21* 15.394* 14.931* 14.001*
(0.109) (0.137) (0.138) (0.146) (0.137) (0.125) (0.168)
O bserv a tio n 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
F-Stat 169.29 56.96 92.96 172.87 88.92 138.90 37.02
Adj R2 0.31 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.19 0.28 0.09
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5%; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
Table 4.4. Own-Price Elasticity -  Weekend Traffic
T e lk o m n e t's  W eek en d  T raffic  (in  m in u te s )
R eg io n  1 R egion  2 R eg ion  3 R eg io n  4 R eg io n  5 R eg ion  6 R eg ion  7
M ean 1,391,250 4,278,371 770,449 698,355 1,170,687 508,943 1,162,518
S tan d .D ev 158,385 605,859 112,801 92,756 156,272 60,984 153,932
M in im u m 864,110 2,421,689 458,969 420,915 673,450 311,112 673,105
M ax im u m 1,670,516 5,314,406 952,453 881,378 1,424,409 652,308 1,460,371
P a ram e te r R eg io n  1 R egion  2 R egion  3 R egion  4 R eg ion  5 R egion  6 R egion  7
T e lk o m n e t_ -0.303* -0.253* -0.349* -0.304* -0.209* -0.312* 0.047
p rice  (in  log) (0.025) (0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) (0.027) (0.039)
C o n s ta n t 15.607* 16.468* 15.236* 14.922* 14.966* 14.644* 13.729*
(0.122) (0.194) (0.178) (0.156) (0.182) (0.133) (0.189)
O bserva tion 209 209 209 209 209 209 209
F-Stat 146.12 38.90 90.36 89.44 30.51 129.01 1.45
Ad] R2 0.41 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.38 0.002
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
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The results show that, except in Region 7, variable Telkomnetjprice has a 
negative sign that is consistent with economic theory. It implies that a change 
in Telkomnet's price has an opposite effect to its traffic demand. The 
coefficients of that variable ranging from -0.209 to -0.361 directly correspond 
to Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand in these regions. It means that 
if Telkomnet's price decreases 1 percent, its traffic would only increase 
between 0.209 and 0.361 percent.
Furthermore, a ratio between the values of coefficient and standard error in a 
variable is used to asses whether that variable is statistically equal to zero or 
not. For Telkomnetjprice, in most regions the variable is not statistically equal 
to zero but they are statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. 
In the case of Region 7, the sign of coefficient in variable Telkomnetjprice is 
theoretically incorrect and also not statistically significant. For that reason, it 
is concluded that the relationship between Telkomnet price and traffic can 
not be determined in Region 7.
In addition, the coefficient of variable weekend_dummy is negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. It implies that in all 
regions Telkomnet has a lower traffic in the holiday. Moreover, the F- 
statistics are sufficiently high, implying that the regression is significant and 
not all of the variables in the model are zero. In addition, adjusted R-squared 
are relatively small meaning that, except for Region-7, only 12 to 41 percent 
of Telkomnet's traffic variation can be explained by price changes.
In brief, it can be concluded that Telkomnet demand is inelastic. In other 
word, a decrease in Telkomnet's price discount would only stimulate 
additional traffic in much lesser percentage than the discount.
I l l
Estimation Based on National Aggregate Traffic Data
National level data is obtained by aggregating regional level data. In this 
national level, Telkomnet's average Internet traffic is almost 50 times higher 
than the ISPs'. Figure 4.10 compares the daily traffic of dial-up Internet 
service between Telkomnet and the ISPs. The figure also shows that during 
the WeekendNet promotion program between April 2006 and March 2007, 
Telkomnet's traffic has an increasing trend. It implies that Telkomnet's users 
are responsive enough to price change.
As in previous analysis, Equation (4.13) and Equation (4.15) are also used to 
estimate the elasticity. The observed days for regression are only between 1 
January 2006 and 30 September 2007. The days between October and 
December 2007 are not included because the prices are not nationally 
uniform. Summary statistics of the data and results of regression based on 
daily and weekend traffic are presented in Table 4.5.
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Figure 4.10. National Daily Traffic of Dial-up Internet Service
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Table 4.5. Own-Price Elasticity Estimate - National Aggregate
T e l k o m n e t  T ra f f ic D a i ly  T ra f f ic
(m in u te )
W e e k e n d  T ra f f ic  
( m in u te )
M e a n 1.01e+07 1 .01e+07
S t a n d a r d  D e v ia t i o n 869 ,169 1,189 ,720
M in i m u m 5,813 ,269 5 ,949 ,275
M a x im u m 1.20e+07 1.20e+07
P a r a m e te r D a i ly  T ra f f ic W e e k e n d  T ra f f ic
T e l k o m n e t  P r ic e  ( in  lo g ) -0 .302 (0.023)* -0 .279  (0.032) *
w e e k e n d - d u m m y -0.103 (0.009)* -
C o n s t a n t 17.67 (0.117)* 17 .46  (0.153) *
N u m b e r  o f  O b s e r v a t io n 636 181
F -S ta t is t ic s 93.05 76.70
A d ju s te d  R - S q u a re d 0.22 0 .30
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
113
The result shows that the sign for variable Telkomnetjprice is also negative, 
which is consistent with the theory. The value of the coefficient of that 
variable which directly represents Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of 
demand is less than one and statistically significant at 1 percent level of 
significance. It implies that Telkomnet's demand is inelastic.
In addition, the coefficient of variable weekend_dummy is also negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. It shows that on 
weekends and public holidays Telkomnet's traffic decreases. Moreover, 
adjusted R-squared for both models are relatively small meaning that only 22 
percent of Telkomnet's traffic variations can be explained by its price. In 
addition, the F-statistics are sufficiently high and significant at 1 percent. This 
indicates that the models are significant and not all of the variables in the 
model are zero.
4.3.I.2. Telkomnet's Cross-price Effect on ISP's Traffic Demand
Internet services offered by Telkomnet and the ISP are considered as 
substitute products. Intuitively, a price change in Telkomnet's Internet 
bundle will reduce traffic of the ISP. A degree of this responsiveness is 
measured by cross-price elasticity of demand. This section discusses some 
estimations of that elasticity based on the models in Equation (4.14) and 
Equation (4.16). The regressions are run on individual ISP traffic, regional 
traffic, and national aggregate traffic data.
In brief, based on individual ISPs' traffic, cross-elasticity estimates of some 
ISPs are significant and some others are not. It means some of the ISPs are 
affected by Telkomnet's price variation. Since the effects are not uniform for
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all ISPs, a conclusion cannot be drawn. Furthermore, regression results based 
on regional level data show that Telkomnet pricing behavior has small effect 
on ISPs' traffic only in two regions. Again, it can be too early to assume that 
ISPs are not affected by Telkomnet pricing behavior. Finally, an estimation 
based on national aggregate data indicates that the cross-price elasticity is 
sufficiently small. For that reason, it is concluded that a change in 
Telkomnet's Internet bundle price does not have considerable effect on the 
average ISP's traffic.
This finding may imply that ISP subscribers are relatively loyal or reluctant 
to change their subscription scheme. In other word, the market is sufficiently 
segmented and the competing Internet services offered by Telkomnet and the 
ISPs are weakly substitute. The following paragraphs present the detail of 
these estimation results.
Estimation Based on Individual ISPs' Traffic
The effect of Telkomnet price on individual ISP traffic is estimated by 
regressing the ISP's traffic data with Telkomnet price based on Equation 
(4.14) and Equation (4.16) above. Summary statistics and the estimates are 
presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Observed days in the regression are 
different across the ISPs because during 2006 and 2007 some of the ISPs had 
just terminated PWS subscription and the others had just started to use the 
service.
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Table 4.6. Cross-elasticity Estimates of Individual ISP - Daily Traffic
IS P 's  D a ily  T ra ffic  (in  m in u te s )
IM 2 C BN In d o n e t C e n trin B itn e t B iznet
M ean 112,364 50,675 14,754 10,840 7,243 4,503
S tan d .D ev 30,480 16,477 18,334 3,629 2,957 1,752
M in im u m 7,907 6,012 2 1,450 123 8
M ax im u m 166,225 76,175 58,167 18,481 22,595 10,479
P a ra m e te r IM 2 CBN In d o n e t C e n trin B itn e t B iznet
T e lk o m n e t Price -0.173* -0.116** 2 .195* -0.203** 0 .623* 0 .464*
(in  log) (0.058) (0.053) (0.515) (0.079) (0.131) (0.144)
w e e k e n d - -0.606* -0.802* -0.637* -0.573* -0.430* -0.543*
d u m m y (0.023) (0.021) (0.191) (0.032) (0.052) (0.057)
C o n s ta n t 12.645* 11.60* -1.20 10.43* 5.783* 6.138*
(0.074) (0.272) (2.636) (0.406) (0.671) (0.735)
N o. O bs 636 636 363 636 636 636
F-Stat 515.24 1143.56 34.93 236.07 120.77 120.26
Adj R2 0.62 0.78 0.16 0.43 0.27 0.27
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
IS P 's  D aily  T raffic  (in m in u te s )
C e n tra ln e t R ad n e t IP n e t S p e e d n e t P acif icn e t S is te lin d o
M ean 2,801 1,394 1,155 577 563 389
S tan d .D ev 1,416 801 1,614 632 832 370
M in im u m 86 10 1 2 2 7
M ax im u m 16,466 3,569 4,994 2,807 4,046 2,072
P a ra m e te r C e n tra ln e t R ad n e t IP n e t S p e e d n e t P ac if icn e t S is te lin d o
T e lk o m n e t -0.901* 0 .389** 2 .291* -0.132 1 . 757* 0.005
Price (in  log) (0.139) (0.176) (0.818) (0.501) (0.541) (0.373)
w e e k e n d - -0.880* -1.160* 0.426 -0.036 -0.071 -0.059
d u m m y (0.555) (0.070) (0.348) (0.224) (0.229) (0.150)
C o n s ta n t 12.645* 5.398* -4.212 6.986* -1.992 5.507*
(0.074) (0.899) (0.899) (2.56) (2.764) (1.907)
N o. O bs 636 636 263 427 276 590
F-Stat 138.33 280.24 4.52 0.04 12.49 0.14
Adj R2 0.30 0.47 0.03 0 0.08 0.00
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
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Table 4.7. Cross-elasticity Estimates of Individual ISP -  Weekend Traffic
IS P 's  W eek en d  T ra ffic  (in  m in u te s )
IM 2 CBN In d o n e t C e n trin B itnet B iznet
M ean 75,189 28,751 7,098 7,403 5,384 2,827
S tan d .D ev 15,711 7,642 8,922 2,296 3,143 1,236
M in im u m 12,956 6,012 2 1,450 123 8
M ax im u m 111,915 60,444 32,959 15,178 22,595 7,365
P a ram e te r IM 2 CBN In d o n e t C e n trin B itnet B iznet
T e lk o m n e t -0.201* -0.169** 2 . 748* -0.297** 0 . 763* 0 .409**
P rice  (in  log) (0.074) (0.083) (0.513) (0.096) (0.217) (0.189)
C o n s ta n t 12.171* 11.043* -4.384*** 10.291* 4.710* 5.850*
(0.359) (0.400) (2.499) (0.461) (1.046) (0.192)
N o. O bs 181 181 103 181 181 181
F-Stat 7.31 4.14 28.66 9.65 12.35 4.67
Adj R2 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.02
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5%; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
IS P 's W eek en d  T raffic  (in  m in u te s )
C e n tra ln e t R ad n e t IP n e t S p e e d n e t P ac if icn e t S is te lin d o
M ean 1,827 618 955 584 347 350
S tan d .D ev 980 462 1,378 655 555 359
M in im u m 86 10 1 2 2 7
M ax im u m 5,045 2,749 4,737 2,796 2,345 1,722
P a ra m e te r C e n tra ln e t R ad n e t IP n e t S p e e d n e t P ac if icn e t S is te lin d o
T e lk o m n e t -1.109* 0.379 2 .499* 0.027 1 .954* -0.159
Price (in  log) (0.176) (0.274) (0.946) (0.585) (0.529) (0.392)
C o n s ta n t 12.679* 4.285* -4.745 6.219** -12.971 6.203*
(0.848) (1.319) (4.507) (2.757) (2.521) (1.889)
N o. O bs 181 181 75 121 76 161
F-Stat 39.78 1.92 6.98 0 13.63 0.16
Adj R2 0.18 0.005 0.07 -0.008 0.14 -0.005
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5%; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
The results show that either based on daily or weekend traffic data, some 
ISPs have a positive sign in the coefficient related to variable Telkomnet _price
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that are theoretically consistent. Among them, cross-elasticity estimates of six 
ISPs are higher than Telkomnet's own-price elasticity (0.302). Furthermore, 
most of these estimates are statistically significant at 1 and 5 percent level of 
confidence. It may suggest that subscribers of these six ISPs are most likely to 
switch to Telkomnet if there is a price discount. However, since six other ISPs 
are not affected by Telkomnet pricing behavior, in general, it cannot be 
concluded that the Telkomnet's discount program has a negative impact on 
the ISPs. There might be other factors occurring during the observation 
period that reduce the traffic of these three ISPs.
Estimation Based on ISPs' Regional Traffic
At the regional level, the regressions are also conducted based on daily and 
weekend traffic. The data for the regressions cover a period between 1 
January 2006 and 31 December 2007. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 present the 
results of regression over seven regions of Telkom for daily traffic and 
weekend traffic respectively.
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Table 4.8. Cross-Price Elasticity -  Daily Traffic
IS P s ' D a ily  T ra ffic  (in  m in u te s )
R egion  1 R egion  2 R egion  3 R egion  4 R egion  5 R egion  6 R egion  7
M ean
S tan d .D ev
M in im u m
M axim um
36,340
13,219
2,383
57,292
52,071
11,599
6,351
81,984
16,546
6,913
2,179
32,168
31,085
10,615
1,970
58,052
19,336
6,789
2,806
33,607
15,121
6,413
950
27,607
35,895
11,819
5,586
58,963
P a ram e te r R eg io n  1 R eg ion  2 R eg ion  3 R eg io n  4 R eg io n  5 R eg io n  6 R egion  7
T e lk o m n e t_ -0.281* 0.013 0.446* 0.437* -0.017 0.031 0.096
Price (in  log) (0.069) (0.048) (0.083) (0.071) (0.061) (0.091) (0.061)
w e e k e n d _ -0.902* -0.399* -0.535* -0.592* -0.734* -0.911* -0.641*
d u m m y (0.026) (0.020) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.023)
C o n s ta n t 12.12* 10.89* 7.556* 8.264* 10.122* 9.643* 10.152*
(0.353) (0.247) (0.425) (0.361) (0.312) (0.463) (0.311)
N o. O bs 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
F-Stat 809.32 372.17 326.55 532.40 761.08 555.80 640.60
Adj R2 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.59 0.68 0.60 0.64
(*) p< 1%; (**) p< 5%; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
Table 4.9. Cross-Price Elasticity -  Weekend Traffic
IS P s ' W eek en d  T raffic  (in  m in u te s )
R eg io n  1 R eg ion  2 R eg ion  3 R eg io n  4 R eg io n  5 R eg io n  6 R egion  7
M ean 20,085 39,299 10,271 18,712 11,366 7,841 22,110
S tan d .D ev 6,892 7,493 3,419 5,833 3,207 3,290 6,355
M in im u m 2,383 6,351 2,179 1,970 2,806 950 5,586
M ax im u m 34,103 53,419 19,082 41,518 21,172 15,926 39,546
P a ra m e te r R eg io n  1 R eg io n  2 R egion  3 R eg io n  4 R eg io n  5 R eg io n  6 R egion  7
T e lk o m n e t_ -0.335* -0.001 0.444* 0.407* -0.064 -0.032 0.036
Price (in log) (0.103) (0.069) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.139) (0.084)
C o n s ta n t 11.468* 10.561* 7.028* 7.811* 9.603* 9.024* 9.785*
(0.503) (0.329) (0.428) (0.434) (0.419) (0.632) (0.406)
No. O bs 207 207 207 207 207 207 207
F-Stat 10.48 0.99 0 0 0.54 0.81 0.66
Adj R2 0.04 -0.005 0.11 0.09 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
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The results show that the coefficients of variable Telkomnet jprice are positive 
in several regions. It implies that Telkomnet pricing behavior has an opposite 
influence to ISPs' traffic in these regions. However, only in Region-3 and 
Region-4 are the cross-effects estimates significant and slightly higher than 
Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand. It indicates that in these two 
regions additional traffic gained from Telkomnet's price discount comes 
from ISPs' traffic reduction. In contrast, in other regions the discount 
generates new traffic instead of acquiring it from the ISPs.
These finding suggest that Telkomnet's price discount would have negative 
impact on ISPs only in Region-3 and Region-4. Interestingly, in late 2007, 
Telkomnet continued the discount only in Region-2 and Region-5 where 
ISPs' traffic is relatively independent from the effect of the discount. This 
pricing behavior creates new Internet traffic and does not bother the ISPs' 
traffic. Moreover, since Telkomnet pricing behavior only has considerable 
effect on ISPs' traffic in two regions, it also cannot be concluded that the 
discount has a harmful effect on rivals.
Estimation Based on National Aggregate Traffic Data
In the national aggregate traffic, regressions over the model in Equation 
(4.14) and Equation (4.16) are also run based on daily and weekend traffic. 
Table 4.10 shows the result of the regressions. A more detailed discussion is 
presented in the following paragraphs.
120
Table 4.10. Cross-Price Elasticity Estimate - National Aggregate
I S P  T r a f f ic D a i ly  T r a f f ic W e e k e n d  T r a f f ic
(m inu te ) (m in u te )
M e a n 207,263 130,974
S ta n d a r d  D e v ia t i o n 58,574 26,798
M in im u m 23,066 23,066
M a x im u m 307,619 180,999
P a r a m e te r D a i l y  T r a f f ic W e e k e n d  T r a f f ic
T e lk o m n e t  P r ic e  ( in  lo g ) 0 .0 1 3  (0.048)*** -0 .0 1 5  (0.071) ***
W e e k e n d _ d u m m y -0.62 (0.019)* -
C o n s t a n t 12.32 (0.245)* 11.83 (0.341) *
N u m b e r  of O b se rv a tio n 636 181
F -S tatistics 925.18 0.05
A d ju s te d  R -S q u ared 0.74 0.01
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10% ; the number in parentheses is standard-error
The results show that regression based on daily traffic data provides a better 
and more consistent result. It is shown by the positive sign for the coefficient 
of variable Telkomnet_Price which is theoretically consistent. In addition, the 
F-statistics is high, meaning that the model is significant and not all of its 
variables are equal to zero. Moreover, adjusted R-squared is also relatively 
high, also indicating that 74 percent of ISP traffic variation can be explained 
by Telkomnet's price changes. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
weekend_dummy is negative, meaning that ISP traffic also reduces during 
weekends and public holidays.
The cross-elasticity estimate is sufficiently small (0.013) compared to 
Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand. It implies that a reduction in 
Telkomnet price creates new additional traffic and only takes very little 
traffic from the ISP. It implies that Internet services of Telkomnet and the
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ISPs are weakly substitutable or almost independent. In other words, it can 
be concluded that in general ISPs' traffic is not affected by Telkomnet's 
pricing behavior.
4.3.2. Analysis
Telkomnet's WeekendNet program that offers a significant price discount to 
its Internet bundle can be suspected as an anticompetitive behavior because 
the implied or unbundled price of Internet service after the discount is quite 
low. Based on a strong assumption that Telkomnet and the ISPs have a 
relatively equivalent cost structure, the cost-based analysis discussed above 
shows that Telkomnet is likely engaging in below-cost pricing. However, it is 
possible that Telkomnet has a much lower Internet cost structure due to 
vertical integration.
Alternatively, the case can also be analyzed based on the profit-maximizing 
concept. In this approach, Telkomnet's discount program is considered 
anticompetitive if the discount is not profit maximizing and it adversely 
affects ISPs. A model is developed to identify the profit-maximizing price. 
The model presented in Equation (4.10) reveals that a price reduction can 
only be a profit-maximizing pricing if own-price elasticity of demand is 
relatively elastic. In other word, if the demand is inelastic, price discount 
will sacrifice profit.
Linear regression analyses based on the model in Equation (4.11) conclude 
that the estimates for Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand are much 
less than one either for regional or national actual traffic data. In other 
words, that price reduction only increases traffic much less than the
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percentage of the discount and additional profit earned from traffic increase 
cannot compensate for the loss from the discount. It means that Telkomnet's 
own-price elasticity of demand is inelastic. Consequently, as indicated in 
Equation (4.11), Telkomnet's Weekendnet discount program can simply be 
concluded to be a profit-sacrifice pricing.
However, as shown in Equation (4.12), profit sacrifice is necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to judge an anticompetitive behavior until there is 
evidence of damage to rivals. In the Telkomnet case, an indication of the 
harmful effect of a non-profit maximizing discount on competitors is 
analyzed through Telkomnet's price-cross effect on ISPs' demand. The 
Telkomnet discount program may lead to harmful effects on the ISPs if this 
price-cross effect is relatively high. In contrast, if it is sufficiently small the 
competing Internet services are considered almost independent from each 
other.
Regression analyses on individual ISP's traffic data indicate that only few 
ISPs are affected by Telkomnet pricing behavior. Furthermore, similar 
analyses based on regional ISP data also show that Telkomnet pricing 
strategies have relatively little effect on the ISPs' traffic in two regions. In 
other regions, the effect is very small and negligible. Moreover, by 
aggregating the data as national level data, the estimate for cross-effect is also 
sufficiently small. For that reason, it is concluded that on average 
Telkomnet's aggressive pricing is not harmful to its competitors. Based on 
these findings, there is no strong evidence to support predatory pricing or 
exclusionary bundling allegations of Telkomnet's pricing behavior. 
Consequently, according to this static analysis, the Telkomnet Weekendnet 
discount program is not anticompetitive.
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This conclusion is also supported by the fact that Telkomnet continued the 
WeekendNet promotion discount during October -December 2007 only in 
Region-2 and Region-5. The cross-price elasticity estimates of these regions 
are quite small and negligible. If Telkom had an intention to predate or 
exclude the ISPs, it should have carried on the discount in the regions with 
higher cross-price effects such as in Region-3 (West Java) and Region-4 
(Central Java).
In addition, Telkomnet's average daily traffic is much higher than the traffic 
of all the ISPs. It is too risky for Telkom to predate the ISPs just to gain a 
small amount of additional traffic. If Telkom's discount program is aimed at 
excluding rivals, in addition to reduction in profit due to price discount, it 
would also have faced costly legal problems.
Furthermore, Telkom claims that the WeekendNet discount program is a 
part of its corporate social responsibility program to educate people in using 
Internet services. This loss-making strategy can also be interpreted as an 
investment to create future demand and to build a positive image of the 
company. Moreover, low cross-price elasticity indicates that the products are 
sufficiently differentiated, which makes the market quite segmented. In that 
market condition, price might be not an important instrument for 
competition and price reduction may benefit consumers with less negative 
effect on market competition.
The benefit of Telkomnet's Weekendnet program for Internet service users 
can be estimated by assessing net traffic increase due to the discount. Table 
4.11 presents a simple computation of consumer benefit produced by the 
discount program. It uses elasticity estimates calculated based on daily traffic
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at a national level. The reason is that daily traffic and national aggregate 
traffic data give better and more conclusive estimation results, especially for 
cross-price elasticity. A more detailed explanation of the calculation is 
described below.
Table 4.11. Benefit from Telkomnet's WeekendNet Program
T elk o m n et's  W eek en d N et D iscou n t  
(From  R p .165  to be R p .100  per m in u te )
39.4%
T elk o m n et's  o w n -p r ice  e lastic ity  (rjt) 0.302
C ross-p rice  e la stic ity  ( 7 7 ,) 0.013
T elk o m n et's  traffic increase d u e to  d isco u n t  
(Tjtx discount)
11.89%
ISPs' traffic d ecrease d u e  to T elk om n et's
d isco u n t
(7 7 , x discount)
0.51 %
N e t Internet traffic increase (con su m ers  
b en efit)
{(7 7 1 - 7 7/) x discount}
11.38%
Telkomnet offers special Internet bundle price for weekend usage through its 
long WeekendNet promotion program. Compared to the regular price, 
which is Rp. 165 per minute, this special Internet price which only charges 
Rp. 100 per minute is equivalent to a 39.4 percent discount of normal Internet 
service bundle. Seeing that Telkomnet's own-price elasticity of demand is 
0.302, this discount increases Telkomnet's traffic by around 11.89 percent. 
Furthermore, the discount also has an adverse effect to ISPs' Internet service. 
Since the cross-elasticity of demand is quite small, is only 0.013, Telkomnet's 
discount program only decreases 0.51 percent of ISPs' traffic. Because the 
increase of Telkomnet's traffic is greater than the decrease of ISPs', in total
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the discount program raises 11.38 percent net additional Internet traffic. This 
additional Internet traffic is considered as a benefit for consumers created by 
Telkomnet's Weekend Net program.
4.4. Policy Implications
Up to 2007, the dial-up Internet service market in Indonesia especially for 
residential users is considered as a market with many players but dominated 
by few operators. These major Internet service providers usually gain the 
advantages from their related businesses such as network providers. 
Telkomnet is an ISP in which the parent company, Telkom, provides access 
to Internet backbone as well as to local networks. A vertically integrated 
operation between local telephone and Internet services gives Telkomnet an 
opportunity to bundle these services. Since local telephone access is still 
highly dominated by Telkom, this vertical integrated operation represents a 
one-way access structure. Furthermore, a practice of bundling in this 
structure can be used to support hidden price discrimination, cross subsidy, 
and internal transfer pricing leading to low prices that can predate rivals.
In the case of Telkomnet's discount program leading to low bundling price, 
the static analysis discussed in the previous section concludes that the 
discount is not anticompetitive even though the low price sacrifices profit. 
The main reason is because the Internet services provided by Telkomnet and 
independent ISPs are weakly substitutable. In addition to that static analysis, 
two theories based on dynamic concept provide alternative perspective 
related to the Telkomnet case.
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Firstly, the recent theory of predatory pricing, based on a dynamic game 
with asymmetric information, suggests that a dominant firm may set low 
price as a strategy to inform rivals that it has enormous financial resources 
(deep pocket theory), cost advantage (signaling game), or a powerful 
position in the market (reputation game) (Kobayashi 2008:10-14). In the 
context of the Telkomnet case, a discount program that makes the price of the 
bundle sufficiently low can also be interpreted as a strategy to threaten the 
ISPs. Since rivals are uncertain about Telkomnet's resources, they avoid 
having a conflict with Telkom. As a result, the market becomes less 
competitive.
Secondly, contestable market theory suggests that regulatory intervention 
can be relaxed in the market with a costless barrier because the dominant 
firm's pricing will be disciplined by the threat of rivals' entry (Schwartz 
1986:37). In the perfectly contestable market, the dominant firm sets a low 
unregulated price to deter entry. However, if the dominant firm can easily 
change its price, low entry or exit barrier can not be regarded as a threat to 
control pricing behavior of the incumbent (Schwartz 1986:55). In this case, the 
dominant firm can set a low price when it faces entry and a high price when 
rivals leave the market.
The dial-up Internet market is considered as a contestable market with low 
entry barrier in term of license and financial aspects. This is shown by the 
existence of some small ISPs. Related to the Telkomnet case, price discount 
can be interpreted as a way to persuade the regulator not to worry about the 
market because it has been contestable, or to warn potential entrants not to 
enter the market because it is unprofitable. In fact, contestability of the 
market is questionable because Telkomnet can easily change its price that is 
relatively high in peak time and sufficiently low in only certain periods of
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off-peak time. This behavior may indicate that Telkomnet uses price as a 
strategy to relax regulatory control to the market and to soften market 
competition.
In brief, even though in the formal static analysis Telkomnet's WeekendNet 
program is not concluded to be anticompetitive, this pricing behavior still 
can be regarded as a strategy to threaten rivals or to persuade the regulator 
to loosen regulatory constraint in this market. For that reason, the regulator 
needs to be aware of Telkomnet pricing behavior and any possible 
motivation behind it. The following paragraphs discuss several implications 
related to Telkomnet's WeekendNet program.
Firstly, Telkom often asked the regulator to regularly adjust the fixed line 
tariff. Adjustment is a soft terminology to propose an increase in the local 
telephone tariff because they claim that the regulated local tariff is still below 
cost. Telkom's argument about tariff adjustment may contradict Telkomnet's 
WeekendNet discount program because it reduces the price of a bundle that 
contains a component that is priced below cost. If the discount is not a loss­
making pricing and only sacrifices part of its profit due to margin squeeze, it 
may indicate that the current local telephone tariff is sufficiently profitable. 
The implication is that the regulator needs carefully reconsider Telkom's 
proposal for tariff adjustment.
Secondly, Telkom claims that the WeekendNet discount program is a form of 
corporate social responsibility to educate people to use the Internet by 
offering low Internet price. If this is the case, the regulator should encourage 
Telkom to provide a regular low Internet price especially in the off-peak 
time, not only limited to during the weekend but also during public holidays 
or at night. Alternatively, Telkom may also be asked to give equal
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opportunity for the ISPs to provide a similar bundle product because 
competition of the bundles will benefit consumers.
Thirdly, if these options are not financially feasible for Telkom, meaning that 
the Telkomnet promotion discount is really a loss making activity, the 
regulator needs to reduce the monopolization bottleneck access. Mobile 
cellular service is one alternative network to access the Internet. However, 
this service is still relatively costly for long Internet usage. Furthermore, since 
mobile cellular operators also provide Internet service, these independent 
ISPs will be less preferred to be accessed by mobile subscribers.
Alternatively, the regulator can encourage independent ISPs to provide a 
limited access network just to connect their servers and subscribers. Up to 
the end of 2007, several ISPs have offered Internet connection through 
wireless technology. However, since the technology, Wi-Fi (wireless 
fidelity), is only for short distance, they only offer this service in several spots 
in public places. Furthermore, their charges are still relatively high. There is 
another wireless technology that can reach longer distance known as 
WiMAX (worldwide interoperability for microwave access) or broadband 
wireless access. However, the technology is not implemented yet and, up to 
May 2009, the regulator currently is still offering the license through public 
bidding. If the independent ISPs can also be awarded licenses for WiMAX 
operation, they can compete equally with current vertically integrated 
operators. However, in the open bidding these ISPs will face competition 
from dominant incumbents. It seems that regulator needs to give special 
attention to these small operators.
In addition, the government should also support community-based Internet 
networks. At the moment, there is a movement to create community Internet
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networks, known as RT/RW Net. In this network, the Internet users are 
interconnected to their neighbors and create a community local area network 
(LAN). The server of the community network net is attached directly to an 
ISP either through wire-lines or wireless technology, depending on which 
one is most efficient. Even though these community Internet networks have 
been developed in several places, this practice is still considered 'illegal' in 
terms of network regulation. The regulator may need to review regulation on 
telecommunications network provision and must take into account the 
potential of community Internet networks in order to the narrow digital 
divide.
Related to cross-subsidy issue, there was a suspicion that Telkom may 
involve in that practice (cross-subsidizing profit from local telephone service 
to Internet service) making it possible for Telkomnet to offer low Internet 
bundle price. In fact, to avoid a cross-subsidy problem by a vertically 
integrated operator such as Telkom and Telkomnet, the regulation requires 
accounting separation between the upstream and downstream divisions. 
However, this obligation was not fulfilled by Telkom and was not enforced 
by the regulator. It seems that the problem is not at the regulation itself but at 
the motivation of the regulator. The reason, perhaps, is because of the 
weakness of the regulator either due to lack of resources or because of its 
closeness with Telkom as a state-owned company.
In some developed countries where telecommunications network has 
covered nation-wide, to prevent the upstream-downstream cross-subsidy, 
the regulator often require the vertically integrated operator to unbundle its 
local-loop (last-mile or access network). However, in Indonesia the 
unbundling policy is not a choice because the spirit of the policy maker is to
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enlarge network coverage in order to improve telecommunications density 
which was still low.
However, in the recent development where there are several mobile cellular 
operators with their network coverage have been close to national wide, 
unbundling policy may be relevant to consider. In addition to unbundling, 
virtual network operation (VNO) scheme can also be taken into account. In a 
VNO scheme, the new operators do not necessarily have to have their own 
network (access or backbone network) but they can just act as resellers of the 
service offered by the existing network providers. An example of this VNO 
scheme in Australia can be seen in some mobile virtual network operator 
(MVNO) such as Virgin Mobile and Dodo Mobile which use OPTUS' 
networks.
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Chapter 5
Collusive Behavior in Two-way Access
Two-way access is a condition when operators need to access each other's 
network in order to deliver a complete service. In this case, each operator 
holds monopolistic access to their subscribers. A simple illustration of two- 
way access is shown in Figure 5.1. As a result of this interdependency, these 
operators must co-operate in providing interconnection service. 
Consequently, this interdependency influences behaviors of the 
interconnected operators.
Figure 5.1. A Simple Illustration of Two-way Access Structure
N e tw o r k
A
Access / 
Interconnection
N e tw o r k
B
Subscribers A Subscribers B
Interconnection between operators in two-way access can be classified into 
two categories. First is interconnection between non-competing operators. 
For example, interconnection between international telephony service 
providers in different countries. Second is interconnection between the 
competing operators. For instance, interconnection between mobile cellular
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operators located in the same regions. In both cases, there is a common 
concern about possible collusive behaviors leading to high retail prices. In 
addition, a fear of possible predatory behavior has also emerged recently, 
especially it there is large asymmetry between incumbent and new entrant as 
the competitors. Related to the case, this research only concentrates on the 
possible collusive behavior of competing operators in a two-way access 
structure.
This chapter reviews literature in two areas that discuss possible collusive 
behavior between symmetric firms. Firstly, it looks at papers on access 
pricing in two-way access. The concern of the papers in this field is on 
possible use of negotiated access price to produce collusive outcome in retail 
price. Secondly, it explores literature on collusion, with focus on some 
factors that facilitate collusive outcome. Combination of the papers in both 
areas is able to explain collusive outcome in the mobile cellular market.
The access pricing papers indicate that operators in a market with two-way 
access structure are not always able to produce collusive outcome in retail 
price through access price. It depends on retail price constraints in that 
market. The literature analyzes the possibility of collusive effect of access 
price in four combinations of retail pricing. Furthermore, in the mobile 
cellular market, access price may influence retail prices of off-net (inter­
network) calls. Moreover, the literature also indicates that on-net (intra­
network) price should be lower than off-net price. This price differential 
between inter-network and intra-network calls is optimal for each operator.
In actual market conditions, there is a situation when the competing 
operators tend to set uniform price, that is, they charge off-net calls at
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relatively the same rate as on-net calls. The access pricing literature does not 
explain whether this uniform pricing indicates a possible collusive behavior. 
However, by referring to the papers dealing with collusion, this uniform 
pricing can be a collusive outcome, especially if there are some facilitating 
factors such as limited number of firms in the market, cross-ownership 
between the competing firms, and ineffective regulations.
The following sections briefly present some papers on access pricing and 
facilitating factors, in addition, it also illustrates a game theoretical concept 
explaining a collusive outcome that can be used as a method to identify 
possible collusive behavior.
5.1. Pricing Behavior in Two-way Access Structure
Most discussions in the literature of access pricing in two-way access 
structure concern the possible effect of negotiated access price in producing 
collusive outcome in retail prices. The reason is that most of these papers are 
intended to identify operators' behavior in a competitive era where price 
regulation has been eliminated. Furthermore, the analyses in the literature 
are mostly theoretical and the conclusions are strongly shaped by the 
assumptions used in the models. The works of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont 
et al. (1998a and 1998b) are considered two pioneer papers in this area. In 
general, the papers indicate that access price is not always able to create a 
collusive effect in retail price. Some constraints in retail pricing, especially 
related to linearity and the possibility of discriminating price based on call 
termination, also influence the power of access price to give collusive effect.
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In term of linearity, retail price can be categorized as linear and non-linear. 
Linear retail price means that the price only consists of usage fee where 
subscribers are charged only if they use the service. In contrast, in non-linear 
retail price, in addition to usage fee, subscribers are also charged with other 
fees. The most common form of non-linear retail price is a two-part tariff 
which consists of a fixed monthly subscription fee and usage fee. 
Furthermore, in term of possible discrimination based on call termination, 
retail price is differentiated into non-discriminatory and discriminatory. A 
non-discriminatory or uniform retail price is a condition when the prices of 
the call terminated in the same networks (intra-network or on-net calls) must 
be identical to the call terminated in the competitor's networks (inter­
network or off -net calls). In contrast, a discriminatory retail price happens if 
on-net and off-net prices can be different.
These two basic characteristics of retail price produce four combinations of 
retail price constraints including linear and non-discriminatory, non-linear 
and non-discriminatory, linear and discriminatory, and non-linear and 
discriminatory. In their paper, Laffont et al. (1998a and 1998b) also 
differentiate their analyses into these four combinations. Similarly, this 
review also structures the discussion into these four classifications and the 
main topics discussed in two-way access papers can be summarized as in 
Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2. Topics Discussed in Two-way Access Literature
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In the mobile cellular service, the most appropriate assumption is 
discriminatory retail price. Discriminatory retail price may reduce the 
collusive effect of access price and promotes more intense competition in 
retail price (Laffont and Tirole 2000). In this case, in order to create a network 
externality, the competing operators may set high off-net price and low on- 
net price. In pre-paid plans of mobile cellular services where retail price is 
linear, high off-net price might be affected by the level of access price. 
However, some papers that consider that subscriber utility increases not only 
by making a call but also by being called argue that on-net and off-net price 
differential is optimal, even though access price is at cost (Hoernig 2007). 
Therefore, in a pre-paid plan, ideally there should be a price competition in 
on-net price regardless of the level of access price.
The following sections briefly present analyses and findings of literature on 
two-way access. Even though this research only observes cases with
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discriminatory and linear retail price, this chapter also reviews other papers 
that assume other retail price conditions.
5.1.1. Linear and Non-Discriminatory Retail Price
The competing operators in a market with two-way access structure 
constrained with linear and non-discriminatory retail price are only able to 
use usage price as the instrument for competition and revenue making. 
Furthermore, retail price must be uniform either for a call terminated to its 
own network or to competitor networks. If access price is left unregulated, 
the competing operators may have a chance to negotiate a high access price 
which inflates retail prices. High access charges make the operator less 
motivated to compete in retail price. The reason is that lowering retail price 
would encourage inter-network traffic, which increases interconnection cost 
leading to access deficit. This argument implies that access price can be used 
to produce collusive outcome in retail price. A more detailed discussion on 
the literature is presented below.
The works of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a) are two pioneer 
papers in analyzing collusive effect in two-way access structure with linear 
and non-discriminatory retail price. Their analyses are based on the profit- 
maximizing model of two competing operators with several assumptions 
including (i) retail prices are unregulated, linear, and uniform, (ii) access 
price is reciprocal and negotiated between the competing parties, (iii) 
operators are in symmetric equilibrium meaning that in equilibrium 
condition their market share and retail price are relatively equal, (iv) traffic is 
balanced as a proportion of market share, (v) each subscriber has a 
homogeneous calling pattern, (vi) the services offered are similar according
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to subscribers' point of view implying identical elasticity of calling or usage 
demand, and (vii) operators have full coverage networks, and (viii) people 
subscribe to only one operator. Their main conclusion is that negotiated 
access price can be used as an instrument to provide collusive effect in retail 
price (Armstrong, 1998:553-4; Laffont et al. 1998a:10-l). Armstrong (2002:364) 
also argues that collusive effect of access price is still likely even if the 
competing products are sufficiently differentiated.
Moreover, Dessein (2003) slightly changes the assumption that consumers 
are differentiated into two categories (heterogeneous users), light and heavy 
users. Based on this assumption, the calling pattern is not necessarily 
balanced. He concludes that, in symmetric equilibrium, high access charges 
still lead to collusive outcome in retail price, especially if the light users 
receive more calls than they make (Dessein 2003:6-7).
In addition, Carter and Wright (1999) consider an asymmetry in their 
analysis. The asymmetry means that demand, market share, and retail prices 
of the competing parties can be different. Based on numerical simulation, if 
an incumbent dominates the market, joint profit maximization can be 
achieved through reciprocal access price and identical retail tariff rules 
(Carter and Wright 1999:17 - 21). This conclusion implies that reciprocal 
access price in an asymmetric environment would disadvantage consumers 
(Carter and Wright 1999:21). In order to minimize collusive outcome, they 
argue that regulation in access price is more effective than regulation in retail 
price (Carter and Wright 1999:23). In the case where the regulator lacks 
information to calculate the appropriate access charge, they recommend zero 
access charge or bill-and-keep regime (Carter and Wright 1999:24).
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Armstrong (2004) analyzes another variation of the model by considering 
heterogeneous calling pattern and asymmetry between incumbent and 
entrant. He also assumes that there are two groups of subscribers, high and 
low volume users, who face two different schemes of retail price. He 
concludes that if demand for calls is inelastic, meaning that volume of calls is 
relatively stable, high reciprocal access price encourages an entrant to reduce 
retail price for low volume users and increase the price for high volume users 
in order to minimize access deficit (Armstrong 2004:386-7). Furthermore, in 
the case that access price is asymmetric where the entrant can charge a higher 
access price than incumbent, the entrant will reduce retail price to both users 
which leads to more intense price competition (Armstrong 2004:387). The 
conclusion shows that the collusive effect of high access price partially 
disappears if the assumptions, such as heterogeneous calling pattern and 
third degree price-discrimination, are relaxed.
In brief, the literature reveals that, in some strong assumptions, access price 
has a central role to shape competition. Retail price regulation may not be 
sufficient to eliminate collusive outcome in retail price because it is the result 
of cost factor, especially related to access charge. Consequently, regulation of 
access price is more appropriate in disciplining the operators' behaviors.
5.1.2. Non-Linear and Non-Discriminatory Retail Price
In a market with two-way access structure limited with non-linear and non- 
discriminatory retail pricing, operators are equipped with multi-pricing 
instruments. Especially in a two-part tariff system, these pricing instruments 
include monthly subscription and usage fees. An example of a market with 
this retail pricing constraint is fixed telecommunications service.
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In this case, some papers argue that access price is neutral to operators' 
profit, implying that negotiated access price cannot be used to mute 
competition. The reason is that operators can attract subscribers by lowering 
subscription fees. Therefore, even though the high access price reduces 
subscription demand, it is offset by a low subscription fee that is an access 
charge free. Consequently, operators still can compete even though access 
price is high. However, again, this argument is based on strong assumptions 
such as a balanced calling pattern. With a more realistic assumption, access 
price may still affect profit and can be used as instrument to create collusive 
outcome in retail price. Interestingly, collusive effect can also be generated by 
low access price instead. The paragraphs below briefly describe the analyses 
and findings of these papers.
Laffont et al. (1998a) develop a basic model of competition in two-way access 
with non-discriminatory two-part retail tariff. They find that in a symmetric 
equilibrium operators' profits are not affected by the level of access price or 
known as profit neutrality of access price (1998a:20-2). This conclusion shows 
that access price cannot be used as an instrument to soften market 
competition. Furthermore, Armstrong (2002:365) also finds that profit 
neutrality still holds, even if the market shares of the competing operators 
are not equal. The reason is that an increase in access price raises retail price 
and reduces the incentive to subscribe to the network. In order to maintain 
market share, the operator attracts subscribers by lowering fixed fees. As a 
result, the ability of access price as an instrument to maximize joint profits 
diminishes. In this case, it is socially optimal if access price is set equal to 
termination cost (Armstrong 2002:366). However, the operators may still 
have an incentive to set high access price leading to high usage price,
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especially if they have imperfect information about the customers (Laffont et 
al. 1998a:22).
In contrast to the basic model assuming that every person subscribes to a 
network (full consumer participation), Schiff (2002) considers that not all 
consumers are attached to the networks (partial consumer participation). The 
implication of this assumption is that competition is not only to attract rivals' 
subscribers but also the people who do not subscribe to the service (Schiff 
2002:296). In this model, market participation rate is defined as the total 
number of people joining the networks. Schiff (2002: 301) finds that profit 
neutrality still holds if the participation rate is exogenous, meaning that price 
is not an important factor to subscribe, and profit-maximizing access price is 
at termination cost. Profit will be affected by access price if the participation 
rate is endogenous, implying that the decision to subscribe to a network is 
influenced by some factors such as price and market share of the network 
(Schiff 2002:304).
Moreover, Carter and Wright (2003) assume that the competing operators are 
asymmetric. If access price must be reciprocal, larger operators prefer to set 
access price at termination cost, but smaller operators would only favor 
access price at cost if its share is below one-third (Carter and Wright 2003:
33). This conclusion implies that large operators are less motivated to use 
access price as a collusive device to lever usage tariff. Consequently, effective 
regulation can just be implemented by requiring reciprocal access charges 
and by asking the incumbent to set the level of access price (Carter and 
Wright 2003: 40).
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In addition, Dessein (2003) assumes that subscribers are heterogeneous and 
can be differentiated into light and heavy users. A heterogeneous calling 
pattern provides the ability for operators to discriminate the tariff for 
different types of users (Dessein 2003:8). He finds that access price still does 
not affect profit but it may influence operators' pricing strategies in 
discriminating their subscribers (Dessein 2003:9). Using a similar assumption 
for heterogeneous subscribers, Hahn (2004:621) also comes up with a similar 
conclusion about the profit neutrality of access price. However, if 
subscription demand is elastic, meaning that the decision to choose which 
network to join is influenced by retail price, profit can be maximized by 
setting below-cost access price (Dessein 2003:10). This conclusion may raise 
another concern that not only high access price may be used as an 
anticompetitive device but also low access price (Dessein 2003:13). Moreover, 
Poletti and Wright (2004:349) also find that profit neutrality does not hold if 
subscribers are heterogeneous and not all potential consumers participate in 
networks.
In another paper, Dessein (2004) considers heterogeneous subscribers and 
heterogeneous calling patterns. He argues that access price is still neutral to 
profit but an unbalanced calling pattern may impact the price discrimination 
strategy of the operators (Dessein 2004:334). However, profit may be affected 
by access price if subscribers have different perceptions of substitutability of 
the competing services (Dessein 2004:336).
The papers discussed above show that profit neutrality of access price in 
two-way access with a non-discriminatory two-part tariff is only valid with 
some strong assumptions. Under assumptions that are more realistic, some 
of these papers argue that access price still can be used as a collusive
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instrument leading to high retail tariff. Again, access price-regulation is still 
important in this kind of market in order to control operators' behavior and 
to reach an optimal social outcome.
5.1.3. Non-Linear and Discriminatory Retail Price
In a market with two-way access structure constrained with non-linear and 
discriminatory retail pricing, the operators possess at least three pricing 
instruments. In terms of the non-linearity of the retail tariff, the operator has 
at least two instruments of tariff, subscription and usage fees. Furthermore, 
the usage price can be discriminated between the calls within the network 
and out of the network. One good example of a market with this condition is 
a post-paid mobile cellular service.
Some of the papers discussing competition in this kind of market still put 
their attention on the topic of whether access price can be used to produce 
collusive outcome. In this case, the conclusions show that profit is still 
neutral to access price. In addition, several others also deal with analyses 
related to optimal level of retail prices. In general, the analyses can be 
classified into two major groups, the one that does not consider call 
externality and the one that does. Considering the call externality implies 
that the subscriber's utility increases not only because he can make a call but 
also due to the ability to receive a call. The analyses that do not include the 
call externality assumption tend to conclude that optimal retail price would 
reflect perceived marginal cost and be uniform (non-discriminatory). In 
contrast, the analyses which consider call externality argue that in the 
optimal condition there should be a price differential where the retail price 
for calls terminated in rival networks (off-net calls) is higher than that for
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calls ended in the same networks (on-net calls). A more detailed description 
of these papers is presented in the following paragraphs.
Laffont et al. (1998b) create a basic model by assuming a balanced calling 
pattern and no call externality. They conclude that if the products are less 
substitutable, in a symmetric equilibrium, operators prefer to set access price 
at cost and retail price at its perceived marginal cost (Laffont et al. 1998b:52). 
This finding implies that the power of high access price to produce collusive 
outcome disappears. In addition, since access price is set at cost, optimal on- 
net price will be equal to off-net price, meaning there will be no termination- 
based price discrimination.
However, Gans and King (2001) argue that the analysis of Laffont et al. 
(1998b) above is not complete. They claim that below-cost access price will 
produce a collusive effect in retail price (Gans and King 2001: 419). Below- 
cost access price makes on-net calls more expensive than off-net calls. 
Therefore, subscribers of smaller networks will face a lower average price 
because the probability of making on-net calls is also small. Consequently, 
people tend to join operators with smaller networks. This condition puts 
larger operators at disadvantage, as they have higher probability to receive 
off-net calls from rivals which in turn leads to access deficit. As a result, 
operators are less motivated to compete for subscribers by setting a high 
subscription fee. For that reason, they prefer a cost-based access regime 
rather than a bill-and-keep regime which is below cost (Gans and King 2001: 
419). Theoretically, this analysis is justified but it is less sensible in practice 
because the evidence that on-net price is higher than off-net price would 
never be found.
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Alternatively, Berger (2005) analyzes behaviors of symmetric operators by 
considering call externality. He finds that, in symmetric equilibrium, optimal 
access charge is below marginal cost and off-net price is always higher than 
on-net price (Berger 2005:111). In contrast to the argument of Gans and King 
(2001), this conclusion suggests that the bill-and-keep regime is socially more 
optimal than the cost-based access regime (Berger 2005:112).
Moreover, Hoernig (2007) also considers a call externality in analyzing 
pricing behaviors of asymmetric operators. His main objective is not to 
observe whether access charge can be used as a collusive device but rather to 
examine whether low on-net price can be considered as predatory. He 
concludes that optimal on-net price is always below optimal off-net price 
(Hoernig 2007:178). Furthermore, if the initial equilibrium is symmetric, 
meaning that market shares and off-net prices of the competing operators are 
identical, an increase in access price raises off-net price, decreases the 
subscription fee, and does not change on-net price (Hoernig 2007:179).
In addition, Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2008) examine why on-net price is 
usually cheaper than off-net price. They find that this price differential is 
mainly imposed by above-cost access charge, and high off-net price will 
create tariff-mediated network externalities to raise the switching cost for 
subscribers who have the tendency to call only to certain people / calling club 
(Gabrielsen and Vagstad 2008:106). For that reason, they conclude that 
operators can use high access charges to soften competition and argue that 
optimal access price should be set at cost (Gabrielsen and Vagstad 2008:111). 
In general, their finding is similar to the one of Laffont et al. (1998b) who 
implicitly claim that cost-based access charge is optimal.
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The discussion above shows that the findings and conclusions of papers can 
be different according to the assumptions used in the models. In general, 
there are four points can be drawn from the literature including (i) access 
price can be neutral to profit, (ii) below-cost access price may lead to 
collusive effect, (iii) high access price may give partial collusive effect to off- 
net price, and (iv) on-net/off-net price differential is an optimal equilibrium if 
call externality is taken into account.
5.1.4. Linear and Discriminatory Retail Price
The operators constrained with linear retail pricing are only equipped with 
usage retail price as an instrument for competition. However, since the usage 
price can be discriminated based on call termination, the operators possess 
two pricing instruments including price for inter-network calls (off-net price) 
and price for intra-network calls (on-net price). One example of a market 
with this pricing scheme is the pre-paid plan of the mobile cellular market.
The papers analyzing this kind of market argue that access price may still 
have a partial collusive effect, that is, an increase in access charge will raise 
off-net price. Furthermore, an on-net/off-net price differential will create a 
tariff-mediated network externality. If the operators are asymmetric in size, 
this externality may affect subscription decision, especially if people tend to 
join an operator where their call ended most. In this case, an incumbent with 
many subscribers might be the most preferred operator. Therefore, when the 
market becomes more competitive where several new operators enter the 
market, people are also concerned about the exclusionary effect of a large 
price differential on small operators. However, it is not the interest of this 
section to review papers related to exclusionary behavior in two-way access.
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Rather, it pays more attention to the optimal retail price condition. Most of 
the papers indicate that equilibrium off-net price is always above on-net 
price, even if access price is at cost. The paragraphs below present brief 
descriptions of the papers related to linear and discriminatory retail price.
Laffont et al. (1998b) model the competition with several strong assumptions 
including (i) the proportionality rule, meaning that optimal prices are 
determined by perceived marginal costs, (ii) identical price elasticity of 
calling demand, (iii) symmetric equilibrium or similar market share and 
retail prices, (iv) balanced calling pattern which balances access revenue and 
cost in the reciprocal access price rule. They argue that if the competing 
products are sufficiently differentiated or the degree of substitutability is 
low, an increase in access price decreases on-net price but raises off-net price 
(Laffont et al. 1998b:48). This conclusion implies that collusive outcome in 
off-net price and the on-net/off-net price differential may only exist if access 
price is above cost. However, if access price is at cost, on-net and off-net 
prices will be uniform and the collusive effect of access price diminishes.
Berger (2004) considers a positive call externality in his model. Call 
externality means that the utility for the subscriber increases not only 
because he can make a call, but also because he can be called. Based on 
graphical analysis, he also concludes that an increase in access price 
decreases on-net price and raises off-net price (Berger 2004:9). However, in 
contrast with Laffont et al. (1998b), he argues that profit-maximizing and 
welfare-maximizing access charges are below cost and optimal on-net price is 
lower than off-net price (Berger 2004:14).
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Moreover, using a numerical simulation, Cricelli et al. (2005) analyze 
competition in the mobile telecommunications industry based on the model 
of Laffont et al. (1998b) and take into account asymmetry between the 
competing operators. They run three simulations by varying level of 
asymmetry, level of substitutability, and elasticity of demand. The first 
simulation assumes that operators are identical in costs and demand 
elasticity. In this case, they find that optimal off-net price is always higher 
than on-net price (Cricelli et al. 2005:4). The second simulation keeps the 
degree of asymmetry constant and they conclude that optimal retail prices 
decrease if the products are more substitutable and on-net/off-net price 
differential is larger for the incumbent (Cricelli et al. 2005:5). Lastly, the third 
simulation assumes that operators are asymmetric and product 
substitutability is low. The result is that the more inelastic the incumbent's 
demand, the higher is its profit and market share (Cricelli et al. 2005:6). In 
brief, one interesting point from their findings is that on-net/off-net price 
differential is an optimal equilibrium.
In addition to asymmetry, Hoernig (2007) also takes into account call 
externality in his model. The model also assumes a balanced calling pattern, 
meaning that call probability is determined by market shares. However, it 
does not necessarily imply a balanced traffic between competing networks 
because traffic is not only a function of calling pattern but also of duration of 
call. In this case, he concludes that off-net price is always higher than on-net 
price (Hoernig 2007:176). Furthermore, he also concludes that operators with 
higher market share will have higher optimal off-net and on-net prices, and 
price differential increases in access charge (Hoernig 2007:177).
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Again, the papers discussed above show that the analyses can produce 
different findings depending on the assumptions used in the models. 
However, there is one interesting point from these papers. Most of them 
argue that optimal on-net price is lower than off-net price. It implies that on- 
net price competition in this kind of market should be relatively competitive.
5.2. Facilitating Factors of Collusion
The on-net prices for the pre-paid plan of the mobile cellular service, which 
represents a market with two-way access structure constrained with linear 
and discriminatory retail price, should relatively be competitive. The 
literature on two-way access indicates that network externality created from 
termination-based price discrimination encourages competitive pricing such 
as high off-net price and low on-net price. The literature also argues that the 
on-net / off-net price differential is optimal. For that reason, if the competing 
operators set a uniform price for on-net and off-net calls, one may suspect a 
collusive behavior. However, this concern does not appear in the two-way 
access pricing papers discussed in the previous section.
This section is intended to explore other literature dealing with collusion. 
The objective is to have some view about the incentive of the competing 
operators setting uniform prices in the pre-paid mobile cellular market. 
These papers indicate several factors that may contribute to the collusive 
outcome in the mobile cellular market, including structural aspects such as 
the limited number of competing firms and cross-ownership, and regulatory 
aspects such as ineffective price regulation. The paragraphs below present a 
brief description of these papers.
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In legal terms, collusion is often described as co-operative actions intended 
to, or conspiracy to deter competition (Buccirossi 2006:88; Buccirossi 2008, 
305). In contrast, in economics, collusion is defined in broader terms, that is, 
as a condition where prices are sufficiently high above the Nash equilibrium 
of the static game or close to monopolistic level (Motta 2004:138, Buccirossi 
2006:88). Furthermore, the evidence of collusive equilibrium can be a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to judge a conspiracy (Buccirossi 
2006:88-89).
There are several ways to achieve collusive outcomes. One of them is 
through a conspiracy that is forced through an agreement or a contract. 
However, in most countries, this kind of explicit collusion is unlawful. 
Alternatively, collusive outcome can also be tacitly maintained through some 
strategies such as mutual understanding and price leadership (Rees 1994:39; 
Phlips 1995:81-123; Phlips 1996:499). These practices are also considered 
unlawful in some countries, especially in Europe. Moreover, a collusive 
outcome can also result from independent behavior of firms, such as 
conscious parallelism (Hylton 2003:81). However, this argument is still 
debated (Hylton 2003:86).
In addition, collusive outcome is usually achieved if the situation supports it. 
There are several factors that can be considered to facilitate collusion or 
collusive outcome. Motta (2004:142-59) classifies these facilitating factors into 
structural aspects, price transparency, information exchange, pricing rules, 
and contract. Furthermore, Feuerstein (2005:179-181) indicates several 
practices which can be used to maintain collusive outcome including 
information sharing, price policy, vertical restraint, and intra-firm structure. 
Moreover, Buccirossi (2008) puts more attention on how communication and
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information-sharing among the competing operators can help collusion. 
Related to the case in this research, the discussion is limited to structural and 
regulatory aspects that make collusion or collusive outcome more feasible.
Market concentration and cross-ownership are among the structural aspects 
that may affect collusive outcome. High market concentration means that 
only few firms possess significant power in the market. If the dominant 
firms in the concentrated market are relatively symmetric in terms of market 
share, costs or capacity, collusive outcome is more likely to be maintained 
(Ivaldi et al. 2007:220-223). A duopolistic market is one example of a highly 
concentrated market. From some empirical studies, it is known that there 
were indications of tacit collusion between the operators during the 
duopolistic era of mobile telephony competition in German and the UK 
(Stoetzer and Tewes 1996:305; Valleti and Cave 1998:115-116). In addition, in 
some circumstances passive partial cross-ownership of the competing firms 
may also facilitate collusion (Gilo et al. 2006:82). This argument also implies 
that active cross-ownership would also have a perverse effect on competition 
because the owners of the competing firms would have more ability to 
coordinate firms' strategic behavior.
In the case of regulatory aspects that may affect collusive outcome, pricing 
regulations such as price ceiling, price cap, and price filing may also promote 
collusion. There are several empirical studies concluding that price 
regulation encourages collusive outcome. Hausman (2002:591-4) blames price 
regulation as a supporting factor behind high prices in the US mobile 
telephony industry in the past. Knittel and Stango (2003:1718) argue that, to 
some extent, a non-binding price ceiling is used by the competing firms in 
the credit card industry in the US as a focal point to set interest rate. They
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also argue that price cap regulation would also give a similar collusive effect 
as ceiling price regulation (Knittel and Stango 2003:1726). Moreover, Ma 
(2007:13) also finds that an evidence of tacit collusion in Taiwan's flour 
market was facilitated by non-binding price ceiling regulation, which was set 
relatively high above competitive price. In addition to price ceiling, the 
regulation that obliges operators to report and file their price change to the 
regulator may also encourage collusive outcome. MacAvoy (1995:158) finds 
that identical prices offered by the three largest long-distance service 
providers was facilitated by the pricing process which requires the dominant 
operator to submit a proposal of tariff changes to regulator. Choi et al. 
(2001:131) also conclude that disincentive to compete in price in the Korean 
mobile telephony market was caused by regulations that oblige market 
leaders to get approval prior to adjusting the tariff.
5.3. Identifying Collusion
Identifying collusive behavior is not a simple task. Evidence of collusive 
outcome does not necessarily conclude a collusive behavior because the 
equilibrium could also be a product of an un-coordinated reaction such as 
price leader-ship, parallel behavior, or conscious parallelism. Buccirossi 
(2006:99-100) argues that parallel behavior can be a collusive equilibrium but 
it does not prove a conspiracy.
Harrington (2008: 215) proposed three stages of detecting cartel or collusion 
including screening or identification, verification, and prosecution. In the 
screening stage, collusion is usually identified based on market share or price 
data. Furthermore, in the verification the examination usually requires more
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complex analysis, involving more detail of data and an advanced method. 
Finally in the prosecution stage, a legal institution or competition 
commission will utilize the findings from previous stages to undertake 
further investigation. The first two stages of Harrington's proposal may 
involve economic analysis, which is more relevant to the scope of this 
research.
There are several indicators that can be used in the screening stage. Highly 
and positively correlated retail prices, or stability of prices during a certain 
period, is one initial indicator of possible collusive behavior (Harrington 
2008:236-46). In addition, parallel pricing can also be used as an alternative 
indicator. Alternatively, market share analysis can also be employed. 
However, the analysis only shows the pattern of possible collusive outcome. 
In fact, parallel pricing or stability in some market indicators can be a result 
of many factors such as cost, demand, or regulatory changes. However, this 
information is important for further analysis in the verification stage.
In the verification stage, the analysis is more complex. It should be able to 
explain whether the indicators provided in the screening stage can be 
justified as a possible collusive behavior. For example, it may need to prove 
price is sufficiently high above optimal level. Consequently, it requires an 
appropriate method and extensive market data, such as characteristics of 
consumers and demand elasticity.
One alternative method that can be used to identify collusive outcome in the 
verification stage is based on its fundamental explanation of collusion. 
Collusion is often associated with a condition where prices are sufficiently 
high above the Nash equilibrium of the static game (Buccirossi 2006:88). The
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stable Nash equilibrium of the prisoners' dilemma game shows a competitive 
outcome where the parties involved behave selfishly to maximize their own 
interest. In fact, there is a higher outcome than this Nash equilibrium, but it 
is unstable and risky. However, they can achieve it through co-orciination. A 
more detailed illustration of the prisoners' dilemma game modified for the 
telecommunications case is presented in the paragraph below.
Assume that there are two dominant operators, x and y, competing in the 
market. They face a dilemma whether to set low non-cooperative price p 0 or 
high collusive price p c. The consequences or pay-off from setting these prices 
are described in Figure 5.3. If both operators, x and y, set a low non- 
cooperative price p 0, each of them will earn moderate pay-off 4. Actually, 
they can get higher pay-off 7 if they altogether set a high price p c. However, 
setting a high price will put them at risk because if any of these operators 
changes its mind and sets a low price, the one that set the high price will 
have the lowest outcome 2. Due to that risk, it is safer for these competing 
operators to set a low competitive price. However, the chance to co-ordinate 
or collude may encourage these operators to set p c  that maximize their joint- 
profit, 7.
Figure 5.3. Pricing Dilemma: non-cooperative or collusive price
o p e r a to r  y
p 0 pc
op
er
at
or
 x po 4 , 4 1 0 , 2
2 , 1 0 7 , 7
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The game illustration above is only conceptual. One method to make it 
operational is by examining the profit-maximizing prices of the operators, 
which are assumed as non-cooperative prices. These non-cooperative prices 
are then compared to actual prices set by the operators. A collusive outcome 
is shown if these competing operators together set prices above their non- 
cooperative prices. In this case, the operators tend to maximize their joint- 
profits instead of individual profit.
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Chapter 6
Competition in the Mobile Cellular Market
A Case of Collusive Pricing in Two-way Access
Three major operators, Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo, dominate 
mobile cellular market in Indonesia. In 2007, the Commission for Supervisory 
of Business Competition of Republic of Indonesia (KPPU) investigated 
possible anticompetitive behavior in the mobile cellular market. KPPU sees 
that mobile cellular prices were relatively uniform and profitability of the 
operators was considered high. This market performance is associated with 
market structure which was oligopolistic and the two major operators, 
Telkomsel and Indosat, are partially cross-owned by the Temasek group of 
Singapore.
Based on these facts, KPPU argues that cross-ownership has enabled the 
Temasek group to control behaviors of major operators which in turn 
increased market concentration and softened competition. Therefore, in its 
decision, KPPU demands elimination of cross-ownership and punishes 
several companies involved. However, the decision faces some objections 
from some economists. They claim that KPPU's analyses are inappropriate 
and not based on sound economic justification.
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This chapter presents an alternative analysis dealing with pricing behavior 
especially related to price fixing or collusive pricing as initially concerned. It 
limits the attention on the pre-paid plan of the mobile cellular service which 
has more than 95 percent of market share. The analysis is based on a game 
theoretical concept that argues that a coordination or collusion likely exists if 
the competing operators tend to set prices sufficiently above their non- 
cooperative level. In this case, non-cooperative price is defined as a profit- 
maximizing price which is estimated through a profit-maximizing model of 
competition in a two-way access structure.
Based on consumer preference information collected from a survey, the 
analysis concludes that in the year 2006 prices of all pre-paid plans were 
above non-cooperative level. It implies that the market is in collusive 
equilibrium. In contrast, in 2007, only the prices of Telkomsel's and Indosat's 
pre-paid plans were above their non-cooperative level. Furthermore, XL's 
price was at its non-cooperative level. This finding supports an allegation 
about possible collusion between two major mobile cellular operators which 
were cross-owned by Temasek. Moreover, one of Indosat's pre-paid plans 
tends to set quite a high price above its non-cooperative level. In fact, this 
pricing may lead to self-destruction. This usual pricing behavior may 
indicate a possible strong control of Telkomsel and Indosat by Temasek, or 
there is an attempt to weaken Indosat as claimed by KPPU.
Furthermore, in its regulatory aspect, the finding seems in line with some 
empirical works which conclude that price regulation which sets a high 
ceiling price may produce collusive effect. The policy to eliminate ceiling 
price level is considered appropriate. In a market which faces more intense 
competition, like the mobile cellular market, price regulations can be relaxed
157
and operators' pricing behavior may be better just monitored by the 
regulator and the competition commission.
6.1. Background of the Case
In general, there are two types of mobile cellular services in Indonesia. The 
first one is cellular service with unrestricted mobility. Three operators with 
GSM technology and national coverage dominate the market of this service. 
The second one is cellular service with limited mobility, also known as fixed- 
wireless access (FWA). The FWA operators are basically awarded a license as 
fixed network providers. However, since the operators utilize cheaper 
wireless technology instead of copper cable, subscribers can use it as a 
mobile cellular service with coverage limitation. This limited mobility is 
constrained by regulation but not the technology. Therefore, FWA can offer 
limited mobility service with a low price. However, even though to some 
extent mobile cellular service and FWA are substitutable, they are considered 
to reside in different markets. This argument is supported by the facts found 
in the survey conducted for this research and from the analysis by KPPU.
The case discussed in this chapter refers to real mobile cellular services with 
unrestricted mobility. Three GSM operators, Telkomsel, Indosat, and 
Excelcomindo have dominated the mobile cellular market in Indonesia for a 
long time. Before 2008, competition in this market was limited mainly to 
coverage, product, and quality of service. Competition in price or usage tariff 
was very rare except during certain occasions. Due to lack of price 
competition, the competing operators were suspected to behave collusively. 
Partial cross-ownership has been blamed as a condition that may facilitate
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coordination among the operators. Some paragraphs below briefly describe 
the history and analysis of that allegation.
Price-Fixing Allegation in the Mobile Cellular Market
The anticompetitive issue in the mobile cellular market was raised formally 
after F.X. Arief Poyuono, a leader of a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) called FSP-BUMN (Federasi Serikat Pekerja -  Badan Usaha Milik 
Negara / United Federation of State-Owned Enterprise Workers), filed a 
formal report to KPPU in mid-October 2006 about an indication of price 
fixing between Indosat and Telkomsel. The report is mainly based on a post­
paid tariff pattern of mobile to fixed line calls offered by the two biggest 
operators, Telkomsel and Indosat (Hukum On-line 2006a). The report 
indicates that as competing operators Telkomnet and Indosat should not set 
uniform prices for their mobile cellular service and argues that this pricing 
behavior is possible because both operators have close affiliation in 
ownership as well as in management (Hukum On-line 2006a). Table 6.1 
compares the tariff of Telkomsel and Indosat that was used to justify the 
price fixing allegation by FSP-BUMN.
Table 6.1. Price Indicators Used by FSP-BUMN to Claim Price Fixing
T im e-b and
M o b ile  to F ix ed -lin e  T ariff 
(R p /m in ute)
In dosat
(M atrix)
T e lk o m se l
(H alo )
P eak  (08.00-22.00) 503,75 504
O ff P eak  (22.00-08.00) 422,5 423
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Furthermore, they also argue that since Telkomsel and Indosat are dominant 
operators, their smaller competitors will imitate this pricing strategy and act 
as the market followers (Hukum On-line 2006a). In mid-November 2006, 
FSP-BUMN submitted additional data showing that the commissioners 
representing Singaporean share holders in Telkomsel and Indosat may have 
control over operational aspects in both competing operators (Hukum On­
line 2006b).
In short, this NGO claims that partial ownership of the competing mobile 
cellular operators by Singaporean companies is a practice of cross-ownership 
leading to high prices in the mobile cellular market. At that time, KPPU 
considered that the allegation was weak and not supported by sufficient 
evidence (Hukum On-line 2006c). FSP-BUMN revised the report in late 
December 2006 and claimed that there were 11 telecommunications 
companies which should be responsible for the monopolization of the mobile 
cellular market in Indonesia (Hukum On-line 2006c).
However, in early April 2007 FSP-BUMN withdrew its report to KPPU 
(Hukum On-line 2007). They argued that the timeframe to investigate the 
case had expired and they could not find strong arguments to continue the 
case (Hukum On-line 2007; Rakyat Merdeka 2007). This action is 
incomprehensible, because it was still the clarification stage. Since the 
information and documents of the submitted report were not complete yet, 
the potential case could not enter the investigation stage. Lately, there has 
been information revealed that F.X. Arief Poyuono as the leader of FSP- 
BUMN has met Temasek high-level officers and received some financial 
assistance for not continuing the case (Jurnalnet 2007).
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Investigation and Decision by KPPU
KPPU still continued the case based on their initial information. In early 
April 2007, the Secretariat of KPPU presented its initial view related to 
pricing behavior of the competing operators in the mobile cellular market 
and proposed the case be passed into the investigation stage9. The 
Commission agreed on this proposal and created a team to undertake a 
preliminary investigation which was conducted between 9 April 2006 and 22 
May 2006. The report of the preliminary investigation shows strong 
indications that Temasek Group may breach Article 2710 of Law No 5/1999
9 According to KPPU's case handling procedure established in 2006, every report of a 
potential case either the one comes from third party or as an output of internal monitoring 
activity must be clarified within 30 to 60 working days. In this stage, the Secretariat of KPPU 
examines several aspects including the party filing the case, rationale of the case, and 
possible relevant articles of the Law. If there is an initial indication of possible unlawful 
conduct, the clarification process may continue to the filing process. At this stage, the 
Secretariat should complete the document and gather information from the parties involved, 
which should be finished within 30 working days. Results and analysis in the filing stage 
must be presented by the Secretariat in front of the Commissioners within 14 working days 
afterward. If the Commissioners agree to these initial findings, they create a team to 
undertake preliminary investigation. The process takes at maximum 30 working days to 
finish. If the defendants refuse the conclusion in the preliminary investigation stage or the 
findings need to have stronger indication, the Commission can continue the case into further 
investigation which should be completed in 60 working days with possible extension of 30 
working days. Furthermore, based on the analyses in these investigation processes, the team 
is given up to 30 working days to prepare the final decision of the case. The defendant can 
appeal KPPU's decision to the District Court in the first stage. If the defendants are not 
satisfied with the decision made by the District Court, they can appeal it to the Supreme 
Court. The decision of the Supreme Court is binding for all parties and must be exercised.
10 Article 27 of Law No. 5/1999 mentions that “Business actors shall be prohibited from 
owning majority of shares in several similar companies conducting business activities in the 
same field on the same market, or establishing several companies with the same business 
activities on the same market, if such ownership causes: (a) one business actor or a group of 
business actors to control over 50% of the market share of a certain type of goods or services; 
(b) two or three business actors or a group of business actors to control over 75% of the 
market share of a certain type of goods or services."
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about cross-ownership11 that leads to domination of more than 50 percent 
market share by a group business entity, and Telkomsel may violate Articles 
1712 and 2513 of the law about monopolization practice causing high tariff in 
the mobile cellular market and abuse of dom inant position. Based on these 
findings, the Commission agreed to give a m andate for the team to carry out 
an advance investigation which ended at the end of September 2007.
11 According to KPPU, Telkomsel is owned by Telkom (65%), a state-owned company, and 
Sing-Tel (35%), a mobile cellular operator in Singapore. Moreover, STT, a telecommunication 
company in Singapore, dominates 41% of Indosat's shares. These companies, Sing-Tel and 
STT are allegedly owned by Temasek Holding. This condition leads to the assumption that 
policy making in Telkomsel and Indosat can be influenced by Temasek.
12 Article 17 of Law No. 5/1999 says that
" (1) Business actors shall be prohibited from controlling the production or marketing of 
goods and or services which may result in monopolistic practices and or unfair business 
competition.
(2) Business actors may be reasonably suspected or deemed to control the production and or 
marketing of goods and or services as intended in paragraph (1) in the following events: (a) 
there is no substitute available yet for the goods and or services concerned; or (b) causing 
other business actors to unable to enter into business competition for the same good and or 
services; or (c) one business actor or a group of business actor controls over 50% of the 
market segment of a certain type of goods or service".
13 Article 25 of Law No. 5/1999 says that
" (1) Business actors shall be prohibited using dominant position either directly or indirectly 
to: (a) determine the conditions of trading with the intention of preventing and or barring 
consumers from obtaining competitive goods and or services, both in terms of price and 
quality; or (b) limiting market and technology development; or (c) bar other potential 
business actors from entering the relevant market.
(2) Business actors shall have a dominant position as intended in paragraph (1) in the 
following events: (a) if one business actor or a group of business actors controls over 50% of 
the market segment of a certain type of goods or services; or (b) if two or three business 
actors or a group of business actors control over 75% of the market segment of certain type 
of goods or services".
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Finally, on Monday 19 November 2007, the commission announced its 
decision on the case. It concluded that Temasek and several related 
companies breach Article 27.a of the law about prohibition to cross-own the 
firms with 50 percent of market share, and that Telkomsel violates Article 
17.1 of the law in its attempts to dominate production or marketing in the 
mobile cellular market that leads to monopolistic and unfair business 
practices. However, the Commission could not find any evidence that 
Telkomsel abuses its dominant position to deter competitors as indicated in 
Article 25.1 of the law. As punishment, in addition to monetary fines, 
Temasek group had to divest its shares either in Telkomsel and Indosat, and 
Telkomsel was asked to lower its tariff at least 15 percent.
KPPU's effort to combine economics and legal approaches in its analysis 
should be appreciated. It might be the first case of KPPU that involves more 
advanced economics analysis. A structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
approach is used in the analysis. In this approach, an anticompetitive 
behavior is identified by relating market structure and market performance. 
Figure 6.1 summarizes the approach used by KPPU in analyzing the case 
(KPPU 2007:73-5).
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Figure 6.1. KPPU's Approach in Analyzing the Mobile Cellular Case
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KPPU finds that cross-ownership of Telkomsel and Indosat by Temasek 
Group has increased their joint market share and market concentration 
which in turn strengthened the market power of the dominant operator 
(KPPU 2007:87-92). KPPU argues that in the cross-ownership scheme 
Temasek acts as an active share holder which tends to strengthen Telkomsel 
as the dominant operator and weaken Indosat as the closest competitor, 
through their strategic decision related to the development of a base 
transceiver station / BTS (KPPU 2007:97). By assuming that the Stackelberg 
competition model works in the mobile cellular market, Telkomsel, a 
dominant operator with the highest number of BTS, acts as a first mover and 
price leader, and competitors as followers imitate Telkomsel's pricing 
behavior (KPPU 2007:92-7). Statistical analyses on mobile cellular prices 
show that the patterns of Telkomsel and Indosat's prices are identical (KPPU 
2007:97-9). In addition, the data also indicates that the profitability of the
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three biggest mobile cellular operators in Indonesia is sufficiently high14, and 
their retail prices are also higher than in other comparable countries15 either 
for inter-network or intra-network calls. Table 6.2 summarizes several points 
in KPPU's report (KPPU 2007). Based on these facts, it is concluded that 
Telkomsel's price is excessive16 and is followed by competitors causing high 
retail prices in the mobile cellular market (KPPU 2007:114).
14 Profitability is measured based on EBITDA (earning before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortization).
15 These comparable countries include Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, India, Singapore, and 
Vietnam.
16 KPPU is aware that this excessive price is still below the ceiling level of regulated price.
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Table 6.2. Several Issues and Findings in KPPU's Decision
N o T o p ic s F i n d i n g  /  C o n c lu s i o n
1 R e le v a n t  m arket R e le v a n t m a rk e t  fo r  In d o s a t  a n d  T e lk o m se l is  m o b ile
( d e te rm in e d  b y  p ro d u c t c e llu la r  se rv ic e  w ith  n a tio n -w id e  c o v e ra g e  (n o t in c lu d in g
s im ila r ity  -fu n c tio n , p rice , 
c h a ra c te r is tic s  a n d  m a rk e t  
g e o g ra p h y )
fix ed  w ire le s s  a ccess  w ith  l im ite d  m o b ility ) .
2 M ark et sh are A v e ra g e  m a rk e t  sh a re s  fo r  T e lk o m se l, In d o sa t ,  a n d
(c a lc u la te d  b a s e d  o n  o p e ra tin g  
in c o m e  in s te a d  o f su b sc r ib e rs )
E x c o m in d o  a re  61.24% , 25.15% , a n d  13.61%  re sp ec tiv e ly .
3 M ark et co n cen tra tio n T h e  H H I is g e tt in g  h ig h e r  in d ic a tin g  m a rk e t  is m o re
(m e a s u re d  b a s e d  o n  H e r f in d a h l- c o n c e n tra te d .
H ir s c h m a n  In d e x  o r  H H I  to  see T h e  G H H I is  a lso  g e tt in g  h ig h e r  in d ic a tin g  c ro ss -o w n e rsh ip
m a rk e t  c o n c e n tra t io n , a n d le a d s  to  h ig h e r  m a rk e t  c o n c e n tra t io n .
G e n e ra l iz e d  H H I o r  G H H I to  see K P P U  in te rp re ts  it a s  th a t  c ro s s -o w n e rs h ip  le a d s  to  m o re
c ro s s -o w n e rs h ip  effec t o n  
m a rk e t  c o n c e n tra t io n )
m a rk e t  p o w e r .
4 T a r iff r eg u la tio n O p e ra to r s  s till r e fe r re d  to  p a s t  ta r if f  re g u la tio n . N e w  
r e g u la tio n  w a s  s till in  tra n s it io n .
5 R eta il T a r iff T h e re  is a p a t t e m  o f p r ic e  p a ra l le l is m  in  p o s t-p a id  se rv ice . 
K P P U  a s s u m e s  it is  a  p ra c tic e  o f  p r ic e  le a d e rs h ip  o r  tac it 
c o llu s io n .
T e lk o m se l 's  a n d  In d o s a t 's  ta r iffs  a re  re la tiv e ly  h ig h e r  
c o m p a re d  to  c o s t-b a se d  in te rc o n n e c tio n  c h a rg e  a n d  th e  
o p e ra to r s  in  so m e  A s ia n  c o u n tr ie s .
6 In v e s tm e n t g ro w th B e tw ee n  2004 a n d  2005, In d o s a t  e x p e r ie n c e d  th e  lo w e s t BTS
( in d ic a te d  b y  n u m b e r  o f B ase g ro w th . It is in fe r re d  th a t  c ro ss  o w n e r s h ip  w e a k e n e d
T ra n s c e iv e r  S ta tion /B T S ). In d o s a t  in  o rd e r  to  so f te n  m a rk e t  c o m p e tit io n .
7 In ter co n n e ctio n  p ro b lem K P P U  w a s  in fo rm e d  th a t  c o s t-b a s e d  in te rc o n n e c tio n  is n o t 
e ffe c tiv e  yet.
K P P U  w a s  in fo rm e d  th a t  th e re  w e re  so m e  d e m a n d in g  
r e q u ire m e n ts  to  h a v e  in te rc o n n e c tio n  f ro m  T e lk o m se l su c h  
a s  m in im u m  tra ffic  a n d  o w n e r s h ip  o f in te rc o n n e c tio n  link .
8 P ro fita b ility T elk o m se l h a s  th e  h ig h e s t  E B ITD A  in  th e  A s ia  Pacific
( in d ic a te d  b y  E a rn in g  B efore re g io n  (m o re  th a n  70% ) a n d  In d o s a t  a lso  h a s  h ig h  EBITD A
In te re s t, T ax , D e p re c ia tio n , a n d (a b o v e  50% ).
A m o r t iz a t io n  /  EB ITD A , a n d T e lk o m se l h a s  h ig h  R O E  (55% ).
R e tu rn  o n  E q u ity /R O E ) T h ese  in d ic a to rs  a re  in te rp r e te d  a s  e x ce ss iv e  p ro f i t  o f 
T e lk o m se l.
9 C r o ss -o w n e r sh ip  an d  C on tro l T e m a se k  is a b le  to  c o n tro l  T e lk o m se l a n d  In d o sa t  th ro u g h
o f  M a n a g e m en t its  s u b s id ia r ie s  e v e n  th o u g h  th e y  o n ly  h e ld  p a r tia l  
o w n e rsh ip .
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Some Critiques of the KPPU's Analysis
Price analysis of the mobile cellular service is rather complex. Operators may 
discriminate prices according to several factors such as time band, 
termination of call, and type of scheme. Prices in peak time are usually 
higher than off-peak time. Furthermore, calls ending in the same operator 
(on-net calls) are usually cheaper than calls terminating in a rival operator 
(off-net calls). Moreover, pre-paid plans are usually more costly than post­
paid plans. In this case, KPPU focuses on peak-time prices of post-paid and 
pre-paid plans.
In general, there are three major issues related to pricing behavior in the 
analysis. Firstly, based on price pattern, it is concluded that parallel pricing is 
obviously identified in post-paid plans but not in pre-paid plans (KPPU 
2007:86). Secondly, the analysis also indicates that Telkomsel's post-paid 
price tends to increase and the pre-paid price is stable, while its competitors 
have decreasing price trends in both plans (KPPU 2007:86-7). Finally, based 
on paired sample tests, KPPU concludes that post-paid and pre-paid prices 
of Telkomsel and Indosat move in relatively similar directions (KPPU 
2007:97-9).
These findings are used to support Telkomsel's price leadership argument. 
Even though the analyses have been conducted from several perspectives, 
KPPU still faces some critiques either internally or externally. Some domestic 
and foreign economists and experts have submitted their arguments to 
counter KPPU's analyses. Some objections related to economic and price 
analyses are described in paragraphs below.
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Dr. Benny Pasaribu, one of KPPU's commissioners who is also a member of 
the investigation team, has dissenting opinions (KPPU 2007:114-9). He argues 
that, based on legal aspects, the cross-ownership argument could not be 
supported and consequently high market concentration is not a result of 
ownership by these two different Singaporean companies. Furthermore, he 
could not find any evidence of cartel, and the parallel price pattern is not 
necessarily a result of price fixing. In contrast, he supports the arguments of 
some studies that conclude that mobile cellular price has a decreasing trend. 
Moreover, he also claims that mobile cellular prices are still in the corridor of 
price regulation, and, if the ceiling is considered high, it is not the role of 
KPPU but government as regulator to lower ceiling price.
Likewise, Dr. Chatib Basri, Head of the Institute of Economic and Social 
Research of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia (LPEM- 
FEU1), also argues that parallel prices in the mobile cellular market are not 
necessarily a result of anticompetitive conduct and cannot be assumed to be 
an indication of price fixing (KPPU 2007:302). In addition, in contrast to 
KPPU, Dr. Sri Adiningsih claims that mobile cellular prices are being 
competitive, as shown by some price wars especially in off-peak periods 
(KPPU 2007:303-5).
In addition, some other critiques related to the methodology and calculation 
are mentioned below. KPPU is claimed to inappropriately use the 
Stackelberg competition model (KPPU 2007:401). The price-leadership model 
is used to analyze behavior of a dominant player competing with several 
very small competitors. In reality, three big operators dominate the mobile 
cellular market in Indonesia. Therefore, the Stackelberg price-leadership 
model should not be used in this case. Moreover, the Generalized
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (GHHI) as a method to calculate market 
concentration is questioned because it is not commonly used and the 
calculation is not transparently described (KPPU 2007:306-7).
Re-focusing Price Analysis
In addition to these critiques, KPPU's price analysis is considered rather 
unclear. Two findings based on the price pattern of post-paid and pre-paid 
plans seem contradictory. KPPU claims that it finds parallel price patterns in 
post-paid plans but not necessarily in pre-paid plans. This finding is used to 
support an assumption of price parallelism and leadership. In pre-paid 
plans, KPPU argues that Telkomsel tends to maintain the level of its price 
while Excelcomindo, one of its competitors, has a decreasing pattern either in 
on-net or off-net prices. It implies that there is no price leadership in pre-paid 
plans.
In fact, the analysis does not take into account the reality that the ceiling 
price of pre-paid plans is much higher than that of post-paid plans. The high 
ceiling level is aimed to provide ample room for operators to include 
subscription fees in the usage fee because pre-paid plans do not have such 
monthly fees. This high ceiling regulation gives pre-paid plans much greater 
pricing flexibility. In contrast, the ceiling level for the post-paid price is quite 
low. Price variations in post-paid price are mainly driven by changes in 
regulation. The evidence that off-net prices of post-paid plans behave 
uniformly is due to the fact that there was a change in price regulation that 
affects interconnection costs. But, since Telkomsel responded the change 
more quickly than rivals, it seems there is price leadership behavior.
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These facts show that analysis based only on price information is not enough 
to draw a conclusion about price leadership behavior. Furthermore, even 
though KPPU could convincingly find evidence of parallel pricing, it does 
not necessarily show collusive behavior. Other factors such as cost, demand, 
and regulatory changes should also be regarded.
Moreover, since there are several segments in the mobile cellular market, 
price analysis should be focused on a certain segment in which price is a 
substantial aspect for subscribers. In this case, KPPU should pay more 
attention to possible collusive pricing in pre-paid plans. The reasons are that 
because pre-paid plans have a high ceiling price that makes pricing more 
flexible, and pre-paid plans also hold a large market share, which is around 
96 percent of mobile cellular subscribers. Figure 6.2 compares subscriber 
growth of pre-paid and post-paid plans based on the data from the three 
biggest operators, Telkomsel, lndosat, and Excelcomindo (XL).
Figure 6.2. Pre-paid and Post-paid Subscribers
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In the pre-paid market segment, Telkomsel has more than 50 percent of 
market share followed by Indosat and XL. Figure 6.3 illustrates subscriber 
growth for these three big operators. Furthermore, there are five major pre­
paid plans including Simpati and Kartu-As of Telkomsel, Mentari and 1M3 of 
Indosat, and XL-Bebas of Excelcomindo. Simpati, Mentari, and XL are the 
three major incumbent pre-paid plans. IM3 had just joined the market in 2001 
and Kartu-As in 2003.
Figure 6.3. Pre-paid Subscribers of the three Biggest Operators
Subscribers
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Telkomsel40,000,000
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In Indonesia, mobile cellular operators are not prohibited to discriminate 
their prices based on call termination and time band. Operators can set 
different prices between calls terminating in their own networks (on-net) and 
calls ending in rivals' networks (off-net), or between peak and off-peak 
hours. It means that, an operator can have four combinations of prices for its 
pre-paid plan. Figures 6.4 to 6.7 compare the price patterns of five major pre­
paid plans classified into these four combinations.
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Figure 6.4. Pre-paid Prices for Off-net Calls in Peak Hours
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Figure 6.5. Pre-paid Prices for Off-net Calls in Off-peak Hours
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Figure 6.6. Pre-paid Prices for On-net Calls in Peak Hours
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Figure 6.7. Pre-paid Prices for On-net Calls in Off-peak Hours
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In general, as shown in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.7, except for Kartu-As, off-net 
prices tend to converge close to Simpati's price either in peak or off-peak 
hours. Fiowever, this pattern does not indicate price leadership of Telkomsel 
because Simpati's off-net price is relatively stable and at the initial stage its 
level has been relatively lower than others. Furthermore, some pre-paid 
plans exhibit a decreasing trend of their on-net prices as revealed in Figure 
6.6 and Figure 6.7.
Interestingly, in peak-hours, Simpati and Mentari keep their on-net prices 
high. In late 2007, their prices were similar and the highest. In contrast, XL, 
which initially set a higher price than rivals, decreased its price to be the 
lowest in the year 2007. Moreover, by comparing Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.6, it 
can be seen that Simpati and Mentari have close and even similar on-net and 
off-net prices in peak hours. It means that there is almost no price differential 
between the on-net and off-net prices of both plans.
Theoretically, as discussed in Chapter 5, in a market with two-way access 
and where retail price is linear and it is possible to discriminate based on call 
termination, such as the pre-paid plans of the mobile cellular market, off-net 
price is higher than on-net price. High off-net price is not only shaped by the 
level of access charge. Even though the access price is at cost, non- 
cooperative off-net price is still higher than on-net price. Low on-net price is 
to attract additional subscribers and high off-net price is to keep existing 
subscribers in its network (increase switching cost).
Since Simpati and Mentari are two competing pre-paid plans, does high on- 
net price indicate a collusive pricing? The prisoners' dilemma or co­
ordination game that is often used to explain collusion can be utilized to
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analyze the pricing behavior of the competing operators. In fact, in its report, 
KPPU uses a prisoners' dilemma game to explain possible collusive outcome 
in an oligopolistic market (KPPU 2007:79). But, this concept is not applied in 
their analysis.
In this game, competing parties would get a higher pay-off if they co-operate 
than if they behave selfishly. In the case that these parties met each other 
only once, a collusive outcome is hard to achieve except when there is an 
enforceable agreement. In this static game, they tend to betray to earn a 
much higher return. In contrast, if they interact infinitively, a collusive 
equilibrium is likely to sustain. In this dynamic game, betrayal will trigger 
punishment by the rival, leading to lower pay-off. A more detailed 
discussion of this concept is presented in Chapter 5 above.
This game concept can be employed in the mobile cellular competition case. 
Since on-net price is the main variable in the observation, a collusive 
outcome can be interpreted by a condition where on-net prices of the 
competing operators are above their non-cooperative level. In practice, the 
profit-maximizing model can be used to estimate non-cooperative on-net 
price. These non-cooperative prices are then compared to actual on-net 
prices. If prices of the competing pre-paid plans are above their-own non- 
cooperative prices then it shows a collusive outcome which may be achieved 
through conspiracy, implicit agreement, or mutual understanding.
The following two sections present an application of the game theoretical 
concept to identify whether on-net prices are in collusive equilibrium. It is 
started by model development for the case and followed by analysis based 
on available data and information.
175
6.2. The Profit-Maximizing Model of Mobile Cellular 
Competition
In a competitive mobile cellular market operators do not only face a 
competition problem, but also co-operation. They compete to attract 
subscribers and, at the same time, they must co-operate to be able to access 
each others' networks. Network interconnection plays a crucial role because 
it makes it possible for a subscriber of one operator to call subscribers of the 
rivals. Therefore, the mobile cellular market can be considered as a market 
with two-way access. In the literature, a competition in two-way access 
structure is usually modeled as a market consisting of two competing 
operators (for example, see Armstrong 1998, Laffont et al. 1998a and b). 
Therefore, competition in the mobile cellular market can be illustrated in a 
simple model as presented in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8. Two-way Access in Mobile Cellular Service
network i network j
<---------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
interconnection operator joperator i
Off-net call
On-net callOn-net call
subscriberssubscribers
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The model assumes that there are two operators, i and j ,  where each of them 
has n subscribers. A call originating and terminating in the same operator's 
network is named an intra-network or on-net call. This on-net call incurs 
originating and terminating costs. Supposing that the transit or switching 
cost is negligible, the marginal originating cost (co) and marginal terminating 
costs (ct) are constant and identical, and the competing operators face similar 
cost function, then the cost of an on-net call for both operators can be 
expressed as in Equation (6.1).
(6.1) Cost of on-net call = ca + cr = 2c
Furthermore, a call ending in a rival's network is labeled inter-network or 
off-net call. Cost for an off-net call consists of originating cost (co) and 
interconnection cost or access charge (a) as stated as in Equation (6.2).
(6.2) Cost of off-net call = c0 +  a =  c +  a
In the case where access charge is equal to terminating cost (a = ct = c) then 
costs of off-net and on-net calls are identical at 2c. However, it does not mean 
that prices for off-net and on-net calls should necessarily be the same. In 
addition to cost, there are some other factors that may shape price setting, 
such as demand and regulatory constraints. For that reason, tariff or prices of 
calls are differentiated into on-net prices pa and pa, and off-net prices pij and 
pji respectively for operator i and j .  The order of the subscript indicates the 
direction of call. For example, pij represents a price charged by the operator i 
for a call originating in its network and terminating in /'s network.
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Furthermore, since the case deals with pre-paid plans, the monthly 
subscription fee is not included.
In addition, it is defined that the market share of operator i is s/ and of 
operator j is Sj. Since there are only two operators in the model then the sum 
of these market shares represents the whole market as expressed in Equation
(6.3) . In addition, these market shares are a function of prices as notated in 
Equation (6.4).
(6.3) s, + s =1
(6.4) s = S(pii,pij,pJj,p ji)
The total profit of an operator is determined by several components 
including profit from on-net calls, profit from originating outgoing off-net 
calls, profit from terminating incoming off-net calls, and fixed cost. In a linear 
and discriminatory retail price system, the basic form of profit function for 
operator i (m) can be expressed as in Equation (6.5) (Laffont 1998b:44;
Hoemig 2007:174). The profit function of operator; can also be stated in 
similar way with some modification in the subscript of variables. To avoid 
duplication, the discussion below focuses only on operator i.
(6.5) n, = s,k (p„ ~ 2c)9» +s ,(P„ ~a-c)q
In this case, cja, qij, and qp are the average duration of on-net calls, outgoing 
off-net calls, and incoming off-net calls respectively. Furthermore, based on a 
balanced calling pattern assumption, that is the percentage of traffic is
178
reflected by market share (Laffont 1998a:3), the number of calls for on-net 
and off-net are defined as s/2 and sisj respectively. However, it does not mean 
that traffic is balanced, because call duration can be different for each 
operator (Hoernig 2007:174). Interaction between number of calls and 
average duration of calls represents a measure of traffic. Moreover, /  is 
defined as fixed cost to maintain subscribers, such as the costs for initial 
connection and billing system.
In addition, access price a can also be written as a function of cost and access 
mark-up m as in Equation (6.6). Access mark-up may have positive value, 
meaning that access charge is above cost, or zero, implying that access price 
is set equal to termination cost. By substituting Equation (6.6) into (6.5), 
another form of profit function is shown as in (6.7).
(6.6) a = (1 + m)c
(6.7) 7T, =sf(p„ - 2 c)qa +y(l-5,)[(p(/ -(2  + m)c)qtJ +mcqji] - s if
In this case, the focus is to see whether on-net price is optimal given off-net 
price. Suppose that the operators compete in price only for market share (s) 
and traffic duration (q), non-cooperative on-net price can be estimated by 
maximizing profit function m with respect to on-net price pa as presented in 
Equation (6.8). Since the competing services are sufficiently differentiated, 
equilibrium prices are not necessarily equal.
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( 6 .8)
7^ =7si^~(Pu +s;(pii +sh +dp, qp„ cpu
~ 5/ Vpij -(2+m)c^/ =0
.^ Pii yPii i  9 /^/
In the mobile cellular service, a change in on-net price may have an effect on 
subscription and calling decisions. The effect of on-net price change is 
accommodated in two measures of own-price elasticity of demand. Firstly, 
price-elasticity of subscription demand represents the impact of a change in 
on-net price to people's decision about which plan or operator to choose. It 
can be written in the mathematical form as in Equation (6.9).
(6-9 ) n,i, Pi,
dp,, s,
Secondly, price elasticity of usage demand denotes the effect of variation in 
on-net price to usage duration as shown in Equation (6.10).
(6-10) /?,„ d?„ P„ 
dp„ 9„
The negative sign in both elasticity estimates indicates that the mobile 
cellular service is a normal good where price change has the opposite effect 
to subscription or usage demand. Furthermore, by substituting Equation (6.9) 
and (6.10) into (6.8), a non-cooperative on-net price of operator i can be 
written as in Equation (6.11).
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1 1 \  „* r'tfsu  +  Vqu J ^
> / : • > / „  • ] '  b , , •'/, - 1]
(25, - 1) [(a , -  (2 + m)c)% + J f.
s , q„ s,q„
The result shows that on-net price is shaped by mark-up factors. The value of 
mark-up is determined by elasticity of subscription and usage demand. 
Furthermore, there are two major elements that construct non-cooperative 
on-net price. The first element only consists of on-net cost (2c) which is 
always positive. The second part contains several variables including average 
profit margin of delivering outgoing and incoming off-net
calls( (2s, - i) [ (py - (2 + m) c) gv + meg „ ] j and fixed cost/ on-net traffic ratio J. l_ .
V S i 9 it J \ S i (i i i  y
This second part can be positive or negative. In general, all else equal, as long 
as fixed cost is small enough, the higher the market share the higher on-net 
price is. However, if the fixed cost is quite high, the reverse may be true.
Furthermore, off-net price can be defined as a function of cost and price/cost 
ratio k as shown in Equation (6.12). In addition, the on-net and off-net price 
differential d is also defined as a ratio between these prices as presented in 
Equation (6.13),
(6.12) p i j  = k(2c)
(6.13) d = —  = -Eli— or rf’ = —  = -Eli—
P„ k(2c) ptJ k(2 c)
In this case, the objective is on examining whether on-net price represented 
by price-differential is optimal at a given value of off-net price. By
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substituting Equation (6-4) into (6.11), a non-cooperative on-net/off-net price 
differential condition can be written as in Equation (6-14).
(6.14) d' =
[27l, ,+fh n - ]]k \^7hu + 77<//i ~l] k(2c)
(2s, — l)c [(2(k-\)-m)q,l +mqJ, j  ^ /
s,q„
Access price is equal to cost
In Indonesia, access charges are still regulated and the magnitude is close to 
cost17. In the case that access price reflects cost, then there is no added mark­
up on top of access cost, implying m=0. Consequently, non-cooperative on- 
net price and optimal price differential as shown in Equations (6.11) and 
(6.14) can be re-written as in Equation (6.15) and (6.16) respectively.
//: -t c\
[^ v// +77(/,/-1] Nuv+Lz-l]
(2s,- 0  qu f,
(Pij -2c)+-
S i Qii
( f l  - \ ( l \  ____ 1? ‘rfx i i  +  V  qii J 1 , _____ ( h i i_____ J _
fasti +r?Vn - l ] k [2rlsn + 7 ,« ~ •] k
(25,-1) q,j 1X . 1 f
s ,
( k -  1) + -2 cs,q„
The prisoners' dilemma or co-ordination game discussed in Chapter 5 
indicates that co-ordination can give higher joint profit than behaving 
selfishly. In this case, profit-maximizing or non-cooperative on-net price
17 Access charges for mobile cellular service used to be named air-time, and before 2008 it 
was set at Rp. 406 per minute for mobile-to-mobile interconnection in peak hours. As a 
comparison, a calculation of cost-based access charges for mobile service by an International 
consultant, Ovum, results in a value between Rp. 381 and Rp. 449. For that reason, it is 
assumed that access charges used before 2008 have been close to cost.
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represents a selfish behavior. Accordingly, in the mobile cellular case, a 
collusive equilibrium can be identified if the competing operator set their 
actual on-net prices above their non-cooperative level. In other words, 
collusive pricing is suspected if the non-cooperative price differential is 
sufficiently lower than the actual price differential (d*«  d actual).
Consequently, in the case that access price is set at cost, an allegation of 
collusive behavior does have sufficient grounds if Equation (6.17) is satisfied.
1 fIn this case, x is the fixed cost factor which is defined as-----1—.
2 cstqn
(6.17)
2+£id >f»(* 1) +  X rJsii + 7 1qii
(2^ , + -  0 *
«  dactual
The following section examines whether pricing behavior of mobile cellular 
operators in Indonesia indicates a collusive outcome. The game theoretical 
principle discussed above is used as a method of analysis.
6.3. Analyzing Pricing Behavior of Mobile Cellular Operators
The discussion in previous sections indicates that in 2007 and before, 
dominant mobile cellular operators in Indonesia set high on-net price close to 
off-net price for their pre-paid plans. Theoretically, the non-cooperative on- 
net price should be lower than the off-net price. The lack of on-net price 
competition raises a concern about possible coordinated pricing among these 
competing operators. This section examines whether that price pattern may 
indicate a collusive behavior. It uses the idea explained in the prisoners'
183
dilemma or co-ordination game as a basic principle of analysis. In brief, the 
concept mainly argues that collusive behavior is identified if the competing 
parties set prices above their non-cooperative level.
Furthermore, as indicated above, the focus is on examining the on-net price 
of the pre-paid plans offered by three major mobile cellular operators in 
Indonesia: Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo. The analysis compares the 
actual and non-cooperative on-net and off-net price differential. There are 
several sets of data and information required in this process including cost, 
price, and demand. Ideally, these indicators should be estimated based on 
actual operators' operational data. However, since these actual data are not 
available due to confidentiality reasons, they are estimated based on 
consumer information gathered in a survey conducted in April and May 
2008 and some available publications.
In short, the analysis finds that in 2006 the prices of all pre-paid plans were 
sufficiently above their non-cooperative level. Furthermore, in 2007, there 
was a pre-paid plan that had a lower actual price differential than its non- 
cooperative level. For that reason, allegation of collusive pricing between 
Telkomsel and Indosat is supported. Moreover, it is also found that there was 
an unusual pricing behavior in one Indosat's pre-paid plans that may 
indicate a co-ordination of pricing between Telkomsel and Indosat. The 
paragraphs below discuss the process of analysis in more detail.
184
6.3.1. Data Collection and Estimations
This section describes the method of gathering data and the process of 
estimating some required variables to confirm whether Equation (6.17) is 
satisfied. The data used in the analysis are mainly based on consumer 
information collected in a survey. It is the best available data because actual 
data and information, especially related to traffic and subscription demand, 
could not be obtained from operators due to confidentiality reasons. Data 
and information gathered from the survey were mainly used to estimate 
elasticity indicators ( r js a  and Tjqa) and traffic ratio (c j i j /q u ). In addition to the 
survey, some data especially related to costs and prices are extracted from 
various published sources. These data were employed to estimate mark-up 
of off-net/cost ratio (k), actual on-net/off-net price differential (d), market 
share (s), and fixed cost factor (x). A more detailed description of these data 
estimation processes is presented below.
Consumers' Preference Survey
Initially, the survey was prepared to collect data and information about 
consumer preferences and usage patterns for dial-up Internet service and 
mobile cellular service. Although questionnaires for these two services are 
put together in one form, they are independent of each other, meaning that 
the respondent is not necessarily a person who subscribes to both services. 
Appendix 1 shows some information gathered in the questionnaire.
The questionnaire contains some questions about demographic information 
of the respondents, their choice of mobile cellular service, their opinion about 
several important factors in choosing mobile cellular service, their usage
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pattern during peak time, and hypothetical questions about what percent of 
their usage pattern will change as a response to a certain percent of price 
change during peak time. Demographic data, choice, and important factors 
in mobile cellular services are used to estimate elasticity of choice demand 
using discrete choice analysis. Furthermore, information on usage or traffic 
pattern is used to estimate traffic ratio between on-net and off-net calls. 
Finally, the hypothetical question on price change is used to estimate 
elasticity of usage demand during peak time.
The survey was conducted between 28 April and 23 May 2008 in several sub­
districts of Jakarta and surrounding areas. It is considered that mobile 
cellular subscribers are relatively similar regardless of region. Thus, the 
information from subscribers in Jakarta represents the behavior of all 
subscribers. The survey was carried out mainly in some public places such as 
shopping centers, public parks, universities, or community centers. The 
locations were chosen randomly and potential respondents were also 
selected randomly from people visiting survey locations.
Most questionnaires were completed through assistance, that is, the 
interviewer read a question from questionnaire and wrote down the answer. 
It was intended to get accurate and complete information. In some situations, 
respondents were willing to participate in the survey but they did not have 
time to be interviewed directly. In this case, the interviewer gave the 
questionnaire form to respondents and made an appointment where and 
when the completed form could be taken. In total there were 412 people who 
were asked to participate in the survey. Among them, 320 people agreed to 
be respondents and the rest refused for several reasons, such as they did not 
have enough time, were not interested, or were not pre-paid subscribers.
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There are 233 questionnaires which have complete information. The 
remainder of the forms filled in cannot be used due to lack of important 
information.
In general, the number of male and female respondents was relatively equal. 
It is almost similar to the sex ratio in Jakarta (BPS Jakarta 2007:55). The 
respondents were mostly people with an age below 36 years. This is 
comparable with statistical data showing that 65 percent of the population in 
Jakarta is below 35 years old (BPS Jakarta 2007:62). The respondents were 
mostly resident in east and south Jakarta. Statistics of Jakarta show that 
almost 50 percent of the population lives in these two municipalities (BPS 
Jakarta 2007:63). Moreover, most of the respondents were employees with 
incomes between Rp. 1 million and Rp. 5 million, and their monthly 
spending for mobile cellular service was below Rp. 100,000.-.
Furthermore, around 58 percent of the respondents subscribe to pre-paid 
plans offered by Telkomsel, either Simpati or Kartu As. Around 37 percent of 
them use Indosat's pre-paid schemes, Mentari and IM3. Moreover, the 
respondents see that tariff for voice calls and quality of signal are the most 
important factors influencing subscription decision. It implies that with a 
similar quality of signal, tariff is still considered as a strategic instrument for 
competition. In addition, around 57 percent of the respondents also subscribe 
to a secondary mobile cellular service. Most of the respondents who have a 
secondary mobile cellular service use fixed-wireless access (FWA) service 
with limited mobility due to its low tariff. It indicates that GSM and FWA 
services are not competing products (not substitutable). Summary statistics 
of respondents' demographic information and subscription choices are 
presented in Appendix 2.
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Price Elasticity of Subscription Demand (/]*»,)
Own-price elasticity of subscription demand is an indicator that explains the 
effect of a change in price on consumers' decision of which operator to join. 
Discrete choice analysis is one alternative method that can be used to analyze 
market demand including elasticity measure. Currently, this technique has 
become more popular in some empirical studies on the telecommunications 
market. For example, the works of Madden and Simpson (1997) Rappaport et 
al. (nd), Kim and Kwon (2003), Ida and Kuroda (2005), and Ida and Kuroda 
(2006) use discrete choice method to estimate some demand parameters 
based on consumer preference information.
Discrete choice technique basically analyzes individual choice probability 
from several available alternatives. In this method, utility of an individual n 
over alternative i is expressed as a function of observable component Vm and 
random component £»/ as shown in Equation (6.18).
(6.18) Uni = v m + S ni
Assuming that the error component £ni is independently and identically 
distributed (iid), the probability of individual n choosing alternative i can be 
expressed in logit model as written in Equation (6.19).
(6-19)
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Observable component ihü is usually expressed as a linear function that 
consists of several attributes as in Equation (6.20).
(6.20) v ,„ = ß nix m
In this case, x«< is a vector of attributes of the representative utility i and ß,i is 
vector of coefficients of the corresponding attributes. If vector x only contains 
the characteristic of alternatives, the model is called a conditional logit model 
in which coefficient ß  is constant across the alternatives but value of attribute 
x may vary for different alternatives. In contrast, if the attributes only 
comprise individual characteristics of the consumers or respondents, it is 
named a multinomial logit model where each attribute x is constant across 
the alternatives but the coefficient ß  varies. Furthermore, the vector x may 
also contains alternative and individual attributes which is known as mixed 
logit model. However, by some adjustment on individual characteristics, 
either multinomial or mixed logit can be estimated based on the conditional 
logit approach (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:495).
In the mobile cellular case, the attributes are mixed involving alternative and 
individual characteristics. Specific alternative attributes are basic tariff of pre­
paid plans during peak time including off-net price, on-net price, and 
mobile-to-fix price. Information about these prices is extracted from several 
publications and advertisements. These prices do not vary with individuals 
because all people face a similar price for the same service. Furthermore, 
attributes for individual characteristics covers some specific information 
about the respondents that participate in the survey. The information 
includes age, gender, working status, living conditions, income, expenditure,
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and three preferences out of six factors related to mobile cellular service. 
These characteristics may be different across individuals. Table 6.3 
summarizes the attributes and their value.
Table 6.3. Attributes and Their Values
A ttr ib u te s V a lu e
O f f - n e t  p r i c e P o s i t i v e  c o n t i n u o u s
O n - n e t  p r i c e P o s i t i v e  c o n t i n u o u s
F ix - to - m o b i l e  p r i c e P o s i t i v e  c o n t i n u o u s
A g e P o s i t i v e  c o n t i n u o u s
M a le 0 ( f e m a le ) ;  1 ( m a le )
W o r k i n g 0 ( N o t  w o r k in g ) ;  1 ( W o r k in g )
L iv i n g _ w i th _ f a m i l y 0  ( n o t  l i v in g  w i t h  f a m i ly ) ;
1 ( l i v in g  w i t h  f a m i ly )
I n c o m e 1 ( le s s  t h a n  R p . 1 m i l l io n ) ;
2  ( b e tw e e n  R p . l  a n d  R p .3  m i l l io n ) ;
3  ( b e tw e e n  R p .3  a n d  R p .5  m i l l io n ) ;
4  ( b e tw e e n  R p .5  a n d  R p .7  m i l l io n ) ;
5 ( m o r e  t h a n  R p .7  m i l l io n ) ;
M o n t h l y _ e x p e n d i t u r e P o s i t i v e  c o n t i n u o u s
T  a r i f  f _ p r e f e r e n c e 0 ( le s s  i m p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
G r o u p _ p r e f e r e n c e 0 ( le s s  im p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
S ig n a l _ p r e f e r e n c e 0 ( le s s  i m p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
S M S _ p r e f e r e n c e 0  ( le s s  i m p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
F e a t u r e _ p  r e f e r e n c e 0 ( le s s  i m p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
C o v e r a g e _ p r e f e r e n c e 0 ( le s s  im p o r t a n t ) ;  1 ( i m p o r t a n t )
These attributes and a constant are used to construct a conditional logit 
model. The alternatives are five pre-paid plans offered by three major mobile 
cellular operators. Since attributes that represent respondents' characteristics 
do not vary across alternatives, they need to be interacted with constant.
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Three models with three different constants are regressed by using N LOGIT 
4, specific software designed for discrete choice analysis.
In model 1, the constant is valued 1 if the choice is TelkomseLs pre-paid 
plans (Simpati and Kartu As) and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, in model 2, the 
constant is set at 1 if the respondent chooses pre-paid plans from Indosat 
(Mentari and IM3) and 0 otherwise. Moreover, in model 3, the constant is 1 if 
it is the pre-paid plan of XL and 0 otherwise. Regression results of these three 
models are presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4. Regression Results of Discrete Choice Model
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3
C o n stan t = Telkom sel C onstan t=  In d o sa t C onstant=  XL
A ttr ib u te s
Coeff (ß) SE C oeff (ß) SE Coeff (ß) SE
C o n stan t 2.031 1.454 -1.343 1.481 2.348 2.123
O ff-net Price -0.007* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006* 0.001
O n -n e t Price -0.002* 0.0005 -0.001** 0.0003 -0.00004 0.0003
M obile-To-Fix Price -0.001** 0.0003 -0.002* 0.0004 -0.0029* 0.0005
C onstant*  A ge 0.064** 0.029 -0.040 0.0304 -0.0544 0.0449
C onstant*M ale -0.351 0.322 0.944* 0.315 -0.8867** 0.3946
C onstan t*W orking 0.951** 0.452 -0.209 0.426 -0.7554 0.5542
C onstan t*L iv ing_w ith_fam ily -0.276 0.374 0.081 0.367 0.1348 0.4739
C onstant*  Incom e 0.035 0.119 -0.039 0.115 -0.0185 0.1465
C onstan t* M o n th ly _ ex p en d itu re 8.01 e-07 2.01e-06 -5.43e-06** 2.33e-06 5.00e-06** 2.23e-06
C onstant*T  a r if f_p reference -1.430* 0.496 1.102** 0.539 0.8393 0.6996
C onstan t*G roup_preference -0.409 0.526 0.231 0.532 0.4641 0.7153
C onstan t*S ignal_preference -0.397 0.433 0.412 0.464 0.2371 0.6461
C onstant*SM S_preference -0.588 0.439 0.658 0.466 0.0538 0.6681
C o nstan t*F eatu re_preference -0.535 0.560 0.794 0.585 -0.0954 0.7745
C onstan t*C overage_preference 0.214 0.446 -0.034 0.478 -0.0747 0.6789
O bserv a tio n 233 233 233
LR C hi-Square  (16) 105.64 84.85 80.62
P seu d o  R -squared 0.14 0.11 0.11
Log likelihood -322.18 -332.57 -334.69
(*) p< 1% ; (**) p< 5% ; (***)p<10%; Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error
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In this result, only sign and level significance of the coefficients are 
informative while value of coefficient does not tell anything due to the non­
linearity of the logit model. Among these three, model-1 is superior for 
several reasons. Firstly, it has negative sign in all coefficients related to price 
that is theoretically consistent. Secondly, these coefficients of prices are 
statistically significant at one percent and five percent level of significance. 
Thirdly, it fits the data better as shown by the highest pseudo R-squared 
value. For that reason, the regression results of model 1 are chosen in 
estimating own-price elasticity of demand.
In general, own-price elasticity of subscription demand can be defined as a 
change of choice probability over an alternative due to variation in its price. 
Furthermore, cross-price elasticity of subscription demand measures a 
fluctuation of choice probability of an alternative as a result of a change in 
the other alternative's price. Equations (6.21) and (6.22) respectively show 
mathematical expressions for own and cross-price elasticity. In these 
equations, Pi is probability choice of alternative i, pi is its price, and pj is other 
alternative j.
(6 -21) n¥l dP, P, 
dp, P,
(own-price elasticity of alternative i)
(6 .22) %J
dp, P,
(cross-price elasticity of alternative i)
Substituting Equation (6.8) into (6.21) and (6.22) produce individual n own- 
price elasticity of alternative i and cross-price elasticity of alternative i with 
respect to alternative; can be estimated as shown in Equation (6.23) and
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(6.24) respectively (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985:111; Train 2003:63-4). In the 
equations, parameter ßP is the coefficient of variable price obtained in the 
regression, p«; is price of alternative i faced by individual n, and pnj is price of 
alternative j faced by individual n.
(6.23) Tjip = (1 -Pm)ßpPni (own-price elasticity of choice i for individual n)
(6.24) T]ip =~PnjßpP,j (cross-price elasticity of choice i for individual n)
Furthermore, Equation (6.24) indicates that cross-elasticity of individual is 
uniform for all alternatives.
Based on these mathematical equations, on-net price elasticity of choice 
probability can be estimated. Fortunately, NLOGIT4 has a feature to compute 
average elasticity of demand over elasticity of individual respondent. The 
numbers in bold in Table 6.4 are average on-net price elasticity of choice 
probability for each pre-paid plan, while the rest are cross-price elasticity 
estimates. Absolute values of all estimates of own-price elasticity of 
subscription demand have values greater than one, which means they are 
relatively elastic.
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Table 6.5. Average On-net Price Elasticity of Choice Probability
C h o ic e
E ffects on p r o b a b ilit ie s  o f  c h o ic e  (M o d e l-1 )
S im p a ti K artu A s XL M en tari IM 3
S im p a ti
-2.0665
(0.6209)
1.1868
(0.6209)
1.1868
(0.6209)
1.1868
(0.6209)
1.1868
(0.6209)
K artu A s
0.2011
(0.1052)
-2.4016
(0.1052)
0.2011
(0.1052)
0.2011
(0.1052)
0.2011
(0.1052)
XL
0.2932
(0.1215)
0.2932
(0.1215)
-1.3334
(0.1215)
0.2932
(0.1215)
0.2932
(0.1215)
M en tari
0.4952
(0.2053)
0.4952
(0.2053)
0.4952
(0.2053)
-2.5412
(0.2053)
0.4952
(0.2053)
IM 3
0.4189
(0.1736)
0.4189
(0.1736)
0.4189
(0.1736)
0.4189
(0.1736)
-1.5331
(0.1736)
the number in parentheses is standard-deviation of the mean
Price Elasticity of Usage Demand ( t]qa)
Own-price elasticity of usage demand is defined as a measure of sensitivity 
of calling duration as a result variation of price. Estimating this elasticity 
indicator requires information about traffic and price. Ideally, these data 
should be gathered from operators. However, due to unavailability of actual 
data, this elasticity is estimated based on information from subscribers.
In the survey, respondents were asked a hypothetical question about 
percentage of increase in mobile cellular usage if their pre-paid plan reduces 
its on-net price in peak hour by 20 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent. Price 
elasticity of traffic demand is estimated by relating usage and price 
variations. Since usage and price changes are stated in percentage, the 
coefficient attached to variable price directly indicates own-price elasticity of
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demand r]qu. Equation (6.25) shows the equation used in the ordinary least 
square regression. The result of the regression for each pre-paid plan is 
presented in Table 6.6.
(6.25) % _ increase_ o f _ usage = const + r/qjj (%_ price_ reduction)
Table 6.6. Own-Price Elasticity of Usage Demand
S im p a ti
(T elk om sel)
K artu A s
(T elkom sel)
X L -B ebas
(E xcelcom )
M en tari
(Indosat)
IM 3
(Indosat)
M ea n 0.746 0.383 0.383 0.600 0.479
S tan d ard  D e v ia t io n 1.344 0.585 0.406 0.883 0.614
M in im u m 0 0 0 0 0
M a x im u m 9 3 2 4 3.333
Param eter
S im p a ti K artu A s X L -B ebas M en tari IM 3
(T elk om sel) (T elkom sel) (E xcelcom ) (Indosat) (Indosat)
% P rice red u ctio n 3.712* 2.662* 1.300* 2.999* 2.390*
(1.006) (0.913) (0.429) (0.977) (0.585)
C o n sta n t -0.367 -0.415 -0.007 -0.299 -0.238
(0.313) (0.284) (0.133) (0.304) (0.182)
O b servation 255 54 126 114 150
F-Statistics 13.62 8.50 9.19 9.43 16.72
A d ju sted  R -Squared 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.10
(*) p< 1%; (**) p< 5%; (***)p<10%; the number in parentheses is standard-error
The result shows that on-net price elasticity of usage demand of each pre­
paid plan is relatively elastic and statistically significant at one percent level 
of significance. The magnitudes are relatively moderate between -1.3 and - 
3.7. As a comparison, elasticity of usage demand for the mobile cellular 
industry in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 estimated by LPEM-FEUI are -8.39, - 
32.12, -6.92, and -3.84 respectively (LPEM-FEUI 2007:45). Furthermore, 
KPPU's elasticity estimations for average price in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006
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are -10.13, -25.42, -7.89, and -14.24 respectively. Moreover, KPPU's 
estimations for on-net price in similar years are -28.67, -8.43, -7.83, and -17.54 
(KPPU 2007:122). Elasticity estimates of both institutions are quite high, 
meaning that demand for mobile cellular service is quite elastic and KPPU is 
also aware that the estimates might be too high (KPPU 2007:123).
Off-net and On-net Traffic Ratio iqij/qa)
Traffic ratio between outgoing off-net calls and on-net calls is one indicator 
that needs to be estimated based on consumer information. In the survey, 
respondents are asked about their monthly spending, daily usage duration 
(in minutes), and traffic pattern (in percent). However, the information about 
usage duration seems inaccurate. Their approximations about average daily 
usage duration are often too high compared to their monthly expenditure. 
For that reason, it was decided to estimate their usage duration based on 
monthly expenditure, traffic pattern, and regular tariff of the corresponding 
pre-paid plan. Equation (6.26) shows the formula for estimating individual 
monthly total usage duration q.
Monthly Expenditure
q (Pa * %q„ + P,J * %q,j + P,f * %qif + P„ * %q„ + p tJ * %qt] + p if * %qif)
In this case, pu, pn, plf are peak time tariffs for on-net, off-net, and mobile-to-
fixed phone calls respectively; pa, pij, pi/ are off-peak time tariffs for on-net, 
off-net, and mobile-to-fixed phone calls respectively; %qu ,%q„ ,%q„ are
percentage of traffic in peak hours for on-net, off-net, and mobile-to-fixed
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phone calls respectively; and %qn, %qij, %q,r are percentage of traffic in off- 
peak hours for on-net, off-net, and mobile-to-fixed phone calls respectively.
Furthermore, in order to have detailed information of usage duration, total 
usage duration of each subscriber is multiplied with the percentage of traffic 
of each type of call in a certain period as shown in Equation (6.27).
(6.27) qn -  q * %qlt ; q:/ = q * %q]f ; q,f = q * %qlf (off-peak hours traffic)
qu = q * % qu ; qtJ = q* %qtj ; q,t = q * %qjf (peak hours traffic)
Moreover, total usage duration for each call type is obtained by aggregating 
corresponding usage duration of all respondents who were attached to the 
same pre-paid plan. In addition, dividing total usage duration of each type of 
call by the number of respondents provides average usage duration per 
subscriber as indicated in Equation (6.28).
(6.28) avg(qii) = — ; avg{q ) = —  ; avg(qif) = — -  (off-peak hours)
n n n
y<7 Hq Y.qif
avg{qu) = —-  ; avg(qit) = —  ; avg(qif) = — -  (peak hours)
n n n
Calculations of average usage duration for each pre-paid plan are 
summarized in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7. Average Usage Duration of Each Pre-paid Plan
P re -p a id  P la n
A v e r a g e  U sa g e  D u r a t io n  (in m inute)
P ea k  H o u r s O ff -p e a k  H o u r s
O n -n e t O ff-n e t T o F ix O n -n e t O f f -n e t T o Fix
S im p a ti -  T e lk o m s e l 41.93 17.53 9.63 24.14 7.43 6.40
K artu  A s  - T e lk o m s e l 37.26 13.18 3.18 18.39 6.08 2.04
XL -  E x c e lc o m in d o 115.12 35.62 16.00 35.81 11.10 6.20
M en ta r i -  In d o sa t 85.28 40.31 20.08 31.27 12.11 5.62
IM 3 -  In d o s a t 39.93 14.94 4.22 19.63 3.97 0.86
Based on the average usage duration for each pre-paid plan, the traffic ratio 
between outgoing off-net calls and on-net calls can be calculated by dividing 
average usage duration of off-net calls with related average duration of on- 
net calls. Table 6.8 presents the ratio between off-net and on-net calls. The 
ratio indicates that most calls are intra networks (on-net calls) especially in 
the off-peak period. The pattern of this estimation is in line with a statement 
in one of Telkomsel's quarterly reports mentioning that since 2003 their on- 
net traffic is higher than off-net traffic (Telkomsel 2003:2).
198
Table 6.8. Traffic Ratio of Each Pre-paid Plan
P re -p a id  P la n
T r a ffic  R a tio  (O ff-n e t /O n -n e t)
P e a k  H o u r s O ff -p e a k  H o u r s
S im p a ti -  T e lk o m s e l 0 .42 0.31
K artu  A s -  T e lk o m s e l 0.35 0.33
XL -  E x c e lc o m in d o 0.31 0.31
M e n ta r i -  In d o s a t 0 .47 0.39
IM 3 -  In d o s a t 0 .37 0.20
Off-net Price/Cost Ratio (k) and On-net/Off-net Price Differential (d)
Mark-up in a product or service exists if price is set above its cost. Therefore, 
identifying mark-up requires information on cost and price. In the mobile 
cellular service, price information is available publicly but not for costs. The 
only available information related to cost is access charge, which represents 
the cost for terminating a call.
In this estimation, it is assumed that access charge is set at cost, and the cost 
for originating a call is identical with the cost for terminating a call. The 
reason for this assumption is that cost-based access price calculated by an 
International consultant is close to the airtime tariff used during 2000 and 
2007 as shown in Table 6.9. This airtime tariff reflects half the price of a 
mobile-to-mobile call of post-paid service. It implies that the cost of a call for 
post-paid service (origination and termination) is equal to twice of access 
charge.
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Table 6.9. Access Charge and Estimated Cost of a Call
A ccess Price
(Local C a ll-peak  
tim e)
C ost o f a C all 
(2 x A ccess price)
A irtim e  T ariff a p p lie d  in  2000-2007 Rp. 406 Rp. 812
O v u m 's  co s t-b a sed  ca lcu la tio n  
(based  on  in c u m b e n t da ta )
Rp. 449 Rp. 898
O v u m 's  co s t-b a sed  ca lcu la tio n  
(b ased  o n  bes t p rac tice  d a ta )
Rp. 381 R p. 762
The condition is different in pre-paid plans. Operators are allowed to set a 
higher pre-paid price than twice the air time tariff. Therefore, if the tariff of 
pre-paid plans is above Rp. 812,- per minute, it indicates that a mark-up is 
applied on top of cost. Thus, the ratio between off-net price and cost of a call, 
k, can be expressed as in Equation (6.29).
(6.29) k = Po——
In addition to off-net price-to-cost ratio, a ratio is also required between 
actual on-net price and off-net price. This ratio is called price differential d 
and can be formulized as in Equation (6.30).
(6.30) d =
P off-net
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Furthermore, Table 6.10 shows values for k and d for each pre-paid plan 
calculated based on average prices in 2006 and 2007.
Table 6.10. Off-net price/cost Ratio (k) and Actual Price Differential (d)
P r e - p a id  P la n
A v e r a g e  P r ic e  (R p )
k d
O f f - n e t O n - n e t
2006
S im p a t i  -  T e lk o m s e l 1,455 1,364 1.79 0.94
K a r tu  A s  -  T e lk o m s e l 2,011 1,068 2.48 0.53
XL -  E x c e lc o m in d o 1,466 1,202 1.81 0.82
M e n ta r i  -  I n d o s a t 1,450 1,398 1.79 0.96
IM 3  -  I n d o s a t 1,409 909 1.74 0.65
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S im p a t i  -  T e lk o m s e l 1,455 1,364 1.79 0.94
K a r tu  A s  -  T e lk o m s e l 2 ,182 1,091 2.69 0.50
XL -  E x c e lc o m in d o 1,366 935 1.68 0.68
M e n ta r i  -  I n d o s a t 1,364 1,364 1.68 1.00
IM 3 -  I n d o s a t 1,409 909 1.74 0.65
Source: various publications
Market Share (s)
Market share of pre-paid services indicates a ratio between subscriber 
numbers of certain pre-paid plans and total subscribers of pre-paid plans. 
Information about subscriber numbers can be collected from operators'
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quarterly and annual reports. Telkomsel, which has two major pre-paid 
plans, regularly publishes subscriber number of Simpati and Kartu-As. 
Furthermore, XL also normally states the number of its pre-paid subscribers 
in its reports. Similarly, Indosat also used to give detaileci information about 
Mentari and IMS's subscribers.
However, since 2006, Indosat does not provide details of subscribers of each 
pre-paid plan in its report but only the total of pre-paid subscribers. In the 
calculation, subscribers of Mentari and IM3 can be estimated by assuming 
they still have similar portion of the total of Indosat's subscribers as in the 
previous year. Subscriber details and estimated market share of these five 
pre-paid plans for 2006 and 2007 are presented in Table 6.11.
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Table 6.11. Estimated Market Share of Pre-paid Plans in 2006 and 2007
S ubscribers S ub scribers
P re-paid  P lan (m arket share) (m arket share)
2006 2007
S im p ati -  T e lk o m se l
21,378,000
(36.3%)
23,986,000
(28.2%)
Kartu A s - T e lk o m se l
12,557,000
(21.3%)
21,991,000
(25.9%)
XL - E xcelcom ind o
9,141,000
(15.5%)
14,988,000
(17.7%)
M entari -  In d osat
8,733,329*
(14.8%)
13,169,987*
(15.5%)
IM 3 -  In dosat
7,145,451*
(12.1%)
10,775,444*
(12.7%)
(*) Estimated based on previous year proportion
Source: Q uarterly and Annual Reports o f Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo
Fixed-Cost Factor (x)
Fixed-cost factor is defined as a ratio between fixed cost and total on-net cost 
of the pre-paid plan as shown in Equation (6.31).
1 f(6.31) x - ----
2 csflu
The denominator, on-net cost of the pre-paid plan, may be estimated based 
on available information on cost of a call (2c), market share (s), and on-net 
traffic ( c ju ) . However, the data about fixed cost ( f t )  is not available.
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Alternatively, this ratio can be approximated based on accounting data of the 
operator. In this case, fixed cost is represented by operating expense, which is 
relatively constant whether there is a production or not. Furthermore, on-net 
cost is replaced by operating cost which varies depend on total output or 
production. Operating cost can be calculated by excluding earning-before­
interest-tax-depreciation-amortization (EBITDA) from operating revenue. 
Based on this approach, the fixed-cost factor can be written as in Equation 
(6.32).
(6.32) x = operating_ expense 
operating cost
operating _ expense 
operating_ revenue- EBITDA
Furthermore, Table 6.12 presents the fixed cost factor for 2006 and 2007 of 
three major mobile cellular operators calculated based on the information in 
annual reports of Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo.
Table 6.12. Fixed Cost Factor
Operating
Expense
(billion Rps)
O perating
R evenue
(billion Rps)
EBITDA
(billion Rps)
X
2006
Telkom sel 12,836 29,145 20,737 0.763
Indosat 8,840.7 12,239.4 5,187.5 0.852
Excelcom indo (XL) 3,224 6,466 3,912 0.412
2007
Telkom sel 16,791 36,670 25,604 0.758
Indosat 11,968.9 16,488.5 8,714.8 0.769
Excelcom indo (XL) 4,480 8,365 3,509 0.461
Source: Annual Reports of Telkomsel (2007), Indosat (2007),and Excelcomindo (2007)
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6.3.2. Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 5 above, theoretically on-net price should be lower 
than off-net price (Berger 2004:14; Cricelli et al. 2005:4; Hoernig 2007:176). 
This on-net and off-net price differential is related to operators' strategy in 
competition. High off-net price may increase the switching cost for 
subscribers who have calling groups (family or friends) in that network, 
which makes subscribers less motivated to change subscription. Low on-net 
price may attract subscribers who have calling groups (family or friends) to 
join that network. The size of the gap between on-net and off-net prices is 
determined by several factors, including cost and demand of the service.
In the analysis, it is assumed that the existing off-net price has been at its 
optimal level. Furthermore, an optimal on-net price is reflected by its profit 
maximizing or non-cooperative level at a given off-net price. However, 
instead of on-net price, we prefer to use price differential reflecting a ratio 
between optimal on-net and off-net prices. Therefore, the purpose of this 
analysis is to examine the non-cooperative level of price differential of each 
pre-paid plan.
A possible collusive behavior is identified based on the principle of a simple 
game explained in Chapter 5 above. If actual price differentials of the 
competing pre-paid plans are altogether sufficiently higher than their own 
non-cooperative level, then it exhibits a collusive outcome. This collusive 
equilibrium may indicate a possible explicit or implicit collusive behavior by 
the competing operators. In contrast, it implies that if only one operator sets 
high price above its non-cooperative level, it does not show possible 
collusive conduct in the market.
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In this case, actual price differential is obtained by dividing of on-net and off- 
net prices. Furthermore, the non-cooperative price differential is calculated 
by applying several variables estimated above in Equation (6.17). 
Calculations of these actual and non-cooperative price differentials for 2006 
and 2007 are summarized in Table 6.13. The result indicates that actual on- 
net and off-net price differentials (dactuai) of most pre-paid plans are above 
their non-cooperative level (dmm-cooperatwe) except for XL-Bebas in 2007.
Table 6.13. On-net and off-net Price Differential
Pre-paid
Plan k
T raffic
ratio
(q i j / q n )
M arket
share
(s)
1 T Js i i  1 1 T j q i i  1 X
dm m -
co opera tive
dactuai
2006
S im p ati -  
T elkom sel
1.79 0.42 36.3% 2.0665 3.712 0.763 0.73 0.94
K artu  A s -  
T elkom sel
2.48 0.35 21.3% 2.4016 2.662 0.763 0.37 0.53
X L-Bebas -  
E xcelcom
1.81 0.31 15.5% 1.3334 1.300 0.412 0.57 0.82
M en ta ri -  
In d o sa t
1.79 0.47 14.8% 2.5412 2.999 0.852 0.46 0.96
I M 3 -
In d o sa t
1.74 0.37 12.1% 1.5331 2.390 0.852 0.54 0.65
2007
S im p ati -  
T elkom sel
1.79 0.42 28.2% 2.0665 3.712 0.758 0.68 0.94
K artu  A s -  
T elkom sel
2.58 0.35 25.9% 2.4016 2.662 0.758 0.38 0.50
X L-Bebas -  
E xcelcom
1.74 0.31 17.7% 1.3334 1.300 0.461 0.71 0.68
M e n ta ri -  
In d o sa t
1.73 0.47 15.5% 2.5412 2.999 0.769 0.54 1.00
I M 3 -
In d o sa t
1.74 0.37 12.7% 1.5331 2.390 0.769 0.54 0.65
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However, the non-cooperative on-net and off-net price differential of each 
pre-paid plan reflects only a mean of a statistical distribution. Since some of 
these actual price differentials are close to their non-cooperative level, we 
need to now whether these actual price differential are inside or outside of a 
certain range of that distribution. In this case, we are only concerned with the 
upper level of the non-cooperative price differential. If actual price 
differential is higher than the upper level, we conclude that on-net price is 
sufficiently high.
The upper level of these non-cooperative price differentials with 95 percent 
level of confidence is calculated by bootstrapping the data that is used for 
estimating elasticity. Bootstrap is a method to take a sample with 
replacement from available sample data. In this case, 1000 sub-samples are 
generated from the sample data and each sub-sample has independent and 
identical distribution. The purpose of applying this technique is to obtain 
variance of the mean average of the data. Upper level is defined as a 
maximum value over 95 percent of confidence interval. Figure 6.9 
graphically compares actual, upper-level and non-cooperative price 
differentials of five major pre-paid plans in 2006 and 2007.
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Figure 6.9. On-net/Off-net Price Differential (d)
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.1
Simpati Kartu- XL Mentari IM3 Simpati Kartu- XL Mentari IM3 
As As
2006 2007
□ d actual B d 95% upper level □ d non-cooperative
The figure above indicates that in 2006 on-net prices of all pre-paid plans 
were above what they should be. It demonstrates a collusive outcome which 
may imply that there was a possibility of collusive or price leadership 
behavior in 2006. Furthermore, in 2007 other pre-paid plans were relatively 
unchanged but XL had a lower actual price differential than its non- 
cooperative level. This indicates that in 2007 XL changed its strategy not to be 
a follower or not engage in collusive behavior. These two facts may support 
KPPU's allegation of price leadership or collusive pricing in the past.
Furthermore, the price differentials of four pre-paid plans offered by 
Telkomsel (Simpati and Kartu As) and Indosat (Mentari and IM3), which 
were relatively stable in these two observed years, may suggest that pricings 
of these two related operators had been coordinated. The unusual pricing 
behavior of Mentari may also support this allegation. In both years, Mentari
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of Indosat kept its on-net price sufficiently high above its non-cooperative 
level. In fact, considering its subscription demand is relatively elastic, 
lowering on-net price would gain more subscribers and increase profit. In the 
prisoners' dilemma game, Mentari's pricing strategy reflects a non-profit 
maximizing and non co-operative behavior leading to minimum pay-off. As 
a result, if this pricing is maintained, it may give adverse impact to Mentari 
itself. This conclusion may be in accordance with KPPU's allegation that 
there is an attempt to weaken Indosat and strengthen Telkomsel by Temasek. 
However, KPPU's analysis is mainly based on the growth of the investment 
performance of Indosat in base-transceiver station (BTS) development that 
was relatively stagnant compared to Telkomsel.
If this allegation is true, Temasek's strategy to weaken Indosat is difficult to 
understand. In term of ownership, Temasek indirectly holds majority shares 
in Indosat and minority shares in Telkomsel. Therefore, it may be profitable 
for Temasek to do the reverse —that is, strengthening Indosat and weakening 
Telkomsel.
One possible reason for this behavior is that there might be an internal policy 
of both operators not to compete in price. Simpati of Telkomsel and Mentari 
of Indosat are two major pre-paid plans and their on-net prices in peak hours 
are relatively similar. This coordination is possible since Temasek indirectly 
owns Telkomsel and Indosat. Temasek might expect a leader-follower effect 
where competitors would imitate their prices. It seems that this strategy 
worked in 2006 but not in 2007. After Hasnul Suhaimi18 led the company, XL
18 Hasnul Suhaimi used to be the President Director of Indosat. After resigning from Indosat, 
he became the President Director of Excelcomindo.
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reformed its positioning and pricing strategy in 2007 (Excelcomindo 2007:21). 
This new paradigm makes XL a real competitor rather than a market 
follower. Moreover, it seems that Indosat and Telkomsel could not respond 
this market situation quickly, perhaps because their strategic decision should 
indirectly be made with consultation with Temasek as an active shareholder.
6.4. Policy Implications
There are two lessons can be taken from the Indonesian mobile cellular case. 
The first is related to analysis of operators' pricing behavior. A conclusion 
about competitive or price leadership is not sufficiently justified if only based 
on price pattern or price movement analysis. There are several factors that 
may influence a price movement including cost, demand, and regulatory 
constraint.
The discussion above shows that allegation about collusive pricing or price 
leadership in the mobile cellular market based on off-net price of post-paid 
plans is misleading. Parallel movement of off-net price may give an 
impression that there has been a price leadership. In fact, post-paid price is 
regulated at a low ceiling level that makes operators tend to set their price at 
the ceiling. Consequently, a regulatory change that affects access charge, as 
happened in early 2004, leads to an increase in off-net prices of all operators. 
In this case, Telkomsel adjusted its tariff earlier than other operators. 
Therefore, it seems like a price leadership pattern. Actually, cost was the 
main factor driving parallel pricing in post-paid plans.
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In contrast, in pre-paid plans, price was regulated at a sufficiently high 
ceiling level. All operators set their price below this ceiling but with different 
patterns. Some pre-paid plans start from a high level and then gradually 
reduce the prices. Furthermore, the others maintain their price at moderate 
levels. In general, off-net prices tend to converge to a point but on-net prices 
are rather diverging. This pattern may give a figure that suggests 
competition in on-net price is getting more intense. In fact, the profit- 
maximizing analysis above reveals that most on-net prices of these pre-paid 
plans are still sufficiently above their non-cooperative level. It implies that 
despite price movement showing an aggressive pattern, it does not always 
indicate competitive level.
The second lesson is about price regulation. The case of pre-paid plans 
describe above shows that a high ceiling price may give operators sufficient 
room to set price at different levels. It seems that operators feel safe to set 
price at any level as long as it is still below ceiling. As a result, prices are 
above their profit-maximizing level. This finding may indicate that ceiling 
price regulation has encouraged operators to set high prices. It is similar with 
conclusions of some empirical studies about the collusive effect of price 
regulation as discussed in Hausman (2002), Knittel and Stango (2003), and 
Ma (2007).
Current development shows that, as there are some new operators entering 
the market, Indonesia's regulatory regime has eliminated price ceiling 
regulation in mobile cellular service. However, the new policy still controls 
pricing behavior by creating a floor price. The objective of this policy is to 
prevent predatory behavior by dominant operators. However, this restriction 
may deter limited price competition. Hausman (2002) suggested that price
211
regulation could be removed if there are four or five competing operators 
with relatively equal position in the market. This advice implies that in a 
relatively competitive market, retail price should not be constrained either by 
ceiling or floor price. Furthermore, any other retail pricing rule such as price 
filing should also be avoided. MacAvoy (1995) and Choi (2001) find that a 
requirement to file a proposal or to report a plan for price change has 
discouraged price competition in the US and Korea respectively. Price 
regulation may lead to market distortion or limiting competition. In terms of 
retail pricing, a continuous price monitoring by the regulator or competition 
commission may be more effective in controlling operators' pricing behavior.
In addition to pricing matters, there is another lesson about policy making 
process in the privatization that can be drawn from the case. The divestment 
of government's shares in Indosat in late 2002 raised controversies especially 
about transparency and accountability of the process. In addition, KPPU 
revealed another concern about potential breach of Anti-monopoly Law 
(Law No 5/1999) related to cross-ownership, merger, and acquisition 
particularly when the winner of the bidding was Singapore Technology 
Telemedia (STT) of the Temasek group. It was based on the fact that another 
Temasek affiliated company, Sing-Tel, also holds significant shares in 
Telkomsel, Indosat's main competitor.
At that time, the State Minister for State-Owned Company, Laksamana 
Sukardi, argued that there is no obligation for the government to have a 
consultation with the KPPU in a privatization process. The minister is 
formally right because in term of ex-ante regulatory process KPPU is only 
mandated by the law to provide non-binding policy advocacy to the 
government. It means that the government has discretion whether to follow 
KPPU's advice or not. The condition might have been different if KPPU's
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opinion on this cross-ownership issue was taken into account. Temasek 
would have not been able to buy Indosat and collusive pricing facilitated by 
cross-ownership would have not happened.
This experience shows that, in order to avoid potential anticompetitive 
conduct, competition analysis should also be included in the privatization or 
foreign direct investment review particularly if it leads to the cross­
ownership of the competing firms. For that reason, in the policy making 
process, the policy makers in Indonesia should always take into account the 
views of KPPU as the institution dealing with the competition law and 
policy.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
Two cases related to pricing behavior of dominant operators between 2006 
and 2007 have been examined in previous chapters. In both cases, the 
dominant operators are allegedly engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This 
chapter presents summary and conclusion of analyses, findings, and policy 
implications of these cases.
The first case is about the significant discount of the dial-up Internet bundle 
offered by a vertically integrated operator, Telkomnet. The main concern 
here is about possible predatory behavior behind the discount strategy. If the 
discount is not profitable and gives adverse impact to rivals, it indicates that 
Telkomnet may engage in predatory conduct. The analysis shows that 
Telkomnet's discount is not profitable as indicated by its inelastic demand. 
However, the discount does not have much effect on rivals, as revealed by 
the small cross-elasticity measure. For that reason, Telkomnet's discount 
program is not predatory behavior. Nevertheless, in the dynamic sense, the 
Telkomnet discount still may indicate a strategy to threaten competitors or to 
persuade the regulator not to regulate the market.
The second case deals with pricing in the mobile cellular market. The interest 
here is in possible collusive behavior among the competing operators, 
especially between Telkomsel and lndosat. Collusive outcome that may
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indicate a collusive behavior is identified if prices of the competing operators 
are above their profit-maximizing or non-cooperative level. The analysis 
finds that prices of mobile cellular services offered by Telkomsel and Indosat 
are sufficiently high above their non-cooperative level. In other word, prices 
of both operators are in the collusive equilibrium. Since these two operators 
were partially cross-owned by a foreign holding company, this finding may 
support an argument that cross-ownership of Telkomsel and Indosat has 
facilitated collusion.
These findings indicate that the purpose of this research to provide an 
alternative approach in analyzing these cases and to indicate lessons for 
regulatory and policy improvement has been accomplished. However, we 
still expect that the approach used in the analyses can be modified to 
investigate similar cases. Furthermore, although the approach requires more 
demanding effort especially related to modeling and demand information, it 
is still feasible to carry out and it may produce a theoretically accountable 
conclusion. Moreover, since the use of economic method in competition 
analysis is emerging, this alternative becomes more interesting to consider. 
Moreover, the research also contributes to the study of telecommunications 
competition in Indonesia, which is relatively rare.
In addition, in the analyses, both cases use a profit-maximizing assumption 
as a main hypothesis in identifying operators' behaviors. Price that 
maximizes individual profit is not an anticompetitive conduct as long as it is 
still in the corridor of price regulation. In contrast, a non-profit maximizing 
price may indicate an anticompetitive behavior. However, non-profit 
maximizing behavior is not a sufficient condition to conclude an illegal 
conduct. To determine whether an operator breaches the law, there should be
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a further investigation and deeper analyses of related documents and people 
involved.
Consequently, investigation based on the profit-maximizing approach does 
not conclusively determine an illegal behavior. Rather, it only gives initial or 
preliminary indication of a possible anticompetitive conduct. A finding about 
non-profit maximizing behavior can be used either as an entry point for 
further investigation or to initiate suggestion for regulatory improvement. 
Furthermore, one should also take into account whether the profit- 
maximizing assumption is relevant to the case under observation.
In addition to pricing behavior analysis, these two cases also give a general 
lesson about regulatory options. It provides two messages about regulations 
in two different market conditions that may be useful in regulatory making 
process.
In a market with one-way access structure, in some extent, government 
intervention through price-related (ex-ante) regulation may still be required. 
Competition in this market is asymmetric where there is a vertically 
integrated operator dominating upstream bottleneck market competes with 
several rivals in the downstream market requiring bottleneck product. An 
example of this market is as presented in the case of competition between 
Telkomnet and the independent ISPs. The purpose of the price regulation 
here is to prevent exclusionary conduct of the vertically integrated firm with 
dominant position in the upstream market that may give predatory effect to 
its downstream competitors. Access price regulation is common in this type 
of market and can also be combined with accounting separation to prevent 
internal transfer pricing or cross-subsidy. In addition, the regulation
216
requiring the dominant upstream operator to unbundle its last-mile to be 
available for the downstream competitors to lease at a certain regulated price 
may also be relevant in some situation. However, in the case that price- 
related regulation could not be effectively implemented, regulator may have 
to find a way to make by-passing the bottleneck network possible. The logic 
of this regulatory strategy is that when the upstream market faces 
competition or close substitution, the bottleneck owner would be less 
motivated to refuse interconnection demand from the downstream 
competitors or to implement cross-subsidy for predatory purpose.
In contrast, the regulatory option is different for a market with two-way 
access in which the competing firms are relatively symmetric and the market 
is relatively competitive. The competition in mobile cellular market in 
Indonesia as discussed in this thesis is one instance of the type of this market. 
In this market, due to asymmetric information, regulator usually fails to set 
regulated price close to competitive level. As a result, the competing parties 
tend to set prices at or slightly below the regulated price to maximize their 
joint profit. For that reason, it is often said that price regulation may facilitate 
collusive pricing. Furthermore, in order to eliminate distortion due to 
inappropriate price regulation, it seems more appropriate to relax price 
regulation and let the market works. Consequently, the competition 
authority should play an active role to monitor and supervise pricing 
behavior of the competing firms (ex-post regulation) to ensure that the 
competing parties do not jointly exercise their power.
The following consecutive sections briefly present a summary of the cases 
and findings.
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7.1. Case 1: Telkomnet's Discount on Dial-up Internet Service
One-way access structure is a condition when there is a vertically integrated 
operator competing in the downstream market and dominating the upstream 
facility that is also essential for downstream rivals. Competition in this access 
structure raises a concern about possible exclusionary behavior of the 
vertically integrated operator toward its downstream competitors. In 
general, sabotage and price discrimination are two common forms of 
exclusionary behavior.
In one-way access, the vertically integrated operator can bundle upstream 
and downstream products to implement price discrimination in providing 
upstream service between its subsidiary and rivals. However, price 
discrimination does not always imply an anticompetitive conduct, but can 
also be a profit maximizing strategy. It needs a careful analysis to determine 
whether a bundling practice is anticompetitive or not. Price discrimination 
through bundling may indicate a predatory conduct if the price of the bundle 
is sufficiently lower than the sum of prices of elements in the bundle.
The dial-up Internet service market is one example of a one-way access 
structure. In the Indonesian dial-up Internet market, Telkom acts as a 
vertically integrated operator. It offers dial-up Internet service through its 
subsidiary, Telkomnet. Furthermore, it also provides a local telephone 
service, which is an essential facility for dial-up Internet service. In 
competing with independent Internet Service Providers (ISP), Telkomnet 
offers a flexible dial-up Internet service called Telkomnet Instan. This service 
has several features such as: it does not require prior registration; it does not
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charge a monthly fee; it integrates Internet and telephone bills; and it bundles 
Internet service and local telephone service. These advantages make 
Telkomnet Instan a popular dial-up Internet service even though its regular 
tariff is relatively high.
An anticompetitive issue emerges when Telkomnet launched a long 
promotion program for weekend usage named WeekendNet. This program 
offers a significant discount to Telkomnet's dial-up Internet bundle that 
makes its bundle price close to the regular price of one element in the bundle, 
local telephone service. This pricing may imply that Telkomnet charges 
Internet service at a very low level or close to zero. For that reason, the 
discount program raises a concern whether this long promotion program 
involves below-cost pricing, which is predatory.
Common analysis related to bundle and predatory behavior usually requires 
accurate cost information. However, since there is no precise information 
about Telkomnet's Internet cost, cost-based analysis cannot give a convincing 
conclusion. Alternatively, the profit sacrifice approach can identify 
predatory pricing behavior. Using this concept, if Telkomnet's discount 
program leads to a lower profit and gives an adverse effect to rivals, it may 
indicate a predatory behavior. The analysis uses non-profit maximizing price 
to reflect a price that sacrifices profit. Therefore, we develop a simple profit- 
maximizing model of competition in the Indonesian dial-up Internet market. 
Furthermore, it also uses cross-price elasticity between Telkomnet's price and 
ISP demand as an indicator of Telkomnet price's effect on rivals.
The model is analyzed based on actual traffic data provided by the 
Multimedia Division of Telkom. The data contains the daily traffic of
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Telkomnet and several ISPs. The analysis uses log linear regression that 
relates actual traffic data and price. We find that Telkomnet's dial-up Internet 
bundle has an in-elastic demand. It implies that in this demand condition 
Telkomnet's discount is not a profit-maximizing pricing. Furthermore, by 
regressing aggregate traffic of ISPs and Telkomnet's price, we see that the 
cross-price elasticity is relatively small. It means that Telkomnet's price 
change does not have a significant effect on rivals' traffic. Overall, we 
conclude that even though Telkomnet's price discount sacrifices profit, it is 
not necessarily a predatory behavior because the traffic of the rivals is not 
affected.
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that lately Telkomnet has 
continued to create other promotion discounts not in the regions where 
cross-price elasticity is relatively high (West Java and Central Java), but in 
areas where that cross-price effect is quite small (Jakarta and East Java). In 
addition, since Telkomnet's average daily traffic has been much greater 
(around 50 times) than the total traffic of the ISPs, it seems unreasonable to 
acquire that small portion of market through risky anticompetitive conduct. 
Moreover, low cross-price elasticity indicates that the products are 
sufficiently differentiated to make the market quite segmented. In that 
market condition, price might be not an important instrument for 
competition and price reduction should be appreciated because it benefits 
consumers with less negative effect on market competition.
However, a short-run analysis might not give a complete explanation of the 
predatory issue. Some theories based on a dynamic game may give a 
different perspective. In dynamic predatory pricing theory, Telkomnet's 
discount can be interpreted as a strategy to threaten rivals. Furthermore, in
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the contestable market theory, the discount can be assumed as an effort to 
persuade the regulator how competitive is the market so that it does not 
require regulatory intervention, or to signal potential entrants not to enter 
the market because it is unprofitable. For that reason, although Telkomnet's 
discount program is not anticompetitive conduct in a static sense, the 
regulator still needs to be aware of Telkom's behavior.
There are several implications related to this finding. Firstly, Telkomnet's 
discount strategy may imply that the local telephone tariff is sufficiently 
profitable so it can subsidize the low bundling price. It may contradict the 
common perception that the regulated local telephone tariff is still below its 
cost. For that reason, the regulator should consider carefully any Telkom 
proposal to increase the local telephone tariff.
Secondly, the regulator should encourage Telkom to provide regular low 
Internet prices especially in any off-peak times. Alternatively, the regulator 
can also force Telkom to give equal opportunity for the ISPs to provide 
similar bundling products. It is in line with Telkom's WeekendNet objective 
to educate people to use the Internet.
Thirdly, the regulator should encourage any technology that reduces the 
dependency of Internet users on the bottleneck, local telephone network. 
Currently, there have been several options for technology used to access 
Internet services such as through mobile cellular service, cable television, and 
Wi-Fi (wireless fidelity). However, they mostly are only available in some big 
cities. Even if they can be accessed from rural areas, the price is still high. 
Alternatively, government should support cheaper technology that can 
penetrate to rural or most residential areas such as community Internet
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networks, known as RT/RW Net. This method is quite effective to by-pass the 
bottleneck network and lowers the cost to access the Internet.
7.2. Case 2: Pricing Behavior of Mobile Cellular Operators
Two-way access structure is a situation where competing operators need 
access to each other's networks. This inter-dependency motivates these 
competing operators to cooperate. However, this cooperation may lead to 
collusion causing a high retail price. Some papers that deal with access 
pricing in two-way access indicate that collusive outcome in retail price can 
be achieved indirectly through negotiation in determining access charge. The 
reason is that access charge is a component of retail price and an increase in 
access charge will raise retail price. However, in some developing countries 
like Indonesia, the regulator still regulates access charge. It implies that 
creating collusive retail price through access price negotiation is less likely. 
Alternatively, operators still can achieve collusive outcome directly through 
coordination or mutual understanding in setting retail price. Some papers 
dealing with the collusion issue identify several factors that may facilitate 
collusion including symmetry, cross-ownership, and ineffective regulations.
Mobile cellular service is one instance of a market with two-way access 
structure. Three major operators, Telkomsel, Indosat, and Excelcomindo, 
dominate the mobile cellular market in Indonesian. Two foreign companies 
under a Singaporean holding company, Temasek, partially own the two 
biggest mobile cellular operators, Telkomsel and Indosat. This ownership 
structure may be risky for market competition. In late 2006, LSP-BUMN, a 
non-governmental organization, filed an allegation of price fixing by
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Telkomsel and Indosat to the Competition Commission (KPPU). They used 
the uniform pattern of mobiles to fix prices of Telkomsel and Indosat as the 
main argument. KPPU started formal investigation in early 2007 and 
announced its findings in late 2007. KPPU concluded that partial cross­
ownership breaches the law and it ordered Temasek to divest its share either 
in Telkomsel or Indosat. Furthermore, KPPU also found that Telkomsel was 
engaged in an attempt to monopolize the Indonesian mobile cellular market.
However, some experts opposed KPPU's decisions and analyses. One of the 
objections was about KPPU's price analysis. KPPU observes operators' 
behavior mainly based on movement, growth rate, and statistical differences 
of the prices. Then, it concludes that there is a parallel pricing and price 
leadership conduct in the market. Some of the economists argue that parallel 
pricing does not conclusively indicate price leadership behavior. There are 
some factors those may affect price movement such as cost and demand. For 
example, regulatory and cost changes are two major factors that make tariffs 
in the competing post-paid plans move in the same direction. In addition, 
KPPU also compares the mobile cellular tariff in Indonesia with several 
comparable countries. It then argues that the price in Indonesia is relatively 
high. In fact, benchmarking can be misleading because each country may 
have different characteristics not only in macroeconomic indicators, but also 
geographic, demographics, consumer behavior, and regulations.
This research provides an alternative price analysis by using another 
approach and a different focus. It mainly examines prices of pre-paid plans 
in peak time because it has around 96 percent of the mobile cellular market 
share. Retail price in pre-paid plans is linear, meaning that subscribers do not 
need to pay a monthly subscription fee, only a usage fee. Furthermore, retail
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price in pre-paid plans can also be discriminated based on call termination. It 
implies that the price for a call ending in the same network (on-net price) can 
be different to the one terminating in rivals' networks (off-net price). 
Theoretically, in a market with this retail price characteristic, on-net price 
should be lower than off-net price. The size of the gap between on-net and 
off-net prices is determined by some factors including demand.
The data shows that on-net and off-net prices of major pre-paid plans,
Simpati of Telkomsel and Mentari of Indosat, are relatively similar. The small 
on-net and off-net price differential of both competing operators raises a 
question about possible collusive pricing in setting on-net prices. The concept 
of the prisoners' dilemma game is used in the analysis. Referring to this 
game, an operator can set its price either selfishly or co-operatively. These 
operators will get higher profit if they could co-operate in determining 
prices. However, co-operation without enforceable power can be risky 
because operators may betray each other to get the highest profit at the 
expense of rivals. Therefore, without co-operation it is safer for these 
operators to behave selfishly. In this context, selfish behavior is interpreted as 
pricing that maximizes individual profit. This non-cooperative principle is 
applied in analyzing possible collusive behavior in on-net pricing. In brief, a 
collusive behavior likely exists if competing operators altogether set their 
prices above their non-cooperative levels.
In the analysis, we develop a simple mathematical model of the mobile 
cellular market. In order to calculate profit maximizing or non-cooperative 
price of each pre-paid plan, the model requires several sets of data related to 
market share, price, cost, traffic, and demand. Unfortunately, most of these 
data are not available due to company confidentiality policy. Alternatively,
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information on traffic and demand elasticity is estimated based on the data 
gathered during a consumer preference survey in Jakarta between April and 
May 2008. The result of the analysis shows that in 2006 on-net prices of pre­
paid plans offered by these three dominant operators are above their non- 
cooperative level. Furthermore, in 2007 only the on-net prices of Telkomsel 
and Indosat's pre-paid plans are well above their non-cooperative level.
This result indicates that in 2006 market was in a collusive equilibrium. This 
evidence may reveal that there was a price leadership or collusive behavior 
in 2006. It is in line with KPPU's allegation related to the mobile cellular case. 
Furthermore, in 2007 only Telkomsel and Indosat maintained collusive 
outcome in their prices. In addition, during these years, Mentari of Indosat 
set quite a high price above its non-cooperative level. Since Mentari's 
elasticity of demand is relatively elastic, this high price strategy may lead to 
self-destruction. It seems that Mentari kept its price high in order to avoid 
competition with Telkomsel. Overall, these findings may support KPPU's 
claim about a possibility of price coordination facilitated by cross-ownership 
of these two competing operators. For that reason, KPPU's order to eliminate 
cross-ownership is considered appropriate.
Furthermore, from the regulatory point of view, prices of the mobile cellular 
service are still in the corridor of retail price regulation. At this time, the price 
of pre-paid plans is regulated at a high ceiling level. Even though all 
operators set their prices below the maximum allowed level, the high ceiling 
price might give incentive to the operators to set a relatively high price above 
their non-cooperative level. Similar to findings in some empirical studies, 
this Indonesian case also shows that ineffective regulation can facilitate 
collusive outcome.
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In the new price regulation, the price ceiling has been eliminated and 
replaced with a floor price rule. Since there are some new operators in the 
mobile cellular market, the regulator seems less worried about the threat of 
collusive behavior. Rather, it pays more attention to possible predatory 
behavior of the incumbents toward new entrants. However, price floor 
regulation may also carry the risk of deterring price competition. For that 
reason, we suggest removing not only price ceiling but also price floor and 
any pricing constraints that may deter competition, such as the requirement 
to file a proposal before applying a new tariff. In an emerging competitive 
market, the role of price regulation to control operators' anticompetitive 
behavior can be relaxed and substituted by regular market monitoring by the 
regulator as well as the competition commission.
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Appendix 1
Questions in Consumer Preference Survey
General Information about the Respondent
1. In what year you were bom? ..............................
2. Sex Male / Female
3. What is the best description about your main occupation?
□ High School Student
□ University Student
□ Employee (private / government)
□ Self-employed / Entrepreneur
□ Home Duty
□ Un-employed / Job-Seeker
4. In what suburb ('kelurahan / kecamatan’) do you live? ......................................
5. What is the best description about how you live?
□ 1 live alone □ I live with relative who take-care of me
□ I live with my family □ I live with friends / others (non relative)
6. Please approximate your monthly household income:
□ less than Rp. 1 million
□ between Rp. 1 million and Rp. 3 million
□ between Rp. 3 million and Rp. 5 million
□ between Rp. 5 million and Rp. 7 million
□ more than Rp. 7 million
□ I prefer not to answer
7. How many times in a week do you come to this place (the place of survey is
conducted)?.......
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Information about Subscription and Usage of Pre-paid Plan of GSM 
Mobile Service
8. What are three most important factors for you in choosing a pre-paid plan of GSM
mobile service?
□ Low on-net tariff
□ Similar to the one used by family or friends
□ Signal Quality
□ Low SMS tariff
□ Additional features (data, internet, etc)
□ Network coverage
□ O ther........................................... (-please specif}/)
9. What is your main pre-paid plan?
□ Simpati (Telkomsel)
□ Kartu As (Telkomsel)
□ XL-Bebas (Excelcomindo)
□ Mentari (Satelindo-lndosat)
□ IM3-Smart (Indosat)
□ O ther............................................(please specif/)
10. Do you use other pre-paid plan of mobile cellular service? Yes / No
If Yes, what is that pre-paid plan?..................
What is the main reason you subscribe other pre-paid plan?
□ Cheap
□ Coverage
□ Back-up
□ O ther........................................... (please specify)
11. How much is your monthly expenditure for main pre-paid plan? Rp......
How much is your monthly expenditure for secondary pre-paid plan (if any)?
12. Please indicate average duration per outgoing call you make by using your
main pre-paid plan
□ 1 minute
□ 2 minute
□ 3 minute
□ 4 minute
□ 5 minute
□ O ther..................minute
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13. How many outgoing calls do you make by using your main pre-paid plan in a
day?
14. How many percent do you use your pre-paid plan to make outgoing calls
during peak hours (between 07:00 and 22:00) in a day?
15. Please approximate your daily usage pattern of main pre-paid plan as indicated
in the table below
A verage T raffic pattern
Peak hours  
(07:00-22:00)
O ff-p ea k  hours  
(23:00-07:00)
Call to the same network (on-net calls) % %
Call to other GSM networks (off-net calls) % %
Call to Fixed-line % %
TOTAL 100 % 100 %
16. What is your reaction if tariff for a call to the same network (on-net call) reduces 
as indicated in the table below?
P ercentage o f  the decrease o f on -n et  
price
P ercentage o f  in crease  in  u sage  
(vo ice call)
10% decrease of on-net price %
20% decrease of on-net price %
30% decrease of on-net price %
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Appendix 2 
Survey Statistics
Locations o f su rv ey
M u n ic ip a lity S u b -D istrict /  S u b -u rb an  / A rea
East Jakarta Cililitan, C ondet, C im anggis, 
R aw am angun, P u lom as
S o u th  Jakarta R agunan, C ilandak, Lebak Bulus, 
K ebayoran Lam a, K un ingan , Senayan  
(G atot Subroto), L enteng  A g u n g  & 
D epok
C en tra l Jakarta C em paka Putih , M enteng , K ebon Sirih, 
Senen, Pasar Baru, Roxy
W est Jakarta Grogol, Tanjung D uren , K em anggisan , 
M eruva, K em bangan
N o rth  Jakarta K elapa gading, P edongkelan , S un ter 
Podom oro, S unter Jaya, M angga D ua
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Demographie Illustration of the Respondents
Occupation
Self
employed
Student
1%
Student
3 2 %
Private
employee
4 0 %
Gov't
employee
19%
Expenditure >150
(x R p.1,000) 1 5 o/o
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Choice and Im portant Factors of M obile Cellular Service
Choice
M 3
21%
Mentari
16%
S impati 
37%
18%
Kartu As 
8%
Important Factors for a mobile service
Tariff, Quality,
76% 75%
C overage, 
52%
Choice and Reason to Use Secondary M obile Cellular Service
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